Proposal: Scroll DAO Constitution

Proposals
1

Revised version

Is in the comments

Overview

This post is meant to present the first version of the Scroll DAO Constitution to the community and delegates. The hope was to have this ready in time for a February 1st vote, though given the timing we recognize that might not be enough time for feedback.

This constitution, as stated below, is meant to be a living document that will evolve alongside the evolution of the DAO, Foundation, and ecosystem as a whole.

Scroll DAO Constitution

This constitution (“Constitution”) sets out the key governance principles, guidelines and processes by which Scroll DAO shall operate. While the Constitution is intended to clearly outline the governance principles and processes of the Scroll DAO, it is recognized that this is a living document that will evolve given our commitment to staying curious and continuing to experiment with approaches that may develop over time as needed.

Article I: Governance Principles

The Scroll DAO shall adopt these key principles, which reflect its governance philosophy:

  • Progressive Decentralization: With decentralization as our north star, Scroll DAO has embarked on a multi-year journey to bring that reality to fruition.

  • Global, Inclusive Participation: Scroll DAO strives to build an intentional global community of builders and community members from all over the world, where everyone has a chance to contribute to the future of the Scroll ecosystem.

  • Accountability: Scroll DAO prioritizes collaborative decision making that is fair, transparent, and accountable, whilst upholding the Scroll protocol’s best interests.

  • Staying Curious: Scroll DAO aims to constantly embrace new ideas and push boundaries, while balancing this with focused and empirically informed decisions.

Article II: Governance Components

1. SCR Holders.

Anyone can participate in the Scroll DAO through holding Scroll’s native token $SCR (“SCR holders”) and by making proposals and/or voting on proposals put forth in the Scroll DAO’s forum and community channels.

2. Delegates.

SCR holders who are unable to participate directly may choose to delegate their power to make proposals and vote on proposals to a Delegate of their choice, who would represent them in the governance process.

3. Smart Contracts.

Several smart contracts are utilized to operate Scroll DAO’s governance processes. These include:

  • Token: Tracks the balances of token holders and voting power of delegates.

  • Governor: Provides the main access control logic of the governance system. Its primary job is to process proposals and their associated votes in order to determine whether they succeed or fail.

  • Timelock: Receives instructions from the governor for successful proposals. Provides a time delay on proposals to give time for stakeholders to respond, should it be needed, then executes the instruction.

  • Modules: Provide optional additional voting strategies (e.g. introducing multiple-choice voting proposals) to the governor.

  • Security Council: A trusted multisig that has admin privileges over many parts of the system that require manual execution (non-emergency protocol upgrades) or to intervene as a last resort (emergency protocol upgrades).

The block addresses can be viewed on Scroll Scan here:

Contract View on Block Explorer
Token Scrollscan link
Governor Scrollscan link
Timelock Scrollscan link

4. Governance Facilitators.

The Governor Manager and Governor Admin act as administrators to facilitate the governance processes of Scroll DAO and they have certain permissions on the Governor smart contract, which shall be exercised in the interest of the Scroll DAO and in good faith. See Article IV for more details.

5. Security Council.

The Security Council is a committee of 12 members, who are signers of a multi-sig wallet and whose primary goal is to safeguard the security, integrity and efficient operations of the Scroll zkEVM rollup. See Article V for more details.

6. Scroll Foundation.

Scroll Foundation, a Cayman Islands foundation company, serves as a steward for the Scroll DAO, and is a legal entity that facilitates operational and administrative objectives of the Scroll DAO. See Article VI for more details.

Article III: DAO Governance Proposal and Voting Procedures

1. DAO Proposal Types.

The Scroll DAO may, from time to time, make proposals to enact decisions relating to the future of Scroll protocol.

Scroll DAO may make these 4 types of proposal:

  • DAO Treasury Transfers (e.g. grants and DAO transfers)
  • Changes to Governance Parameters (e.g. upgrade governor)
  • Protocol Upgrades (e.g. non-emergency protocol upgrade)
  • Social Ratifications (e.g. changes to this Constitution, updates to DAO governing documents and processes)

2. Proposal Drafting and Creation Phase.

DAO proposals may be created in accordance with the following process:

  • Any SCR holder or Delegate meeting the specified proposal threshold (a “proposer”) may draft proposals and put them up on the Scroll DAO forum for the community’s viewing and consideration.
  • A proposal shall pass a ‘temperature check’ mechanism, which requires at least 3 endorsements from Verified Delegates on the Scroll DAO forum, in order to proceed.
  • After passing the temperature check the Foundation’s Governance Team may choose to include the proposal in the next voting cycle, in their sole discretion and acting in good faith.

3. Voting Phase.

After the proposal has been selected to be included in the next voting cycle, the voting period begins. The voting period will take place during a period of 10 days:

  • Voting delay: This is a 3-day period that will occur once the proposal is first visible on the platform. Participants may acquire and delegate their votes during this period. At the end of this 3-day period, a snapshot is taken to show how much voting power each address has.
  • Voting period: This is a 7-day period after the snapshot where participants can vote on the proposal.

4. Voting Quorum.

Parameter Description Value
Standard Quorum % of total supply that must vote for, against or abstain for a standard vote proposal to meet quorum and proceed to voting 0.21% of total supply (i.e. 2,100,000 SCR)
Supermajority Quorum % of total supply that must vote for, against or abstain for a supermajority vote proposal to meet quorum and proceed to voting 0.21% of total supply (i.e. 2,100,000 SCR)

5. Voting Approval Threshold.

A proposal may require standard vote approval or supermajority vote approval, depending on the type of proposal. These are the description and parameters for meeting a standard vote approval or supermajority vote approval.

Parameter Description Value
Standard Vote Approval % determined by:
- votes cast as “For” the proposal; divided by
- votes cast as “For” and votes cast as “Against” the proposal,
in order for a standard proposal to be approved and proceed to execution		 51%
Supermajority Vote Approval % determined by:
- votes cast as “For” the proposal; divided by
- votes cast as “For” and votes cast as “Against” the proposal,
in order for a supermajority proposal to be approved and proceed to execution		 76%

A proposal shall meet the specified voting approval threshold stated in governor parameters. Currently, the voting approval threshold is set as follows:

Proposal Type Voting Approval Threshold
DAO Treasury Transfer Standard Vote
Changes to Governance Parameters Supermajority Vote
Protocol Upgrade Supermajority Vote
Social Ratifications
(i) Changes to this Constitution
(ii) Updates to DAO governing documents and processes		 (i) Supermajority Vote
(ii) Standard Vote

6. Execution Phase.

In the event a proposal does not pass its approval threshold, it fails and nothing happens.

In the event a proposal passes its approval threshold, one of two things can happen:

  • Timelock execution (Onchain): Votes that can be executed by the timelock are sent to the Timelock contract to be passed. Thereafter, after it has been in the timelock for three days, it will be executed manually by the Governance Manager.

  • Enacted by the relevant stakeholders (Offchain): Depending on what the proposal concerns, it could be enacted by the relevant party (i.e. Security Council, Foundation Governance team, etc.).

Article IV: Governance Facilitators

1. Governor Manager and Governor Admin.

The Governor Manager and Governor Admin are multi-sig wallet addresses that have been given additional permissions on the Governor smart contract to facilitate the governance processes of Scroll DAO.

2. Governor Manager.

The Governor Manager has the ability to create proposals regardless of whether its voting power meets the proposal threshold. The Governor Manager is controlled by the Foundation’s governance team. This team works with and acts on behalf of and in the interest of the Scroll DAO in good faith.

3. Governor Admin.

The Governor Admin shall have the ability to enable, disable and modify certain governance processes and parameters in the interest of the DAO and acting in good faith. The Governor Admin will be controlled by the Security Council (see Article V below for more details) and will have the ability to bypass the governance process for the following actions:

  • Update the deadline of an active proposal;
  • Update the voting delay;
  • Update the voting period;
  • Update the proposal threshold;
  • Update the admin address (replaces the current admin for a new one);
  • Update the manager address;
  • Update the proposal type of an active proposal;
  • Cancel a proposal;
  • Create or modify a proposal type (altering quorum and approval thresholds); and
  • Enable or disable a voting module (external contracts that allow you to override the proposal creation and voting logic to enable new types of votes).

Article V: The Security Council

1. The Security Council.

The Security Council is a committee of 12 members, who are signers of a multi-sig wallet. The primary goal of the Security Council is to safeguard the security, integrity and efficient operations of the Scroll zkEVM rollup. The Security Council oversees protocol upgrades, emergency response and other critical decisions impacting the Scroll ecosystem.

2. Emergency and Non-Emergency Permissions.

The Security Council acts as a 9/12 multisig and safeguards the Scroll protocol using certain Emergency and Non-Emergency permissions as follow:

  • Non-Emergency protocol upgrades
    • Includes routine software and protocol upgrades, routine maintenance, and other parameter adjustments.
    • At inception, these upgrades are executed manually. Non-emergency upgrades are almost always voted on first via the governance process. Then, pending a successful vote, the Security Council executes these protocol upgrades manually.
  • Emergency protocol upgrades
    • The Security Council can skip the governance process to make an emergency upgrade to the protocol. They would then be required to report on this activity after-the-fact to the community.
    • These situations might include (but are not limited to) any incidents that may impact the security or liveness of the Scroll chain that require protocol upgrades.
  • Full admin controls over the governance system
    • The Security Council serves as the Governor Admin to the Governor contract and has the ability to change the governance process to ensure the correctness and safety of Scroll governance, in the interest of the DAO and acting in good faith, as described in Article IV above.

3. Membership and Appointment.

  • The Security Council is composed of 12 participants — each a signatory in the 9/12 multisig, with no more than 2 persons from the same or affiliated organization. Members have been thoughtfully selected for their (1) technical competency (and proficiency in rollup and Scroll technology), (2) reputation as trusted individuals/entities with demonstrated alignment with Scroll’s vision, (3) geographic diversity, and (4) aligned incentives (e.g. no conflicts of interest).
  • The members of the Security Council are divided into two cohorts, Cohort A and Cohort B. Cohort A shall have an initial term of 18 months, with subsequent terms of 12 months each. Cohort B shall have an initial term and subsequent terms of 12 months each.
  • At the end of term of each Cohort, the members of that Cohort may be re-appointed and new members may be appointed by Scroll Foundation.
  • During the term of the Cohort, members of the Security Council may be removed by Scroll Foundation, where it is deemed necessary to safeguard the best interest of the Scroll DAO and Scroll Foundation.

Article VI: Scroll Foundation

1. Scroll Foundation.

  • Scroll Foundation is a Cayman Islands foundation company that serves as the steward and driving force behind the Scroll ecosystem. Its core mission is to foster transparency, community engagement, and to decentralize governance. It is the legal entity that represents the Scroll DAO and can facilitate operational and administrative objectives of the Scroll DAO.

2. Core Activities.

The core activities of Scroll Foundation include the following:

  • Foster ecosystem growth through strategic initiatives, such as grant programs;
  • Support and fund research and development activities and projects, focussed on zero knowledge technology for blockchains and governance of digital communities;
  • Educate the public regarding Scroll DAO and zero knowledge technology for blockchains;
  • Support and facilitate governance infrastructure, social media interactions, and various services for Scroll DAO (including engaging officers, employees, contractors, and service providers to carry out the operational and administrative objectives of the Scroll DAO); and
  • Facilitate compliance with relevant laws and regulations.

3. Board of Directors.

  • Scroll Foundation is governed by a Board of Directors, which acts as a collective body to oversee and handle the operational and administrative aspects of the Scroll Foundation and to support the activities of the Scroll DAO.
  • SCR holders’ interests are represented by the Scroll Foundation with respect to contractual and legal processes. Directors are authorized to take any actions reasonably necessary on behalf of the Scroll Foundation to give effect to a vote of the SCR holders, including passing any director resolution to memorialize such vote.
  • Directors must act honestly and in good faith in the best interests of the Foundation.
  • Directors may be appointed or removed from time to time in accordance with the articles of association of Scroll Foundation (“Articles of Association”). If there is any conflict between the provisions of the Constitution and the Articles of Association shall prevail.
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|i had assumed Scroll was configured the same as Arbitrum where one MUST delegate (to self or others) to be able to vote. Is that not the case here? If holders can vote without (self)delegating, then this wording is fine. If voters need to (self)delegate, the this paragraph could use some rewording.

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Having reviewed, I think these might be updates worth considering:

  • Selegation mechanism - specifically whether self-delegation is required for voting, similar to Arbitrum’s model (as @danielo suggests).
  • Security Council structure - while robust with 9/12 multisig, could be improved with clearer definitions around emergency powers and affiliated organization criteria.

Additionally, it might be worth considering adding targeted milestones for progressive decentralization to provide more transparency around the transition of powers from Foundation to DAO and desired timelines.

HTH! Thanks for taking the initiative to put this together!

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After reviweing the proposal Ethereum TGU is happy to endorse it and hopes the the rest of the delegate pool feels the same way in order to move the proposal for voting in the February cycle.

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Thanks for calling this out @danielo and @Sov - we can adjust the language to make it clear that one must delegate to themselves

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Is there anything in specific you want more clarity on? Those powers are only meant to be triggered when delaying to DAO vote would pose significant risk. Are you requesting to have a definition of scenarios (which might be tough as what if a new emergency emerges)? If you can point to any docs in other ecosystems that we can strive for would be helpful. I’ll bring this back to the team regardless.

I do want to produce this during this year, but two things come to mind. 1) A decentralization roadmap should be a standalone document I get that web3 constitutions don’t adhere to the rigor of national constitutions in the sense of being binding legal docs.

  1. Given how early days it is, it feels premature to create a decentralization roadmap. We can outline targeted milestones that will showcase that we are decentralizing (something I want to focus on in the next Co-Creation Cycle this year) and potential incorporate those in the future once we (delegates, foundation, and wider community) all have higher confidence in the timing of achieving this. In my opinion, the immediate priority is to get the DAO functioning well, to pass and launch our first programs, to strive for operational excellence, sort out treasury management, etc. As we make progress on these, the timeline for decentralization will become clearer.

We are also scoping out some a research project that would produce a decentralization checklist. Something that, combined with a Co-Creation Cycle to define specific milestones and outcomes we want to see as part of the transition, can create a meaningful roadmap that we can adhere to. I feel if we put something together now, it’s purely aspirational and will need to change significantly.

My hope is that we do 1, if not 2 more Co-Creation Cycles this year (Jun/Jul-ish and/or Nov/Dec-ish). My proposal would be to focus on of those purely on progressive decentralization. More specifically, I’d suggest that we do the Jun/Jul one on strategic deliberation and priority setting for the DAO given how the first half of 2025 went, and then focus the second on creating a decentralization roadmap with clear milestones and objectives to hit.

These are my personal views here so happy to discuss more on these weeks gov calls too.

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Sure, sorry for the confusion. I don’t think we need a list of all scenarios. It might just be helpful to make sure we’re clear on what constitutes significant risk and outline post action accountability (post mortem reports, etc) and what stakeholder notification looks like.

An example that might be helpful is how OP defines aspects of this for their Security Council: Security Council: Internal Operating Procedures — Phase 0 - #5 by Alisha - Internal Operating Procedures - Optimism Collective

Love that we are being intentional in developing this and I agree that the immediate focus should be operationalizing. I do think that starting to chart out high level milestones as the work on research and development is being done would be helpful as we proceed.

Thanks for all the work you are doing!

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As an advocate for decentralization and community-driven innovation in Web3, I wholeheartedly endorse the Scroll DAO Constitution and will vote in favor of its adoption. My journey—from founding mxweb3 to launching BandaWeb3 and participating in Ethereum Mexico —has been rooted in fostering inclusive ecosystems where builders thrive, security is prioritized, and experimentation flourishes. The Constitution’s principles of progressive decentralization, global participation, and accountability resonate deeply with my work empowering Latin America’s Web3 community through education, events, and collaborative frameworks.

Scroll’s commitment to balancing bold experimentation with rigorous security aligns perfectly with my focus on creating scalable, privacy-first infrastructure for developers. As a delegate, I will champion initiatives that empower builders, strengthen community governance, and safeguard user privacy, ensuring Scroll remains a leader in the zkEVM space. Let’s collaborate to turn this vision into reality—together, we can build a resilient, open ecosystem where innovation knows no borders. ¡Adelante!

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There’s nothing like a constitution to clearly set the baseline framework for DAO operations. We are super excited to see this being put into place in Scroll DAO and we appreciate the efforts of @Eugene and team for the work that has gone into this. It’s important to get these building blocks right from inception as it lays the groundwork for future developments. We only have a few suggestions and questions that we would like to highlight.

Voting Process

  • We suggest modifying the proposal to require an endorsement from the foundation for progression to voting rather than making progression to voting a discretionary power of the foundation. The foundation will clearly be playing a key role in governance (in keeping with the objective of progressive decentralization), and structuring the voting process this way seems less arbitrary than in its current form. DAO contributors should simply understand that they need an endorsement from 3 delegates + the foundation to automatically progress to voting instead of being subjected to an added layer of uncertainty.
  • We also propose inserting a timeframe or window within which delegates and the foundation are required to signal their endorsement for a proposal. This will ensure that contributors are not arbitrarily left in the dark as to the status of their proposal and know when to move on or redirect effort. This window could be something like “within X days of the next voting cycle.”
  • We also think it’s important to define in the constitution what / how voting cycles are determined. If this has already been defined elsewhere on the forum, it might be sufficient to include language that incorporates it in the constitution or, alternatively, directly include it in the constitution. This will ensure predictability for DAO operations and push contributors to kickoff discussions or proposals in alignment with voting cycles.

Quorum

We are quite curious about what informed the decision on the quorum for proposals. Why 0.21% of the total supply? This seems substantially lower than the typical quorum requirements across DAOs which ranges from anywhere between 1-3% of the total supply. As it stands, the votable token supply (~6.12M SCR) is less than 1% of the total supply, so understandably it’s impracticable to follow the convention. However, it would be great to get insight into the design choices informing this proposed figure. Moreover, increasing and dispersing the votable supply of tokens is something the DAO pay attention to in the near future, as a way of safeguarding the DAO from governance vulnerabilities which are easier to exploit at this early stage. But this is perhaps a discussion for another day.

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Initially this provision works well, but subsequently I think this should be the responsibility of the DAO.

Apart from this, I think this is a well put together document, great job!

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Broadly speaking this looks like a sensible constitution for Scroll. It’s probably a little more directed than some DAOs, but my sense is the community are aligned with this.

My only query relates to the Security Council and how it is selected. Are we voting on this w/o knowing who they are or will we know in advance?

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Thanks @eugene for putting this together! The draft looks pretty straightforward to me.

As @Chris_Areta already pointed out, I’m wondering as well how the temperature check will be carried out (I guess it’s a manual process at this point?) and how long a voting cycle will last. There’s a long discussion on whether cycles are beneficial, I guess.

As for the quorum, it’s fine from my perspective to start low, considering the current votable supply. We should, however, be prepared to adapt it in alignment with the votable supply, maybe having a higher supermajority quorum. And there was a proposal threshold mentioned, is that stated somewhere as well?

The constitution also states some values and principles, the DAO and team members should align with, which is a great initiative. Is this more of a general concept, or can certain actions be disputed with regard to the constitution?

Look forward to having a constitution in place. :+1:

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@blockful | Scroll DAO Constitution Discussion

We believe the gradual decentralization approach outlined in the Scroll DAO Constitution is a healthy strategy to align both the Foundation and the DAO, ensuring sustainable growth while mitigating potential governance attacks in these early stages.
A phased decentralization process will allow for experimentation, adjustments, and increased security as the DAO evolves.

Security Council Composition & Selection Process

The Security Council, composed of 12 members, has administrative powers over emergency and non-emergency upgrades.

  • How will the selection process for these members be defined?
  • Will the Scroll Foundation appoint Security Council members, or will there be a DAO-led election mechanism in the future?
  • If decentralization of this process is planned, it would be beneficial to mention it in the Constitution, possibly after the end of Cohorts A and B.

Ensuring a transparent selection process is key to preserving trust and reducing centralization risks in governance.

Governance Contracts Review

blockful is willing to analyze the governance-related smart contracts, particularly the Governor, Timelock, and any other components that may introduce governance risks.
A brief governance security review could help identify potential attack vectors and improve resilience.

Security Council Multisig Threshold & Potential Risks

The 9/12 multisig structure raises concerns regarding operational efficiency and security due to the high number of required signers.

A reference point is ENS DAO, which uses a 4/8 multisig, balancing security and agility:

“Finding the right balance for the multisig threshold is crucial. A higher threshold can complicate coordination but reduces the risk of malicious activity. A lower threshold, while more agile, could make the DAO more susceptible to attacks or unintended consequences if a few signers are compromised.”
(ENS DAO Proposal)

Given that the Security Council holds significant power over governance, the 9/12 multisig setup does make sense, as it provides strong security guarantees. However, we encourage a discussion on whether this balance between security and efficiency is optimal for Scroll DAO.

Additionally, does the Security Council have full autonomy over governance changes?
If so, how can the DAO ensure accountability and mitigate the risks?

Governor Manager Transparency

Given the importance of the Governor Manager, it would be good practice for the Scroll Foundation to provide more details on how this role will be managed:

  • How will the Governor Manager’s multisig be structured?
  • Will it also be a 9/12 multisig like the Security Council?
  • Who will be the initial members of this multisig?
  • Are there plans to decentralize this process over time?

Since the Governor Manager can create proposals without reaching the proposal threshold, it is important to clarify its role, authority, and security measures to prevent potential misuse.

Quorum Considerations & Voting Supply Issues

Currently, the quorum for voting is 0.21% of the total supply of tokens, which is low compared to other DAOs.

  • For reference, Uniswap DAO requires 1% of total supply as a minimum quorum.
  • However, Scroll currently has a low voting supply (~6.12M $SCR), making it impractical to raise the quorum requirement at this stage.

We see two critical issues:

  1. Low quorum requirement makes Scroll DAO vulnerable to governance attacks.
  2. Low voting supply relative to the circulating supply suggests that active participation is limited.

We believe the DAO should explore mechanisms to increase voter participation while avoiding quorum stagnation due to low voter engagement.

Potential Solutions

One approach could be adopting a delegation program similar to Uniswap Foundation’s, which aims to:

  • Distribute, in a future, foundation delegations to smaller delegates.

Additionally, we are open to conducting a future research initiative on governance attack vectors and related risks, similar to our previous research proposal for Uniswap DAO:
(Proposal to Uniswap Foundation).

Another potential approach would be:

  • Incentivizing more individual and professional delegates (I’m aware that this project is ongoing on Scroll DAO right now) to participate actively in governance.
  • One example is the Uniswap Foundation’s delegation program, aimed at giving foundation delegations to smaller delegates.

Final Stance

While addressing these concerns, blockful is happy to vote FOR supporting the Scroll DAO Constitution.

We recognize the effort put into designing a robust governance framework and believe that continued iteration, transparency, and research will enhance Scroll DAO’s security and effectiveness in the long run.

We look forward to ongoing discussions to strengthen governance security, decentralization, and participation mechanisms.

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Hello!

Thank you very much for proposing a Constitution for the DAO. I believe it is important to establish fundamental rules that serve as a reference to define the principles governing proposals, as well as the processes for their approval and execution.

My first comment is regarding the content: this Constitution outlines the governance principles and processes of the DAO. However, it makes no reference to what the DAO actually governs. The organization exists for a purpose—to decentralize the governance of the technology that aims to be decentralized. Why does the DAO exist?

I understand the purpose of this addition, but my view of the Constitution is that it should be a rigid document that outlines principles that are—ideally—immutable while still allowing for the DAO’s evolution. In fact, this is reflected in the requirement of a higher quorum for approving modifications. Therefore, I would either revise or remove it.

From reading this article, it seems like these are two distinct roles or individuals within the DAO. However, it is later explained that they are multisigs with special powers. Could you clarify how this multisig will be structured? Who will be the signers? Will the signers have any active role or participation in the DAO? Will the addresses be shared once they are set up?

I would state it more precisely: “Scroll DAO has the authority to enact decisions regarding the future of Scroll Protocol through proposals.”

In this regard, as of today, that authority is not exclusive, correct? Instead, it is being exercised directly by the foundation/labs. So why grant that ability to the DAO at this stage?

Where is the threshold specified? How can it be modified?

How is the endorsement expressed? Does there need to be a temporal relationship between the endorsers? For example, if I endorse a proposal and no one else does for a month, does my endorsement remain valid?

The concept of good faith is mentioned in several parts of the document. I suggest defining it or replacing it with something more concrete.

“After the proposal has been selected…” By the foundation, right?. It would be helpful to clarify that the proposal cannot undergo modifications from the moment it is selected until it is voted on, and that if modifications do occur, it will return to the drafting and creation phase and thus require new endorsements.

Also, there’s no reference to the voting cycles. What are they? How often do they occur? Can the DAO decide to open a voting cycle?

Out of curiosity, what is the rationale behind this inclusion?

Both quorums are set with the same value (0.21%). Is this intentional? Or should the supermajority be higher?

How “almost”? When does the DAO decide on an non-emergency upgrade, and when does it not?

If the members of the Security Council are not elected by the DAO, why include this article in the constitution?

Maybe I would add that its also to contribute to the development and growth of Scroll?

This is not clear to me. Can the directors be removed by the DAO according to the rules of the Scroll Foundation? Could you share that document with us?

I hope the feedback is helpful!

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Hi there,

We are overall supportive of this draft as it’ll surely set the ground for the expected progressive decentralization process. Nonetheless we have some queries/suggestions on the following items:

Security Council

The election process should be outlined in its initial and expected forms. If in a first round it’s going to be Foundation decided and for a second round it’s going to be DAO elected it should be somewhat stated in the Constitution. Also, the Security Council’s procedure for the removal and replacement of Security members should be clearly stated, eventually leveraging towards an internal SCs process.

Also a suggestion regarding cohorts and duration: On a first round it looks like there should be space between elections but with time the expected election cadence is one election every 6 months just for the Security Council. This could potentially drive the DAO to “elections mode” rather frequently and in the middle of CCCs or other votings, increasing the overall operational burden for a topic that benefits from long term stability. We don’t have a super strong opinion on this one but maybe exploring cadence or mandate duration options (i.e full renewal after a 18 month mandate) could be beneficial. Otherwise having a sense on why adopting the cohort approach would be insightful.

Voting Process

We agree with @Chris_Areta on the idea of having timing included to the process as well as the voting cycles (with the caveat of what an emergency vote would require). Nonetheless, we disagree with this:

In this early stage the proposal submission is already gatekeeped so adding an extra-layer undermines the delegates agency to seek votes and consensus since currently the foundation already reserves the right to block the proposal.

Also, if tempchecks are going to be added as a standard (and not optional), its timing should be accounted for in the voting phase section and considered within the whole lifecycle of the proposal.

Quorum

We definitely share some of the presented concerns regarding votable supply and actioning towards increasing and distributing it. Also we’ve raised the fact that Circulating Supply against Votable Supply should be leveraged when analyzing quorum and threshold requirements. Anyway, we consider this as an ongoing topic that is definitely worth keeping an eye on but exceeds the current draft. The vision of progressive decentralization proposed in Scroll will necessarily have to account for this in upcoming iterations.

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Hi! :wave:

Thank you for drafting this proposal—it’s exciting to see the community’s feedback and engagement around such an important foundational document. :rocket:

I know @pedro touched on this briefly but I’d like to add my 2 cents!

The constitution is described as a living document, which makes sense given the evolving nature of governance in the space. However, how will constitutional amendments be formally enacted and governed over the long term? :balance_scale:

Would it be prudent to codify an explicit amendment process within the constitution itself?
:memo: For instance, should constitutional amendments require a well-defined supermajority threshold for passage?
:white_check_mark: Should governance proposals that seek to modify the constitution be subject to extended voting periods :hourglass_flowing_sand: to ensure that all holders and delegates have adequate time to review, discuss, and respond?

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Got it, thanks @Sov! Will review and revert.

Thanks @Chris_Areta. Stepping back a bit, part of the logic of the co-design is to generally minimize the number of proposals getting to vote stage that have not had at least some discussion. If we move to this kind of language, I would prefer to raise the number of endorsements to 5 + foundation.

Again, with the timeframe, I would personally be reticent to bring a proposal to vote that isn’t brought up in a single group discussion. Regardless, we can explore what makes sense if this is something delegates feel strongly about. Clarifying question - when you say timeframe, from when it gets posted or ahead of a voting cycle?

Good point, we can outline the monthly voting cycles. Goal is to have it start on the 1st of each month going forward.

This was just meant as a starting point given all the unknowns when designing. We assumed this would be revised. I see the question of revision of quorum tied to any efforts focused on increasing the % of supply that’s delegated (and personally would favor focusing on the latter for a few months before revising the #s). We had ~2.8m vote with 2.1m quorum. That might work for a few more months but I agree we should discuss what to revise it to and will appreciate input from folks on that (will bring that up as a separate topic later).

Yes, the goal is to have the DAO be responsible for this. The goal was to have a security council place early on and we do want the DAO overseeing this in the future. To @polar’s related question, the security council should be announced in a few weeks. The constitution is likely not making it for the Feb vote at this stage, so will see if we can be ready to announce the security council prior to the Mar1 voting cycle.

@bitblondy Voting cycles will be from the first of each month, 3 day voting delay, then 7 day voting period, then a timelock. More details on that here. I think it makes sense to see how this works over the course of the first 5ish months of the year. Once we do the next co-creation cycle reviewing the initial 6 months and planning for the next year (likely in June), then we explore revising it.

Do you mind elaborating on this question please?

I will respond to the remaining comments in a separate post. Thanks for all of the feedback and great points!

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Thanks for the info on the voting cycles. I was referring to the significance of the constitution, whether there are consequences for actions against it. But I see, for the security council and board of directors, there’s already a part about that.

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Thank you for putting this constitution together. After going through the proposal most of our suggestions were covered by subsequent articles within the constitution and comments by other delegates. Some thoughts and comments:

Security Council

The structure and overall layout of the council seems standard. Is there any link where we can learn more about the 12 signers selected? Is there any overlapping between other signers for the Gov manager and admin?

Outside of this proposal draft, we believe it would be good practice to require that all changes—whether emergency or non-emergency—be publicly posted on the forum with a brief explanation from the Security Council, along with the mentioned report if it were a emergency action. The same standard should apply if the Foundation removes any Security Council member.

Voting Process

Agreed! This approval process seems straightforward. I’d recommend adopting a standardized endorsement format similar to the Optimism Collective, such as: “I am a Scroll Verified Delegate, and I believe this proposal is ready to move to a vote.” Including a link to the delegate’s Agora profile would make verification easier.

Regarding the voting cycles, for clarity and transparency it would be beneficial to define them either within the constitution or through a separate proposal. Once the process has been tested and refined, it could then be incorporated into the constitution through an amendment.

Thresholds

Reviewing the quorum specified, quorums are lower than expected for a DAO, but we also agree with Seed’s comment that this is an ongoing topic that should be taken into consideration moving forward.

Regarding the majority and supermajority quorum, was there any discussion around potentially increasing the supermajority threshold to require greater participation in protocol upgrades, governance parameter changes, and constitutional amendments?

Which proposal threshold does it refer to?

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