Proposal: Execution Oversight Council (EOC) Formation

General
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This proposal has been authored by @Kene_StableLab, @Jamilya, and myself. Thank you all who provided initial thoughts through the CCC3 process.

Proposal Type: Operations

Summary

Requested Budget: 500,000 SCR
Timeline: 6 Months

This proposal is meant to establish the Execution Oversight Council (EOC), a dedicated operations and accountability body responsible for tracking, monitoring, and ensuring the successful execution of all DAO proposals, service provider deliverables, and governance initiatives.

The EOC will serve as the backbone of accountability for Scroll DAO governance, providing comprehensive oversight, regular reporting, and quality assurance across all funded activities. By maintaining a centralized tracking system and conducting regular check-ins with proposal executors and service providers, the committee will ensure transparency, accountability, and timely delivery of promised outcomes.

The EOC will work very closely with the governance and community teams at the Foundation as appropriate.

MAIN OPEN QUESTION: What kind of enforcement ability should the EOC have? See the enforcement section below.

Motivation

As Scroll DAO continues to grow and fund diverse initiatives, the need for systematic oversight and accountability mechanisms has become increasingly apparent. Currently, tracking proposal execution, service provider performance, and initiative outcomes relies heavily on ad-hoc processes and voluntary reporting. This creates several challenges, including inconsistent follow-up on funded proposals, lack of standardized performance metrics, difficulty in identifying delays or issues early, and limited visibility into the overall health and progress of DAO-funded activities.

Furthermore, the governance team at the Foundation is responsible for all DAO operations (outside of the EGC and GCR WG). This council would be a first step towards creating a dedicated operational component within the DAO.

The Execution Oversight Council (EOC) addresses these gaps by introducing Scroll DAO’s first professionalized operational and oversight layer. This ensures that every SCR allocated delivers its intended value while maintaining high standards of transparency and accountability throughout the ecosystem.

This council serves as an operations and accountability counterpart to existing governance bodies such as (Ecosystem Growth Council, Community Council, etc.) by overseeing execution, facilitating cross-council coordination, and ensuring alignment between approved initiatives and their delivery

Execution

Operational

The committee will consist of three dedicated members selected for their operational expertise, attention to detail, and commitment to Scroll’s governance principles. Each member will contribute approximately 20 hours per week, ensuring comprehensive coverage of all DAO activities.

The committee will be activated immediately upon approval and selection of all three members, with priority given to candidates who demonstrate strong project management experience, familiarity with DAO operations, and excellent communication skills.

The Execution Oversight Council will operate under two core pillars:

  • Operational enablement: ensuring seamless execution of DAO proposals, milestone tracking, and cross-council coordination, in collaboration with the governance team.
  • Accountability & oversight: enforcing transparency, monitoring performance, and surfacing risks or gaps early in the process.

Some focus areas within this will include:

  • Comprehensive proposal tracking
  • Service provider oversight
  • Quality assurance

Comprehensive Proposal Tracking

  • The committee will maintain a detailed database of all approved proposals, including timelines, deliverables, budget allocations, and current status.

  • Regular check-ins with proposal executors will be scheduled based on project complexity and duration, with at least monthly touch points for all active initiatives.

  • The committee will also implement standardized reporting templates to ensure consistent information collection across all projects.

  • The committee will have the ability to engage a service provider / tool to streamline this process, or would be able to issue a grant to have a custom one built if that makes the most sense.

Service Provider Oversight

  • The committee will establish performance metrics and KPIs for all contracted service providers, conduct quarterly performance reviews, and maintain open communication channels to address concerns proactively.

  • This includes tracking deliverable completion rates, budget adherence, and quality of outputs against agreed-upon standards.

  • The priority in this regard will be oversight of the treasury management service provider(s) chosen by the DAO.

Quality assurance

  • The committee will develop and maintain quality standards for different types of deliverables, conduct spot checks and reviews of submitted work, and provide constructive feedback to help teams improve their performance.

  • When issues arise, the committee will work collaboratively with teams to develop improvement plans rather than taking a punitive approach. If reasonable resolutions are not found between the EOC and the relevant party, then the EOC is expected to put forth a DAO proposal to address the issue.

  • The EOC will also begin to support DAO operations more broadly as time permits.

Enforcement

All enforcement actions will require a unanimous vote amongst the EOC members and a full report on the forum within 3 business days of an action being taken.

Conflicts of Interest (COI)

In the instance where a clear violation of COI takes place, the EOC will be able to block the selection or inclusion of the violating party from any proposal, council, or working group as well as receiving Governance Contribution Recognition rewards.

Pausing Funds

In the instance where the EOC finds any contractual violations from third party service providers, councils, workings groups, or any other parties executing proposals on the DAOs behalf, the EOC will be able to pause any further pay outs until a resolution is agreed upon between the violating party and the EOC.

Arbitration

The governance team will act as arbiters in any instance the EOC performs any of the actions described in this [Enforcement] section as needed. As such, if a violating party believes the EOC was acting in error, they can appeal to the governance team for an ad hoc review.

Reporting and Communication

Transparency and regular communication form the foundation of the committee’s operations.

  • Monthly reports will be published to the DAO forum within five business days of each month’s end, detailing the status of all active proposals and initiatives, highlighting any concerns or delays, celebrating successful completions, and providing metrics on overall DAO operational health.

  • These reports will include visual dashboards for easy comprehension of complex data.

Quarterly reports will provide deeper analysis, including trend identification across multiple months, recommendations for process improvements, comprehensive reviews of service provider performance, and strategic insights for DAO governance evolution. These reports will serve as critical inputs for DAO decision-making and continuous improvement.

Weekly Public DAO Accountability calls will be organized by the committee to have touch points with all DAO Service Providers in order to have transparent coordination and possibly identify opportunities for improvement and collaboration between engagements and service providers.

The committee will maintain an active presence in all DAO governance calls, providing regular updates on operational matters and being available to answer questions from delegates and community members. This direct engagement ensures that accountability remains a visible and valued aspect of DAO operations.

Personnel

The EOC will have three seats. These seats can NOT be filled by employees of Scroll Foundation or Up Labs. Seats can be shared by a pair, if deemed appropriate during the recruiting process. Delegates, community members, or external professionals.

The Scroll Foundation will embark on a recruiting exercise to select the best candidates to sit on this committee and present the selected candidates to the DAO.

A public recruiting process will commence via a Foundation-managed form. Results and information will be shared afterwards. A 3-business-day veto will begin once the announcement is posted on the forum.

Budget and Compensation

The total budget request is 500,000 SCR.

This includes $90,000 USD equivalent in SCR for the initial six-month term to cover compensation for the council members. At a price of $0.35, this is approximately 258,000 SCR. This proposal intends to set base pay of $5,000 USD equivalent per month per committee member, for 20 hours/week, paid quarterly to align with standard DAO payment cycles.

This compensation reflects the significant time commitment and specialized skills required for the effective execution of committee responsibilities. No additional operational budget is requested as the committee will utilize existing DAO infrastructure and tools.

Additionally, the EOC would have a budget of approximately 240,000 SCR (the amount remaining from the 500k SCR less the portion for compensation).

  • This amount could be used by the EOC to engage service providers, tooling providers, or commissioning a report relevant to its mandate (e.g. getting a relevant dashboard in place).

  • In the first iteration, we propose that the use of these funds requires unanimous agreement amongst the EOC members and approval from the governance team.

  • This requirement is in place solely for the first 6 months as the EOC commences.

  • To be clear, this budget is to be used at the EOC’s discretion but they are by no means required to use it if they don’t need to. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.

Decision-Making and Governance

The committee will operate with clear decision-making protocols.

  • Routine operational decisions require simple majority approval (2 of 3 members).

  • Decisions involving potential conflicts of interest or significant concerns about proposal execution require unanimous approval.

  • In cases where the committee identifies serious issues requiring DAO intervention, detailed reports will be submitted to the broader governance body for consideration.

Selected committee members must also make full disclosures of all financial/organizational affiliations, both as part of their application process and in an ongoing fashion. Committee members are prohibited from leading active proposals that have a financial benefit attached for the execution of the proposal.

The committee will maintain strict confidentiality regarding sensitive information while maximizing transparency in all other aspects. Clear guidelines will be established for handling confidential data, with regular audits to ensure compliance.

Timeline and Milestones

The first month will focus on committee formation and initial setup, including the development of tracking systems, creation of reporting templates, and initial audit of all active DAO proposals and initiatives. The EOC should also create a process where anyone can raise concerns, whether over conflicts of interest or the execution of a specific program.

Starting the first month, the EOC will also coordinate with the governance team to identify operational tasks to take on relating to DAO activities.

Months two and three will see full implementation of monitoring processes, publication of the first monthly reports at the end of month two, and establishment of regular communication rhythms with all stakeholders.

By months four and five, the committee will have refined its processes based on initial learnings and begun developing recommendations for long-term operational improvements. The final month will include preparation of a comprehensive review and proposal for potential renewal or expansion of the committee’s mandate.

Other EOC outputs should include:

  • Template for note taking and reporting for all councils and working groups.

  • Charter for the EOC going forward, which would need social ratification within the DAO.

Success Criteria & Evaluation

The committee’s effectiveness will be measured through several key metrics.

  • All funded proposals should have current status updates within the tracking system, with 95% of monthly reports published on schedule.

  • Service provider performance reviews should be completed quarterly for all active providers, and committee members should maintain at least 90% attendance at DAO governance calls.

  • Reduction of bottlenecks, on-time proposal submission/completion

  • Community feedback will be actively solicited through surveys and forum engagement to ensure the committee is meeting stakeholder needs.

  • Producing a charter for the council going forward that outlines scope, roles, and renewal mechanisms for future cycles.

  • Providing clear updates as outlined above.

Future Evolution

While this proposal establishes the committee for an initial six-month term, the intention is to create a sustainable operational function within Scroll DAO. Before the term expires, the committee will present a detailed proposal for continuation, including learnings from the initial period, recommendations for scope adjustments, and any necessary budget modifications. The committee will also develop standard operating procedures that can be transferred to future committee members, ensuring institutional knowledge retention.

Conclusion

The Execution Oversight Committee represents a strategic investment in Scroll DAO’s long-term resilience and execution capacity. Together, these bodies will provide the professional oversight, coordination, and tracking mechanisms needed to ensure that initiatives are not only delivered efficiently but also aligned with DAO priorities. By establishing professional oversight and tracking mechanisms, the DAO can ensure that every initiative delivers its promised value while maintaining the highest standards of transparency and accountability. This committee will serve as the operational backbone that enables Scroll DAO to scale effectively while maintaining community trust and delivering consistent results.

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Thank you, @eugene and team for this proposal, very well thought out. In response to your main question about Enforcement, I would also like to see the EOC have the power to claw back any paid funds from milestones, or other payments completed (even partial claw back), in addition to pausing upcoming funds release, if the violation warrants it. Removal of payments are the real incentive for determent, in addition to public notification of violations (forum post by EOC for reason for violation enforcement) to the DAO.

Also, there should be the deliverable from the EOC to create a list of general violation types and penalties, such as including 1st warning, 2nd violation with removal from council/working group, etc. in addition to loss of rewards, payments, ineligibility to be on another working group or council for 6 months, and the possible cancellation of contracts if they are a service provider.

The committee should also restrict service providers from being EOC members (I don’t believe that we have any SP’s currently, but suggest we add this clause for when we do have SP’s). And an obvious addition, is to add that EOC members cannot be a current member (or become a candidate during their term) of another working group or committee.

Which leads me the next point about COI and EOC members:

How would this include professional delegate teams if they have an indiv who is a member on the EOC but another team member of that professional delegate team submits a proposal - with a financial benefit? Not only in regards to a conflict of interest, that you already addressed in this proposal, but also the overseeing of proposals that a team member from a professional delegate team submits when another team member is a member of the EOC, who is supposed to be overseeing for the DAO.

And for delegates who are members of the EOC, if they are prohibited from leading proposals that have a financial benefit, does this also include as co-authors on proposals and what about proposals (for both professional delegate teams and indiv delegates) for non-financial proposals that they are either the author or co-author?

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Thank you to @Kene_StableLab @Jamilya and @eugene for putting together the proposal to establish the Execution Oversight Council (EOC). We view this initiative as a foundational step toward strengthening Scroll DAO’s operational maturity and accountability, moving us toward greater decentralization and reduced reliance on the Foundation. This direction aligns with @alexsotodigital proposal Toward a Role-Based Org Chart for Scroll, which emphasizes clearer roles, responsibilities, and information flows.

Regarding the open question about the EOC’s enforcement: beyond its core mandate, the EOC has the potential to become a strategic asset for Scroll DAO’s long-term health and decentralization journey. Its comprehensive data collection, covering proposal tracking, service provider performance, and quality assurance, offers a unique opportunity to move beyond simple reporting. This information can and should be leveraged as strategic intelligence to guide future governance decisions.

For example, identifying trends in proposal delays or recurring quality issues could directly shape the design of future grant programs or refine proposal submission requirements. Ultimately, the EOC’s quarterly reports should go beyond summarizing past activity and include actionable policy recommendations derived from aggregated insights, transforming the EOC’s role from reactive oversight to proactive, strategic guidance.

Additionally, we think the point raised by @coffee-crusher is an important and sensitive one when it comes to conflicts of interest. Clarifying COI rules for EOC members, especially around professional delegate teams, co-authorship, and proposals with financial benefits, is essential to ensure impartial oversight and maintain trust in the EOC’s decisions.

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Personally, this aligns with what I think is reasonable. Keen to hear what others think.

Will add this to the revised proposal.

This a top-of-mind consideration during the recruiting process but we can be more explicit in the proposal, as with your comment about an EOC member can’t be on another council.

Can add more explicit language but we see professional delegates as one team so it doesn’t matter if it’s different people involved. As in, if professional delegate X decides to join the EOC, they will effectively be barred from being part of other programs during their time on the EOC. This is an important point to discuss as it may be seen as too much for some, but I personally see this as a crucial part of having a true independent body.

I would say that co-authoring is ok if there is no involvement in the execution or financial gain from the proposal. As in, if someone wants feedback from an EOC member to craft a proposal and they get credited as a co-author as a result, I can see how that can be beneficial for the DAO. If their involvement goes beyond that, that should not be allowed.

Exactly - we hope this group starts developing that for Scroll DAO.

Appreciate you bringing that up. Do you have any specific changes you want made to the proposal beyond what is written here? This is a fair point and just thinking about how to reflect it in the proposal.

See comments above in response to @coffee-crusher’s comments and let me know if you want any further clarifications / additions at this time.

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There’s a critical step of interaction between this council and executors before a proposal is approved, whereby it’s easier to define KPIs or accountability measures before a proposal’s deliverables and budget are finalised.

The council needs enforcement authority to have any teeth. So the risk is having the oversight committee be too powerful and start mandating unreasonable terms, i.e. asking executors to do too much reporting work because it makes life easier for the oversight council => scroll becomes a pain to work with, reducing the quality of service providers and the overall ecosystem moves slower, trapped in bureaucracy.

Note these are systemic patterns, organisations delude themselves over and over that it won’t apply to them because they have a different “culture” or whatever, but the system always wins.

This is the classic tension between execution departments and compliance teams, which is often resolved by having a higher-up (an executive) who can intercede and ‘negotiate’ with compliance to find better solutions. Not sure what the mechanism would be here, but it needs to be lightweight as a formal arbitration will feel like too much and would thus not be used enough and allow the oversight committee to run rampant.

A complementary solution is aligning the performance tracking for the oversight itself with ecosystem objectives. As long as these are not short-termist, then performance over medium-long range works. A mechanism here could be having a stream of tokens with say 1 year lockup as part of a compensation package.

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While the proposal provides a strong framework, we suggest a clearer articulation of the EOC’s role in delivering actionable policy recommendations. While “strategic insights for DAO governance evolution” is a valuable start, I believed specifying that quarterly reports will “proactively develop and publish recommendations from aggregated insights” would solidify the EOC as a key source of proactive strategic intelligence.

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I like where this is going, accountability is something we’ve all felt was missing. A couple of thoughts though.

From a legal angle, enforcement is tricky. Pausing funds or blocking participants is powerful, but there should be a clear appeal path beyond just the Foundation so it doesn’t feel centralized. And for conflicts of interest, I’d love to see member disclosures kept in a living doc so anyone can check affiliations at any time.

Overall though, I think this is a strong step. Tightening up those areas would make it even sturdier without slowing the intent behind it.

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Hi!

Thanks for this proposal, we believe that accountability is sometimes a hard debt that becomes notable when it’s too late and therefore tackling it with a proper Council makes 100% sense to us.

We want to contribute to the conversation with some thoughts on the role the EOC should play within the DAO in order for it to be impactful and a cornerstone for transparent operations. As we know at this point, the Councils structure allow for specialized execution on scopes relevant to the DAO, being the Ecosystem Growth Council (EGC), Community Council (CC), Governance Council (GC) the ones that are operational or down the pipeline.

Based on the progressive decentralization framework, liability uncertainty and the upcoming Timelock proposal, the execution of payments is rightfully held by Foundation on the correspondent multisigs dedicated for Councils and Programs, leaving for councils the decision-making process of what and how to fund, leaving the aftermath as an open question that the EOC is answering.

In that sense there is some logical nesting of proposals/initiatives within each of the Councils as per their area of expertise. For example:

  • Local Nodes → CC
  • Security Audits Program → EGC
  • Better DAO Decisions & Aligned Incentives: Research on Carroll Mechanisms → GC
  • Initiatives that may not fall in any existing Council (i.e Treasu Manager) → EOC

The broad questions regarding the EOC are then:

1. Should it operate at the initiative/proposal level or at the Council level (i.e is the EOC supposed to monitor Local Nodes performance or audit the CCs monitoring?)

2. Should payments be greenlighted or should it act ex post (pausing funds / clawback)

Given the current framework, it seems the EOC will provide operational support for Councils in order to track the milestones of the initiatives under their scopes, but leaving the success metrics of those initiatives up to the Councils themselves as well as approval for the milestone-based payments, something we adress in the next section.

Either way, it should be necessary for the EOC to develop a baseline framework for milestone-based payments that could serve upcoming proposals and become a resource for Councils in order to drive compliance.

Flow scenarios

Right now we envision 4 high level tasks that comprise operations up to this point

  • Reporting

  • Milestone control

  • Coordination

  • Approval of payments

The combination of this allows for different set of responsabilities which we think need to be clear in order to ensure a smooth flow and avoid falling into massive operational overhead. In that sense, there are two scenarios we envision for the EOC:

Scenario 1 - EOC tracking milestones and approving Council payments

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In this case the EOC is naturally more empowered to determine the unfolding of the respective grant.

Scenario 2 - EOC monitoring milestones at the Council level

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In this case the EOC operates at the Council level, tracking milestones through the Councils lens and not having direct impact in the approval of the disbursement but instead having the possibility of pause funds or perform clawbacks.

Enforcement

We think that some level of enforcement is unavoidable for the success of this Council. Therefore, from our perspective, the pause/clawback of funds is certainly something that should be present, therefore remarking the need for highly qualified contributors for the EOC. As being mentioned in the post, although submitting a proposal should be the final resolution for any given conflict, there should be room for more immediate actions that might not require to wait until the voting cycle.

That being said, the discussion can revolve around how the EOC exercises this power. As we see it, there are two approaches: the first is giving the EOC access to the multisig in charge of disbursing these payments, giving them the possibility to prevent the distribution of payments if the necessary conditions aren’t met. However, given that currently all the multisigs are under Foundation control, coupled with the legal implications of extending access to the EOC, the second approach is that the EOC provides binding resolutions as per a TBD framework to that end and with the majorities described.

Looking forward to your feedback to keep this conversation going!

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This looks like a very solid proposal overall. Execution oversight is one of the main challenges DAOs face, and introducing a council to ensure accountability is an important step forward. I like the inclusion of monthly reports and visual dashboards.

  • On the budget side, it is a bit higher than I would have expected, especially the 240k allocation for service providers. A smaller portion there might be sufficient, but since it’s optional, that seems acceptable.
  • The 20 hours per week commitment for three council members is significant, but given the scope and the heavy workload already carried by the governance team, this level of support makes sense.
  • I agree that council applicants should be held to high standards, as @coffee-crusher already pointed out, especially regarding conflicts of interest and limiting their participation in other DAO activities.
  • On enforcement, the suggested mechanisms seem reasonable. Clawing back funds may be difficult to execute in practice, so I’d be fine with leaving that out for the moment. As @danielo mentioned, it’s important for the DAO to strike a balance between effective oversight and avoiding micromanagement.

Since this is a fairly new concept, I think it’s most important to leave room for iteration. We’ll should be in a better position to evaluate the enforcement ability of the council once it has been in place for a while.

@SEEDGov which of the scenarios you presented seems more accurate from your perspective?

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Thank you, Eugene, for this proposal.
We see this as an important step to strengthen accountability and transparency within Scroll DAO. The creation of a dedicated council to track funded initiatives, monitor progress, and provide structured reporting will add significant value to governance and execution.
We especially appreciate the inclusion of a centralized database and recurring reporting cycles, which will improve clarity for the broader community. One suggestion would be to further detail the escalation process in cases of underperformance or delays, ensuring the EOC has clear mechanisms for follow-up and resolution.
With these refinements, we believe the EOC can become a cornerstone for efficient and trustworthy DAO operations.

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Thanks Eugene for putting this proposal together. There’s a lot of work that goes into managing and tracking funded proposals, so having a dedicated council focused on this will be a big help.

I agree with @danielo that KPIs and accountability measures should be defined at the application stage. Setting these expectations upfront makes it easier to stop or claw back funding if commitments aren’t met.

Overall I support forming the council, but proposals should include clear and enforceable accountability measures from the application stage.

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So we think the proposal is aiming to Scenario 1, where every project (including Councils themselves) should fall under the EOCs scope, which we think it makes sense.

What is key in order to reduce overhead is coordination and having the EOC and Councils work together in monitoring milestones and activity (i.e having all parties in a single check in with the grantee/SP). The Councils should provide the SME perspective and the EOC the process and compliance side of the equation. Of course they’d be on different sides of the counter when evaluating Councils.

A note on tooling: Given that the Community Council has already adopted Karma-GAP for monitoring it’d be benefitial to have everything on the same platform but of course up to Council to decide on their tooling.

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@eugene , with the consensus of adjustments to this proposal based upon the discussions above, is it possible to consolidate the proposal refinements in the comments, so it’s easier for to understand the latest version?

For me personally, I feel ready to endorse this proposal for the September voting cycle, and just need to see the changes consolidated so I fully understand what I’m endorsing.

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Thanks for this proposal!

These two points are crucial for effective management of execution.

By having this structure in place, the DAO will have the opportunity to monitor current initiatives and assess their efficiency closely.

Strong support.

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Thank you, everyone, for the feedback. From what I have gathered, these are the main points that we would be looking to include in the revised proposal. Please feel free to correct me or point out anything I might have missed.

The primary recommendations include:

  • Granting the EOC power to claw back funds (including partial clawbacks) from completed milestones when violations occur, alongside public notification of violations through forum posts. As a follow up to that, the EOC should develop a comprehensive violations framework detailing offense types and graduated penalties, including warnings, removal from positions, payment forfeiture, six-month ineligibility periods for other roles, and potential contract cancellations for service providers.
  • Additional governance safeguards, which would include prohibiting service providers from serving as EOC members and preventing EOC members from simultaneously holding or seeking positions on other working groups or committees. The conflict of interest provisions would require expansion to address professional delegate teams, specifically clarifying restrictions when one team member serves on the EOC while another submits proposals, and defining whether prohibitions extend to co-authorship roles and non-financial proposals.
  • Finally, the EOC’s role should evolve beyond reactive oversight to include strategic intelligence gathering, with quarterly reports containing actionable policy recommendations derived from aggregated insights to guide future governance decisions.

I would appreciate feedback on these proposed changes from everyone who provided feedback to this proposal.

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Thank you so much @Kene_StableLab for consolidating the comments and recommendations for this proposal. The list looks correct in capturing the consensus of the comments, and I don’t see any discussed items missed.

For me personally, I’m ready to endorse this proposal for the September voting cycle that includes these additions to the final proposal version.

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GM!
:nerd_face:

Thank you for this comprehensive proposal (and constructive comments).

Sorry for the delay in my comments, but they say better late than never!

I’d like to offer 5 suggestions to contribute to the ongoing design of this initiative (specially if this proposal remains open until October voting cycle):

:hand_with_fingers_splayed:

1. Rethinking the Metaphor: From “Oversight” to “Execution Learning Council”

While the current name emphasizes surveillance and control, I believe we might benefit from a slight reframe… something like Execution Learning Council.

This subtle shift reflects a different posture: not standing above other working groups (as “oversight” may imply), but rather operating underneath, supporting foundations, spotting patterns, and harvesting lessons learned to improve our collective execution capacity. Think “support infrastructure” rather than “supervisión”.

This perspective also aligns well with proposals like the Weaver + Scribe Support Squad, which promotes a culture of care and operational coherence across the DAO without centralizing authority.

2. Accountability as Learning, Not Just Enforcement

The proposal rightly identifies the importance of enforcement powers (e.g., clawbacks for milestone violations), but I’d encourage us to consider psychological safety as a foundational element of accountability. In practice, true accountability occurs when contributors can openly acknowledge delays or mistakes, trusting that the system is designed to help diagnose root causes rather than punish individuals.

A culture of “accountability through learning” could include:

  • Safe pathways for contributors to raise internal challenges or signal that initial milestones no longer make sense due to real-time learnings.
  • Reflective reporting that focuses on what didn’t go well (instead of merely listing accomplishments).
  • Conflict mediation and process retrospectives.

3. Streamlining Reporting & Reducing Bureaucratic Overhead

I’d recommend that the EOC (or ELC :wink:) explore centralizing and streamlining reporting responsibilities, potentially using standardized templates, filled by the EOC council itself (or supported by roles like the Scribe in the Support Squad).

If we ask every working group to write extensive reports on top of doing their work, we risk optimizing for appearances rather than results.

As you mention, seamless execution is a goal, and that means councils should spend more time doing and improving, not reporting. The EOC could then synthesize cross-council patterns and deliver truly strategic insight back to the DAO.

4. Surfacing Tensions (without Blame)

The proposed “public notification of violations” is a powerful tool, but I believe its framing matters deeply. Could this instead be presented as highlighting “areas of improvement” and operational bottlenecks, rather than “concerns”?

I also recommend creating an open pathway (e.g., form or forum thread) where any DAO member can raise a topic (about blockers, conflict of interest or execution breakdowns) and have the EOC process it in a constructive, resolution-oriented way. That is, promoting open dialogue rather than filling out ‘anonymous’ forms.

5. Clarifying Scope: Monitoring vs Meta-Monitoring

In response to a question raised in the thread:

I’d advocate for the EOC to directly track Local Node performance, especially by providing shared tooling, milestone templates, and data collection methods.

I believe this would align with Scenario 1 from the @SeedGov comment, where execution accountability happens across all working groups, not as a nested loop of audits. By owning the process, the EOC can also reduce redundancy and make tracking more automated and equitable.

Bonus Suggestion: Potential Integration with Weaver + Scribe Proposal

If this proposal remains open until October, it might be worth exploring whether some of it could be integrated with the proposed Weaver + Scribe model (perhaps even culminating in a single proposal).

The Support Squad could help coordinate reporting rhythms, maintain documentation, and even assist with drafting quarterly overviews; ensuring that accountability is not just enforced, but also resourced and accompanied.

Thank you again for opening this important discussion. I believe Scroll DAO is at a pivotal stage where we can shape not only structures of enforcement, but also the ethos of collaboration, learning, and shared responsibility.

Happy to continue refining this together.

:victory_hand:

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Echoing the sentiment of @coffee-crusher, these recommendations capture the discussion quite well and as a verified delegate, we’re ready to endorse an edited version of the proposal for the Sep 1st cycle.

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UPD:

We will not be moving with this proposal this (September) voting cycle, as it still needs thorough refinement and alignment with the community. Hoping to see this proposal in its final shape and form in October voting cycle! :crossed_fingers:

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Horizontal Structure & Strategic Coherence

I love this proposal because execution is key for any entity to grow IN COHERENCE.

One of the hardest challenges for any organization is to maintain coherence across departments and ensure true cross-functional collaboration. Knowledge-sharing and horizontal alignment are essential for executing strategy in a consistent, sustainable way. No more silos.

Therefore, I would like to propose to align with modern organizational structures, having the Execution Oversight Council as a horizontal entity. Its main goal is to align vision, strategy, and execution, making sure the entire organization follows coherence with the DAO’s stipulated goals. For this reason, it should not operate as a vertical control mechanism, but rather as a horizontal structure that guarantees every initiative is delivered in line with the DAO’s execution parameters and strategic framework - from creation to delivery.

I would also suggest renaming the Execution Oversight Council to either Execution Oversight Committee (EOC) or Operations & Oversight Board (OOB), since the term Council implies vision and strategy, while this body is meant to be a horizontal organ of control, accountability, and continuous improvement—ensuring coherence across all initiatives without adding bureaucracy.

The council’s position in the hierarchy—whether perceived as top or down—is secondary; the goal is not to add bureaucracy, but to oversee execution across the whole DAO while driving continuous improvement.

Regarding the metrics, I like all you have shared.

Relying on clear, measurable metrics creates three key advantages:

  1. Eliminates ambiguity. With objective, agreed-upon measures, it becomes simple to determine whether goals were met, reducing the risk of disagreements, misinterpretations, or internal friction.

  2. Enables independent yet aligned work. Teams can execute autonomously while staying anchored to a shared north star.

  3. Reduces micromanagement. The EOC’s focus shifts from monitoring timelines and tasks to tracking progress against strategic objectives. This allows oversight without stifling execution, and turns follow-up meetings into meaningful discussions about outcomes and blockers, rather than tactical details.

By embedding this horizontal, metric-driven approach, this entity ensures that the DAO’s growth remains coherent, collaborative, and strategically aligned.

Best,