Thanks for this proposal Eugene, it’s a well-written document. We’re in favor of voting for adoption of the Constitution. It could be worth linking to the community code of conduct & the delegate/voter code of conduct somewhere in the document. Also you can see section 8 of the Moonwell Constitution if you want to consider expanding on the Security Council section (e.g. adding a specific nomination timeline)
3 Likes
Thank you all for the thoughtful comments and contributions. I will need some time to respond to all of these but just want to flag that we this is NOT yet ready for the Feb1 vote
Stay tuned on next steps once the comments are addressed
5 Likes
Thanks @eugene for taking the time. It would make sense for the timeframe to align with voting cycles. If a proposal isn’t ready for a vote due to insufficient discussion, it should ideally wait until the next cycle. By defining what the voting cycle should be, we could easily implement a freeze that would prevent proposals submitted too close to one voting cycle from going to a vote until the next cycle. This could be something like a week.
Excellent! @Web3Citizen
2 Likes
Hey everyone,
The Scroll DAO Constitution is a good step toward structured governance, and I appreciate the effort put into making it transparent and adaptable. Thank you @eugene!
I have a few concerns that I believe are worth discussing:
Decentralization Roadmap – While “progressive decentralization” is mentioned, there’s no clear timeline or milestones. A more concrete plan would add confidence. I see this has been discussed already, but wanted to express my support.
Delegate System Risks – Large token holders can consolidate power by delegating votes to a small number of representatives. It could be nice to ratify an aim of the DAO to prevent governance capture over time.
Legal & Compliance Clarity – The role of the Scroll Foundation in governance isn’t fully detailed, especially regarding how its decisions interact with DAO votes. Some clarity here would help ensure long-term alignment.
Overall, I support the direction of this proposal, but refining these areas could make it stronger and more resilient. Looking forward to hearing others’ thoughts!
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Sorry for the delay!
Selection process - they’re being selected by the Scroll team initially. I don’t believe the future process has been outlined. That is something that can be addressed initially or as the first amendment to make. I will speak with the team about it this week.
This feels as though it should be a separate convo. Feel free to provide more info in a separate post, which can start a general conversation around governance security.
Happy to have this discussion, though personally, I think it’s a bit premature. I think there is still so much left to do in the coming months on the core operations and activities of the DAO. As a result, it’d be great to focus limited attention to these initial aspects instead of taking on too many things from the start (especially given the current setup risks being inefficient (less urgent) vs insecure (more urgent). Please do feel free to bring up the conversation when it feels appropriate.
Sorry, can you elaborate on your question
This is one of the places I need to make sure to link to the gov docs. The manager is managed by the Foundation and is a 2/3 managed by the gov team and someone on the ops side.
What is the power / control it has that is worth decentralizing? I see the main thing as who has the power to post proposals. That can be adjusted without decentralizing the control of the manager contract to start, which feels like the priority. I will have to double check the other things the Manager wallet controls and then can add more thoughts.
Agreed! I want to make sure we have a discussion on it (and thanks to all who have contributed to the post so far) and prioritize this in the next few months. If you don’t mind copying your suggestions over to that post, that’d be great!
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Can you please clarify your suggestion? Are you suggesting that we should add some verbiage to outline the mission or vision or purpose of the DAO?
To be clear, I’m not suggest frequent revisions. I agree that changing it shouldn’t be taken lightly. At the same time, given the specific nature of what we’re doing and now nascent all of this is, we need to have more room for flexibility for DAO constitutions (relative to countries and their constitutions). Personally, I could see us reviewing and refining the constitution once a year in the first years with the intention of it becoming something that doesn’t need to be amended frequently.
Yes, sorry for not doing better in terms of pointers to the current info.
Manager - 2/3, Foundation gov team + one ops person
Admin - managed centrally until the security council is in place/announced, then it’s a 9/12
The address for the Manager is already up in our docs and the Admin will be updated there as soon as the security council is finalized.
Pushing back on the wording a bit. To me, enact would imply the DAO is either exclusively coming up with new laws or putting approved ones into practice. The reality of protocol upgrades to start will involved the engineering team suggesting an update, that update getting shared with the DAO, and once endorsed and later approved, it gets enacted. Based on the most recent discussion with the engineering team, the first proposal that will go to the DAO should be ready by mid-March. We can also have someone from engineering present to the DAO ahead of / around then if that’s helpful.
I agree with you that it’s unlikely at this point but I don’t see the harm. Theoretically, if the DAO is ready to give proposal upgrade ideas that are sound, that would be amazing and very welcome!
Yes, the threshold and process for revision are in our gov docs.
It’s expressed by clearly stating that one would vote for it (as has been the norm in DAO forums and for the first DAO proposal). This hasn’t been clarified yet. The way I would personally approach it would be as follows. If someone puts a proposal in the forum up today (Feb 2) for the Mar 1 voting cycle, and only one person endorses it, I would make sure to bring up the proposal via the weekly calls, the forum, and the chat to gauge interest. If there’s no interest, then the proposal doesn’t go any where. If there’s interest and enough endorsements during Mar, then it goes up for Apr 1.
Do you have any specific suggestions there? Good faith is an intentionally broad term. Open to other ideas if people have them.
The reason they aren’t specified here beyond what’s in Article 3 Section 3 is that if would force us to revise the constitution if we realize we need to adjust it. We will make sure to clarify it in the governance docs. Voting cycles are meant to be monthly starting the first of the month to allow for more predictability for delegates.
As I see it, one benefit is that if token holders who were previously not delegating now know that a topic they might care about is going to vote, so it provides a window to allow for that.
We thought that the higher approval threshold (76% vs 51%) is enough of a barrier.
We don’t have a perfect definition of where the exact line between emergency and non-emergency is so we have this language to provide wiggle room. The general logic is that any protocol upgrades that are seen as non-emergency ones will be presented to the DAO first for feedback.
It’s not that clear when writing these what is the best amount of future aspects to include in the current version (versus leaving it open for adjustment via amendments). This felt like one of those that is important to signal, even if we still have to define the future selection process.
It says that in the next section. If there’s a strong sentiment about this, we can adjust.
1 Like
Thank you for calling out the various potential improvements there, especially in terms of the ‘election mode’. Let me circle back on these
Clarifying q - would the extra-layer be the 3 endorsements from delegates? I am not clear how much of a difference it would make it in the grand scheme of things.
Fully agreed on the circulating v votable supply. We will be bringing this up in conversation in the coming weeks. Thanks again for the dune dashboard!
As of now, the process would be in the form of proposing an amendment (and in turn revised constitution).
Changes to the constitution do need a supermajority vote.
I think I would default to extending a discussion window vs a voting cycle. Hopefully the combination of extending the time for discussion + the consistent voting cycles starting the first of the month will be enough to get the best engagement we’re able to. Let me know there’s a specific benefit you see to extending the window.
Got it, thanks for clarifying. Let me know if you think we should be adding anything else around enforcement at this stage.
Yes, that is the goal! The first upgrades post DAO formation are planned for April and we’re coordinating with the engineering team to get the posts up ahead of a Apr 1 vote (so sometime by mid-Mar).
I’d personally suggest not including it in the constitution until we know that it is working well for us. The point of leaving it out was to allow for flexibility and minimize the need for more amendments. I do agree that I need to write something, both on the forum and in the docs, to make the cycle clearer
As in, increase it beyond 76%?
The one outlined here.
Yes, thanks for the call out. I will do another pass through the doc to add relevant links.
I agree that we should postpone things that don’t get enough discussion. Can you please clarify your specific suggestion?
Yes, this is something that is on our minds. If you have any suggestions or references to examples where it’s working well, please do share
The gov docs, particularly the 'Who Are We’ portion is meant to address some of that. Can you please share if there’s any specific clarity you’re hoping to get? I’ll review again and see what improvements come up from our end.
Next step
Thanks for the feedback everyone! I will review the constitution and the feedback here, discuss internally, and propose a new one ASAP. Will keep an eye out for any new feedback as well.
1 Like
@eugene Here is SimScore Report. Notion – The all-in-one workspace for your notes, tasks, wikis, and databases.
Top 1 @pedro “My first comment is regarding the content: this Constitution outlines the governance principles and processes of the DAO. However, it makes no reference to what the DAO actually governs. The organization exists for a purpose—to decentralize the governance of the technology that aims to be decentralized. Why does the DAO exist?”
Top 2@danimum “We believe the gradual decentralization approach outlined in the Scroll DAO Constitution is a healthy strategy to align both the Foundation and the DAO, ensuring sustainable growth while mitigating potential governance attacks in these early stages.”
Top 3 @Chris_Areta “We suggest modifying the proposal to require an endorsement from the foundation for progression to voting rather than making progression to voting a discretionary power of the foundation. The foundation will clearly be playing a key role in governance (in keeping with the objective of progressive decentralization), and structuring the voting process this way seems less arbitrary than in its current form. DAO contributors should simply understand that they need an endorsement from 3 delegates + the foundation to automatically progress to voting instead of being subjected to an added layer of uncertainty.”
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I have concerns regarding the final step where the Foundation’s Governance Team has the discretion to decide which proposals advance to the voting cycle. This setup could potentially lead to a bottleneck or gatekeeping that might not reflect the wider community’s interest.
To address this, I propose implementing a check-and-balance mechanism where if a proposal that has passed the temperature check is not included in the voting cycle by the Foundation, there should be an alternative path. For example, if a proposal garners a higher number of endorsements from Top Delegates (say 10 or more) it could automatically qualify for the voting cycle regardless of the Foundation’s initial decision. This way, while the Foundation can still filter proposals for alignment with DAO’s goals and legal compliance, the community has a more substantial say in matters that garner significant delegate support, ensuring a more democratic governance process.
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Actually was referring specifically to the foundation endorsement. It makes sense to have delegates endorsement for a proposal but since with the current design the submission is already gatekeeped by foundation that extra foundation endorsement might be redundant. In other words, the discretionary power of moving a proposal to a vote would also apply to endorsing a proposal or not.
Anyhow, the approach of rising the delegate endorsements somewhat balances that power so we’d be confortable on supporting that modification.
2 Likes
Intro
@Eugene and governance team, thanks for putting out the effort to draft this document. The number and quality of comments within this post is a clear signal of the value that Delegates and the community see in Scroll.
I’ve read the whole post and would like to emphasize into some comments as well as add new ones. Everything below is categorized for readability.
Proposal drafting:
Re
I agree with @Chris_Areta that the above paragraph gives a feeling of uncertainty. It could be drafted with transparent criteria on how a proposal would pass, which could be a combination of what you, @Chris_Areta, @Web3Citizen, and @0xDonPepe said, plus some of my thoughts:
"A proposal shall pass a ‘temperature check’ mechanism, which requires at least 5 endorsements from Verified Delegates + the Scroll Foundation within a post at the Scroll DAO forum, in order to proceed.
The Foundation’s endorsement becomes optional when 10 Delegates from the top 100 also endorse the proposal.
A proposal’s endorsement is understood as a reply in the forum to the proposal in regard. The reply should contain the reasoning behind the support and the following phrase: ‘I am a Scroll Verified Delegate[Link to Delegate’s profile], and I believe this proposal is ready to move to a vote.’"
Re Endorsement timeframes. There could be proposals that take from weeks to months to discuss. A Delegate could find it good enough to pass in the first discussions, but then the proposal could get delayed. I suggest that no-timeframe is put, but the actual count of endorsements.
The author should seek for the endorsement as mentioned by Eugene.
Re After the proposal has been selected
I support @Pedro’s below comment because sometimes even changing a comma can alterate the agreement.
Security council:
Council members’ election. The Socriocratic approach could help answer the concerns placed by the community. As a TL;DR of the approach:
Sociocratic Election Process
The sociocratic approach to electing members involves a transparent and inclusive process that prioritizes consent and open discussion. Here are the key steps and principles:
Definition of Role: Before the election, the role for which members are being elected is clearly defined. This includes the tasks and responsibilities associated with the role.
Nomination: Members can nominate themselves or others for the role. Nominations are made public, and each nominee is given a chance to explain why they are suitable for the role.
Discussion and Feedback: Members discuss the nominees and provide reasons for their nominations. This discussion is open and transparent, allowing everyone to learn more about the candidates and the role.
Consent-Based Decision: The election is based on consent, not majority vote. Each member must give their consent to a nominee for them to be elected. If any member has a reasoned and paramount objection, the group must address it before proceeding.
Acceptance: Once a nominee receives consent (no significant objections by the community), they are asked if they accept the role. This ensures that the elected member is willing and able to take on the responsibilities.
This process ensures that the elected members are well-suited for their roles and that the group’s decision-making is inclusive and collaborative.
The above could be combined with voting so to follow the governance process we have now or could be directly elected by the Foundation. The important note here is that the community can object on people so the collective intelligence and experiences can emerge.
Decentralization roadmap:
I agree that having an ideal of the decentralization roadmap would help. However, seeing the time and effort the co-creation cycles are taking, I support focusing on the initial co-creation cycles. Those are already part of the decentralization goal. We are collectively creating value. With value co-created will come more “skin in the game” as time and resources have been put, therefore the will to participate in preserving and growing tha value co-created will be more organic and make more sense than focusing on the early-stage governance of only a technology.
If resources are available, then advancing both simultaneously will be ideal.
Good practices enforced through a regulation doc:
Finally, the Constitution is one document, and a set of Regulatory policies (docs/contracts) would complement, as traditional law works.
For example, what @Web3Citizen said should be included in a Regulatory Policy document related to the topic of the Security Council, so that the defined rules are also enforced:
“it would be good practice to require that all changes—whether emergency or non-emergency—be publicly posted on the forum with a brief explanation from the Security Council, along with the mentioned report if it were a emergency action.”
Regulatory policies are easier to modify as they do not embed the risk of modifying the whole Constitution.
Conclusion
Thanks again for setting up this document and for the time invested in reading and replying to everyone. Looking forward to seeing how this initial draft evolves.
1 Like
Hey eugene! Thanks for the response. Awesome to hear about the upcoming upgrades too. Agreed on the voting cycles and specifying guidelines for that whenever we decide the procedure is tried and tested.
We were actually referring to the section in the post about the threshold for the voting quorum and differentiating the percentage of total supply that must participate in a standard and supermajority vote proposal. But got our answer here:
On the question above, after reviewing the governance docs we see that these will be listed there when finalized.
1 Like
Thanks for sharing @maets23
That’s a fair concern and is something that is top of mind when looking forward to the decentralization roadmap we’ll be working on later this year. At this early stage in the DAO, there are some concerns with a process to automatically get a proposal up for vote (from the perspective of alignment), especially while we navigate a low delegated supply. The goal of having this in place is as a safeguard, not as something to be used regularly (ideally there is enough alignment and collaboration that it would never need to be used).
I see, sorry for misunderstanding. I hear where you’re coming from. Even if it’s not technically required, I do imagine we’ll jump in at least a bit on the forum so it’s not a unreasonable expectation overall.
This is very similar to the proposed revision (coming soon)
Definitely hoping to see certain aspects of this come up. I think the first councils will be grant related, so it will be interesting to see what comes up in the co-design there.
We can also add them to our gov process doc as it feels relevant there. If there’s strong desire for a policy doc, we can explore that.
Hopefully that will be finalized soon and we can announce it and will link to it in the gov docs.
Will follow up with a revised proposal. Thanks y’all!
3 Likes
Dear friends,
I come with a dissenting opinion, but great love.
As far as constitutions go, @eugene, I think this represents fine work.
One structural point first: the amount of nits in this thread is likely not because you didn’t draft a solid document, but rather because something about the underlying political architecture is unsound.
So, what is the architectural issue? Here are the three quotes which reveal it most clearly (emphasis added):
“After passing the temperature check the Foundation’s Governance Team may choose to include the proposal in the next voting cycle, in their sole discretion and acting in good faith.”
“Thereafter, after it has been in the timelock for three days, it will be executed manually by the Governance Manager.”
"The Governor Manager has the ability to create proposals regardless of whether its voting power meets the proposal threshold. "
That is, despite all of the noble words in the rest of the document and the first principle of gradual decentralization, sole discretion is maintained at all times by a small and exclusive set of people. The performative contradiction cannot be resolved.
I point this out not to attack @eugene (whom I adore) or Scroll (who I respect). I point this out because the whole space needs to do some serious reflection on what good governance actually looks like.
We have known since 2018 that onchain voting schemes are fundamentally flawed. Some heroic figures continue to beat this unpopular drum today, 7 years later.
I continue to hope that we can internalize the lessons of this research and craft mechanisms that do not have votes at all, which do not need a natural language constitution, and which do not need me to perform the role of disempowered delegate.
I have proposed one such mechanism here for those who are interested. It is specific to that context (as all good mechanisms must necessarily be) and so is not directly applicable to what Scroll Governance could one day become.
I look forward to watching this document hopefully live into the potential I know its authors seek to imbue it with.
4 Likes
Thanks for joining the discussion and flagging this. On the one hand, I directionally agree with the criticism and we are definitely thinking about and working towards a future that is both not centralized on a small group and that relies less on token voting given the challenges of that approach.
At the same time, I do want to respectfully push back on some of what is being stated here.
This statement implies in perpetuity and that is neither the desire nor will it be the case. Yes, we are not pretending to have taken the full onchain voting structure day 1 (and have had feedback from many of the delegates that this is appreciated). I think it’s important to acknowledge the distinction between where we are, where we are headed, and what are our goals. This statement, to me, implies that the goal is to always have a small and exclusive group overseeing, which is counter to our objectives (and I would personally see as a huge failure on my part).
I would love to discuss this in more detail. Happy to dedicate a future call to this. To be explicit, are there specific elements of that design that you think we should be discussing here? Are you more generally signaling that we should be shifting towards minimizing governance?
2 Likes
Hi all. I’m still working through some things related to the security council but wanted to at least provide some of the other revisions for now. Doing my best to have the full revised version up next week.
There were some points around endorsements and timing (@Chris_Areta @Web3Citizen). Some changes were made directly in the proposed constitution while others have been reflected in docs, and are now linked appropriately.
Revisions to Article 3, Sections 2 & 3
- Proposal Drafting and Creation Phase. DAO proposals may be created in accordance with the following process:
- Any SCR holder or Delegate meeting the specified proposal threshold (a “proposer”) may draft proposals and put them up on the Scroll DAO forum for the community’s viewing and consideration.
- A proposal shall pass a ‘temperature check’ mechanism, which requires at least three endorsements from Verified Delegates and one endorsement from the Foundation on the Scroll DAO forum, in order to proceed.
- Any proposal that does not receive the required endorsements 5 days ahead of the next voting cycle, will be considered for the subsequent voting cycle. If a project does not hit the required number of endorsements within 2 voting cycles and wants to be considered in a future voting cycle, endorsements must be attained again in the two weeks leading up to the renewed attempt.
- For example, if a proposal was posted on the forum Jan 1 and did not get the required endorsements before Jan 27th, it is not eligible for the Feb 1 vote. If it receives the remaining number of endorsements before Feb 24th (25th in leap years), then it is eligible for the Mar 1st voting cycle. If did not get enough endorsements in Feb and wants to be considered in Mar, the proposal must receive the required number of endorsements in Mar.
- After passing the temperature check the Foundation’s Governance Team may choose to include the proposal in the next voting cycle, at their sole discretion and acting in good faith.
- Voting Phase. After the proposal has been selected to be included in the next voting cycle, the voting period begins. The voting period will take place during a period of 10 days:
- Voting delay: This is a 3-day period that will occur once the proposal is first visible on the platform. Participants may acquire and delegate their votes during this period. At the end of this 3-day period, a snapshot is taken to show how much voting power each address has.
- Voting period: This is a 7-day period after the snapshot where participants can vote on the proposal.
3 Likes
Hi,
Thank you putting together a draft of the Constitution and sharing it with us. 
I think it’s a solid starting point—simple enough to get things rolling and good from a security perspective. Of course, it’s far from decentralized yet, but that’s totally fine at this stage. Becoming a DAO doesn’t happen overnight; it takes time, as well as a lot of social and political decentralization.
That said, I do have a few comments and questions about the Constitution.
A few things I’d love some clarity on:
- How many proposals can be included in a voting cycle? Is it up to the Foundation to decide based on how many they endorse, or is it strictly limited to one?
- What exactly makes someone a “verified delegate”? Does the Foundation manually verify them, or is there a third party handling KYC?
Few Suggestions:
Right now, the Foundation Team holds the ultimate power, which makes sense in the beginning. But it might be a good idea to set a fixed term for the Council - maybe 6 to 12 months - while the DAO matures. After that, the term could either be extended with a constitutional revision or, if the community is ready, some Council seats could transition to public elections.
To improve accountability, it would be great to have clear guiding principles on how and why the Foundation chooses to endorse certain proposals. Adding a brief rationale for each endorsed proposal - explaining why it was prioritized over others - would make the process more transparent and prevent any proposals from being overlooked for subjective reasons. Additionally, more clarity on the Security Council’s composition and selection process would be really beneficial.
Amendment Process- If this is meant to be a "living document,” there should be a clear process for amending it. Right now, the Gov. Admin has the ability to make all kind of changes - again, this should probably be time-limited until the DAO reaches a more decentralized stage.
A few legal points that might seem a bit much, but they could offer some extra protection. Here are some clauses to think about adding: 1. No Guarantee of Profit Participation 2.No Liability for DAO Decisions 3.Dispute Resolution
I think the “3rd-day snapshot rule” is a decent starting point, and I wouldn’t overcomplicate things just yet. That said, in the long run, it could make the system easy to game. (Not sure if that’s the intent?)
A possible improvement down the line might be to introduce time-weighted voting power to reward long-term commitment. If a token holder delegates their voting power to a delegate, the delegate inherits the delegator’s time-weighted score. e.g
- Holding for 1 day → 10% voting power
- Holding for 1 week → 50% voting power
- Holding for 1 month → 100% voting power
- Bonus: A delegate who has held votes for 3+ months could get 1.1x voting power to encourage stability.
It might be worth considering a DAO Librarian or Steward - someone who knows the Constitution inside and out and helps with organizing governance documentation, summarizing key updates, supporting delegate training, and onboarding new members. Or is the role of the Governor Manager?
Overall, great job, and I’m excited to see how it evolves! 
2 Likes
Hi @vermillion, thanks for joining the discussion.
It is not limited to one / a specific number.
Initially, it was delegates we knew or were connected to (and could confirm that they’re real people who want to be active in gov and are able to meaningfully contribute). I actually drafted a doc last week that will be going up sometime soon on how to become a verified delegate. Going forward, it will mainly be based on governance activity (and potentially combined with vouching and/or the use of a tool Gitcoin’s Passport, though very much not confirmed if we’ll use a DID solution as part of it)
A fixed term for the security council? That is currently the plan (12 and 18 month), though extensions will be possible.
In terms of the affirmative, we’re supporting proposals that can help advance the Scroll ecosystem. We will be involved in the governance process around any proposals that come up and plan to comment / interact with all proposals at this stage.
This is outlined throughout the doc - Article 3.1 states that Constitution revisions are social ratifications and Article 3.5 states that this requires a super majority vote. We are also weary of this doc becoming too unwieldy though we can add an explicit Amendment section if people deem it necessary.
I’m sorry, I’m not following this point. Can you please restate?
These kinds of evolutions are exactly things we hope to explore in the coming months/years! We’ll have more structured discussions around this Q2-Q3 this year.
As of right now, this is one of the responsibilities of the Governance team at the Foundation.
Also, to speak to @Sov and others concern around not having any language, this commitment to reporting back on any emergency procedures is already there. I know the OP language that was pointed to was lengthier but effectively said the same. Please let me know if folks want to see any additions in that regard
2 Likes
Overview
This is a revised version of the proposed Scroll DAO Constitution. Do note that there has also been a revision to the docs to reflect some specific elements of what an endorsement should look like and defining voting cycles.
There was also more color on the timing and endorsements from the Foundation.
There is also a statement to commit the Security Council to publicly report on any emergency actions.
Let us know if you want to see any other changes before people are comfortable voting for this.
Scroll DAO Constitution
This constitution (“Constitution”) sets out the key governance principles, guidelines and processes by which Scroll DAO shall operate. While the Constitution is intended to clearly outline the governance principles and processes of the Scroll DAO, it is recognized that this is a living document that will evolve given our commitment to staying curious and continuing to experiment with approaches that may develop over time as needed.
Article I: Governance Principles
The Scroll DAO shall adopt these key principles, which reflect its governance philosophy:
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Progressive Decentralization: With decentralization as our north star, Scroll DAO has embarked on a multi-year journey to bring that reality to fruition.
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Global, Inclusive Participation: Scroll DAO strives to build an intentional global community of builders and community members from all over the world, where everyone has a chance to contribute to the future of the Scroll ecosystem.
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Accountability: Scroll DAO prioritizes collaborative decision making that is fair, transparent, and accountable, whilst upholding the Scroll protocol’s best interests.
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Staying Curious: Scroll DAO aims to constantly embrace new ideas and push boundaries, while balancing this with focused and empirically informed decisions.
Article II: Governance Components
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SCR Holders. Anyone can participate in the Scroll DAO through holding Scroll’s native token $SCR (“SCR holders”) via delegation to themselves or others, and by making proposals and/or voting on proposals put forth in the Scroll DAO’s forum and community channels.
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Delegates. SCR holders who are unable to participate directly may choose to delegate their power to make proposals and vote on proposals to a Delegate of their choice, who would represent them in the governance process.
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Smart Contracts. Several smart contracts are utilized to operate Scroll DAO’s governance processes. These include:
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Token: Tracks the balances of token holders and voting power of delegates.
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Governor: Provides the main access control logic of the governance system. Its primary job is to process proposals and their associated votes in order to determine whether they succeed or fail.
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Timelock: Receives instructions from the governor for successful proposals. Provides a time delay on proposals to give time for stakeholders to respond, should it be needed, then executes the instruction.
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Modules: Provide optional additional voting strategies (e.g. introducing multiple-choice voting proposals) to the governor.
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Security Council: A trusted multisig that has admin privileges over many parts of the system that require manual execution (non-emergency protocol upgrades) or to intervene as a last resort (emergency protocol upgrades).
The block addresses can be viewed on Scroll Scan here:
| Contract | View on Block Explorer |
|---|---|
| Token | Scrollscan link |
| Governor | Scrollscan link |
| Timelock | Scrollscan link |
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Governance Facilitators. The Governor Manager and Governor Admin act as administrators to facilitate the governance processes of Scroll DAO and they have certain permissions on the Governor smart contract, which shall be exercised in the interest of the Scroll DAO and in good faith. See Article IV for more details.
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Security Council. The Security Council is a committee of 12 members, who are signers of a multi-sig wallet and whose primary goal is to safeguard the security, integrity and efficient operations of the Scroll zkEVM rollup. See Article V for more details.
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Scroll Foundation. Scroll Foundation, a Cayman Islands foundation company, serves as a steward for the Scroll DAO, and is a legal entity that facilitates operational and administrative objectives of the Scroll DAO. See Article VI for more details.
Article III: DAO Governance Proposal and Voting Procedures
- DAO Proposal Types. The Scroll DAO may make proposals to enact decisions relating to the future of Scroll protocol.
Scroll DAO may make these 4 types of proposal:
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DAO Treasury Transfers (e.g. grants and DAO transfers)
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Changes to Governance Parameters (e.g. upgrade governor)
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Protocol Upgrades (e.g. non-emergency protocol upgrade)
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Social Ratifications (e.g. changes to this Constitution, updates to DAO governing documents and processes)
- Proposal Drafting and Creation Phase. DAO proposals may be created in accordance with the following process:
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Any SCR holder or Delegate meeting the specified proposal threshold (a “proposer”) may draft proposals and put them up on the Scroll DAO forum for the community’s viewing and consideration.
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A proposal shall pass a ‘temperature check’ mechanism, which requires at least three endorsements from Verified Delegates and one endorsement from the Foundation on the Scroll DAO forum, in order to proceed.
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Any proposal that does not receive the required endorsements 5 days ahead of the next voting cycle, will be considered for the subsequent voting cycle. If a project does not hit the required number of endorsements within 2 voting cycles and wants to be considered in a future voting cycle, endorsements must be attained again in the two weeks leading up to the renewed attempt.
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For example, if a proposal was posted on the forum Jan 1 and did not get the required endorsements before Jan 27th, it is not eligible for the Feb 1 vote. If it receives the remaining number of endorsements before Feb 24th (25th in leap years), then it is eligible for the Mar 1st voting cycle. If did not get enough endorsements in Feb and wants to be considered in Mar, the proposal must receive the required number of endorsements in Mar.
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After passing the temperature check the Foundation’s Governance Team may choose to include the proposal in the next voting cycle, at their sole discretion and acting in good faith.
- Voting Phase. After the proposal has been selected to be included in the next voting cycle, the voting period begins. The voting period will take place during a period of 10 days:
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Voting delay: This is a 3-day period that will occur once the proposal is first visible on the platform. Participants may acquire and delegate their votes during this period. At the end of this 3-day period, a snapshot is taken to show how much voting power each address has.
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Voting period: This is a 7-day period after the snapshot where participants can vote on the proposal.
- Voting Quorum.
| Parameter | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Standard Quorum | % of total supply that must vote for, against or abstain for a standard vote proposal to meet quorum and proceed to voting | 0.21% of total supply (i.e. 2,100,000 SCR) |
| Supermajority Quorum | % of total supply that must vote for, against or abstain for a supermajority vote proposal to meet quorum and proceed to voting | 0.21% of total supply (i.e. 2,100,000 SCR) |
- Voting Approval Threshold. A proposal may require standard vote approval or supermajority vote approval, depending on the type of proposal. These are the description and parameters for meeting a standard vote approval or supermajority vote approval.
| Parameter | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Standard Vote Approval | % determined by: - votes cast as “For” the proposal; divided by - votes cast as “For” and votes cast as “Against” the proposal, in order for a standard proposal to be approved and proceed to execution |
51% |
| Supermajority Vote Approval | % determined by: - votes cast as “For” the proposal; divided by - votes cast as “For” and votes cast as “Against” the proposal, in order for a supermajority proposal to be approved and proceed to execution |
76% |
A proposal shall meet the specified voting approval threshold stated in governor parameters. Currently, the voting approval threshold is set as follows:
| Proposal Type | Voting Approval Threshold |
|---|---|
| DAO Treasury Transfer | Standard Vote |
| Changes to Governance Parameters | Supermajority Vote |
| Protocol Upgrade | Supermajority Vote |
| Social Ratifications (i) Changes to this Constitution (ii) Updates to DAO governing documents and processes |
(i) Supermajority Vote (ii) Standard Vote |
- Execution Phase.
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In the event a proposal does not pass its approval threshold, it fails and nothing happens.
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In the event a proposal passes its approval threshold, one of two things can happen:
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Timelock execution (Onchain): Votes that can be executed by the timelock are sent to the Timelock contract to be passed. Thereafter, after it has been in the timelock for three days, it will be executed manually by the Governance Manager.
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Enacted by the relevant stakeholders (Offchain): Depending on what the proposal concerns, it could be enacted by the relevant party (i.e. Security Council, Foundation Governance team, etc.).
Article IV: Governance Facilitators
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Governor Manager and Governor Admin. The Governor Manager and Governor Admin are multi-sig wallet addresses that have been given additional permissions on the Governor smart contract to facilitate the governance processes of Scroll DAO.
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Governor Manager. The Governor Manager has the ability to create proposals regardless of whether its voting power meets the proposal threshold. The Governor Manager is controlled by the Foundation’s governance team. This team works with and acts on behalf of and in the interest of the Scroll DAO in good faith.
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Governor Admin. The Governor Admin shall have the ability to enable, disable and modify certain governance processes and parameters in the interest of the DAO and acting in good faith. The Governor Admin will be controlled by the Security Council (see Article V below for more details) and will have the ability to bypass the governance process for the following actions:
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Update the deadline of an active proposal;
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Update the voting delay;
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Update the voting period;
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Update the proposal threshold;
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Update the admin address (replaces the current admin for a new one);
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Update the manager address;
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Update the proposal type of an active proposal;
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Cancel a proposal;
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Create or modify a proposal type (altering quorum and approval thresholds); and
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Enable or disable a voting module (external contracts that allow you to override the proposal creation and voting logic to enable new types of votes).
Article V: The Security Council
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The Security Council. The Security Council is a committee of 12 members, who are signers of a multi-sig wallet. The primary goal of the Security Council is to safeguard the security, integrity and efficient operations of the Scroll zkEVM rollup. The Security Council oversees protocol upgrades, emergency response and other critical decisions impacting the Scroll ecosystem.
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Emergency and Non-Emergency Permissions. The Security Council acts as a 9/12 multisig and safeguards the Scroll protocol using certain Emergency and Non-Emergency permissions as follow:
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Non-Emergency protocol upgrades
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Includes routine software and protocol upgrades, routine maintenance, and other parameter adjustments.
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At inception, these upgrades are executed manually. Non-emergency upgrades are almost always voted on first via the governance process. Then, pending a successful vote, the Security Council executes these protocol upgrades manually.
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Emergency protocol upgrades
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The Security Council can skip the governance process to make an emergency upgrade to the protocol. They would then be required to report on this activity after-the-fact to the community.
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These situations might include (but are not limited to) any incidents that may impact the security or liveness of the Scroll chain that require protocol upgrades.
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Full admin controls over the governance system
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The Security Council serves as the Governor Admin to the Governor contract and has the ability to change the governance process to ensure the correctness and safety of Scroll governance, in the interest of the DAO and acting in good faith, as described in Article IV above.
- Membership and Appointment.
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The Security Council is composed of 12 participants — each a signatory in the 9/12 multisig, with no more than 2 persons from the same or affiliated organization. Members have been thoughtfully selected for their (1) technical competency (and proficiency in rollup and Scroll technology), (2) reputation as trusted individuals/entities with demonstrated alignment with Scroll’s vision, (3) geographic diversity, and (4) aligned incentives (e.g. no conflicts of interest).
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The members of the Security Council are divided into two cohorts, Cohort A and Cohort B. Cohort A shall have an initial term of 18 months, with subsequent terms of 12 months each. Cohort B shall have an initial term and subsequent terms of 12 months each.
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At the end of term of each Cohort, the members of that Cohort may be re-appointed and new members may be appointed by Scroll Foundation.
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During the term of the Cohort, members of the Security Council may be removed by Scroll Foundation, where it is deemed necessary to safeguard the best interest of the Scroll DAO and Scroll Foundation.
Article VI: Scroll Foundation
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Scroll Foundation. Scroll Foundation is a Cayman Islands foundation company that serves as the steward and driving force behind the Scroll ecosystem. Its core mission is to foster transparency, community engagement, and to decentralize governance. It is the legal entity that represents the Scroll DAO and can facilitate operational and administrative objectives of the Scroll DAO.
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Core Activities. The core activities of Scroll Foundation include the following:
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Foster ecosystem growth through strategic initiatives, such as grant programs;
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Support and fund research and development activities and projects, focussed on zero knowledge technology for blockchains and governance of digital communities;
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Educate the public regarding Scroll DAO and zero knowledge technology for blockchains;
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Support and facilitate governance infrastructure, social media interactions, and various services for Scroll DAO (including engaging officers, employees, contractors, and service providers to carry out the operational and administrative objectives of the Scroll DAO); and
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Facilitate compliance with relevant laws and regulations.
- Board of Directors.
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Scroll Foundation is governed by a Board of Directors, which acts as a collective body to oversee and handle the operational and administrative aspects of the Scroll Foundation and to support the activities of the Scroll DAO.
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SCR holders’ interests are represented by the Scroll Foundation with respect to contractual and legal processes. Directors are authorized to take any actions reasonably necessary on behalf of the Scroll Foundation to give effect to a vote of the SCR holders, including passing any director resolution to memorialize such vote.
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Directors must act honestly and in good faith in the best interests of the Foundation.
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Directors may be appointed or removed from time to time in accordance with the articles of association of Scroll Foundation (“Articles of Association”). If there is any conflict between the provisions of the Constitution and the Articles of Association, the Articles of Association shall prevail.
[END]
6 Likes
Friends,
The thread is littered with quotes like:
My point is that there is a higher standard we can hold ourselves to. This could look something like governance minimization @eugene , though it need not be that in all contexts. It is just simple, honest, humble design.
My statements are all about what exists right now, which is all we can reliably verify ourselves. However, if I do cast my mind forward, this is what I see:
- The Governor Manager - which “has the ability to create proposals regardless of whether its voting power meets the proposal threshold” - would need to be upgraded to remove such awful power.
- This would, by the constitution’s design, require a super majority vote, which is quite a thing to organize.
- If such a super majority vote were achieved, you would need to write another Governance Manager to upgrade it to, get that audited, probably get it re-audited, audit the deploy process and the upgrade process, checking the storage properly etc. etc.
- What’s even worse, the current Governor Manager uses the ERC1967 Proxy pattern. This means that all future versions of this contract will also be proxied, which means that the admin of the contract can change to whatever implementation they please at any time. Getting away from an admin for the proxy would likely mean overhauling the whole system. Doing so would also likely require at least one more supermajority vote passing.
My genuine question is: is all of this cost and work truly worth the governance theatre this constitution instantiates? What benefit are we (both Foundation and DAO) really getting? Why create so much busy work for a small team that should have a lot of other, much better, technical things to work on?
The Foundation is still totally liable: any half-decent legal brain can see that. The DAO has no meaningful power, and at best just surfaces slightly better signal for the Foundation to act on.
1 Like