🧾 Request for Comments: DAO treasury management RFP

Ecosystem Growth
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tldr

This Request for Comments (RFC) is to review the treasury management Request for Proposals (RFP).

If you only have time for one thing, please review the ‘Open Questions for the DAO’ below.

Summary

The Governance team at the Scroll Foundation putting forth a Request for Comments on the proposed Request for Proposals (RFP) that will invite qualified service providers to support the DAO in designing, implementing, and evolving DAO treasury management strategy.

This call aims to build a robust and transparent foundation for treasury operations aligned with our long-term mission.

We are opening up questions to the DAO regarding preferred models, risk parameters, and strategic objectives for treasury governance. We are looking for feedback within one week of this post appear on the forum, and then will convert this Request for Comments into a Request for Proposal.

Background & motivation

DAOs take varied approaches to treasury management. Based on the public information, it seems that Optimism enables automated on-chain transfers and is exploring a Treasury Council. Arbitrum seems to have selected their partners via the RFP. Lido aligns treasury strategy with keeping ETH as the primary unit of account managed by a multisig committee. (Do ping us in the comments in case the aforementioned information is outdated or you have more insights on how other DAOs do it (successfully or not)).

The idea to progress treasury diversification conversations isn’t new and we had it listed in the Q1 goals. Since then, we have spoken to several service providers, looked into how other ecosystems are doing it and are finally ready to set a CTA:

  • Community input - perspectives, questions, and ideas on how Scroll DAO should approach treasury management

Once we receive comments from the community and revise the proposal, then we will open up a formal Request for Proposal. This RFP will seek:

  • Service provider proposals - including scope, cost, and reasoning for why their model fits Scroll DAO’s needs

Why now?

As Scroll DAO grows, so does the need for clear, proactive treasury management. A strong treasury strategy helps us:

  • Extend runway and reduce risk
  • Diversify beyond a single asset
  • Fund long-term programs and contributors
  • Support DAO independence and sustainability

The governance team has spoken to several experienced partners, including:

:ballot_box_with_ballot: Open questions for the DAO

We’d love to hear from the community. As we explore the path forward for Scroll’s treasury, please share:

  • Selection process - DAO vote, foundation choice + DAO veto, DAO vote + Foundation veto, quadratic vote, other?
  • Preference towards a single provider vs group. As in, are we open to a single provider potentially getting the opportunity to service the DAO or is there a clear preference for 2-3 to collaborate?
  • Any thoughts, comments, or examples from other ecosystems that we should consider?
  • Any service providers you would recommend we talk to? (or, alternatively, recommend not to)
  • Any strategies or priorities you believe the selected service provider(s) should focus on? (e.g. Should we prioritize stablecoin conversion ? Do we prefer modular on-chain execution (e.g., via Zodiac) or multisig ops?)
  • Any thoughts on forming a treasury management council or working group? The sentiment after CCC3 seemed to indicate no to a council / working group and yes to being held accountable by an Accountability Council and the Foundation.

If no feedback or other ideas are given then the gov team will assume that:

  • there is a preference for multiple providers, and
  • the DAO prefers a DAO vote with multiple options

Drop your input in the thread - this is a collaborative process, and your opinion matters.

Proposed Timeline

  • Tue July 29th - Request for Comments goes live
  • Tue Aug 5th - Request for Comments closes
  • Fri Aug 8th - Request for Proposals goes live
  • Mon Aug 18th - Request for Proposals closes

Open call to the service providers:

The governance team invites qualified service providers to submit proposals to support the DAO in developing a robust treasury management strategy. We are particularly interested in teams with demonstrated experience managing on-chain assets, supporting DAO governance processes, and designing transparent, risk-aware financial systems.

This is an opportunity to help shape Scroll’s financial future - not just by managing assets, but by co-designing the frameworks and tools that will support long-term sustainability, decentralization, and protocol alignment.

We welcome proposals from:

  • Treasury management companies/DAOs
  • On-chain risk and financial modeling teams
  • DAO-native strategists and financial consultants
  • Service providers with experience in tooling

All proposals will be reviewed by the Foundation and the DAO. Shortlisted teams may be invited to present their proposal publicly and/or take part in a pilot program or deeper scoping round.

All submitted proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria:

  1. Strategic fit: alignment with Scroll DAO’s mission & values.
  2. Relevant experience
  3. Treasury & risk management approach
  4. Tooling
  5. Cost
  6. Willingness to potentially work alongside other service providers

:open_mailbox_with_raised_flag: Submission Guidelines

Who can apply:
Treasury management companies/DAOs, on-chain risk and financial modeling teams, DAO-native strategists and financial consultants as well as service providers with experience in tooling.

What to include:

  • Overview of your team and relevant DAO experience
  • Description of proposed services
  • Tooling or protocol integrations
  • Pricing
  • Risk frameworks and assumptions
  • Case studies (examples from your work in other DAOs)

Proposal Deadline: Fri August 15th, 2025 at midnight UTC-8.

Please submit proposals as a post or comment in this thread.

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From our perspective, this is an excellent step in the write direction. It makes sense to ensure that while the DAO pursues various initiatives, the DAO is being financially responsible.

The DAO needs to be well-capitalised to meet its financial obligations. The DAO also needs to move away from paying people in SCR, and finally, the DAO needs a clearly defined budget for operations, at least a quarterly budget segmented across different aspects of the DAO.

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Shared the post at X so providers can come and offer their services and advantages: https://x.com/humbertobesso/status/1950605666525073843?s=46&t=BbkZvpxO1zjcKci51Aosmw

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Hi all,

I think @Kene_StableLab nailed it:

I would like to see the DAO become as “bear market ready” as possible. It would be great to see the DAO operate efficiently in all market conditions rather than be at its mercy.

I would also like to see a futarchy experiment in treasury management at some point in the future.

In response to the open questions:

Cheers!

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Thanks for the proposal Eugene and the great open questions that inspired me to share feedback on some of them.

For the selection process, I’d suggest a DAO vote with the Foundation having the ability to veto. The rationale here is that the Foundation is currently managing delegations, and in these early stages, it would be a strong signal to the ecosystem that stakeholders are aligned on such an important decision.

I think it’s better to have a single service provider rather than multiple. From an efficiency standpoint, it makes things simpler for both the provider and the DAO. I’m not sure yet how we’re planning to pay service providers, but that’s going to be a key detail in shaping the final decision. In general, the level of risk the DAO is comfortable with will guide the provider’s approach, and from what I’ve seen, DAOs tend to play things pretty safe. Also, if one provider is getting paid meaningfully, they’re more likely to make proactive proposals and engage with the DAO, rather than treating it like just another client.

I really like how Karpatkey manages the ENS treasury and how they report weekly on governance calls. In other DAOs, the information is available but you usually need to go looking for it. Karpatkey keeps delegates updated on their strategy and market outlook in a way that makes engagement much easier. If we had multiple providers, I think that kind of tight, ongoing relationship would be less likely to happen.

I don’t believe we need a working group either. I want to emphasize that the more layers of bureaucracy we introduce, the more expensive and less effective the DAO becomes. We should focus our resources on advancing the mission. Of course, some structure and clarity around roles is important, but we need to keep things lightweight and focused.

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One additional point I would like to note is that it is preferable to have a single treasury manager, rather than two or more; this way, there is a clear strategy and chain of responsibility for the DAO’s treasury operations.

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I am happy to see that progress is being made and this is a key moment for Sroll DAO.

My thoughts on the above.

A DAO vote with more than one option is the most effective. It promotes transparency.

It makes sense to have more than one provider, two or three that complement each other would make perfect sense

In terms of strategy, we need to prioritize on-chain execution and diversification of stablecoins. Achieving long-term sustainability should be our objective.

We should not have a full treasury council yet but the council can be formed later if the need arises.

I’m open to newer, protocol-native teams, but Karpatkey and Avantgarde look solid.

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Thanks for this RFC, that’s overall a very reasonable approach. I appreciate the transparency around the topic and the goal to find a provider that aligns most well with Scroll specifically.

As for the open questions:

  • Selection process: I’d actually deem a foundation choice + DAO veto as effective. I would trust the foundation at this point to select the best fit for the DAO, this seems rather like an expert decision to me.
  • Single provider vs. group: Generally, I think it’s beneficial to have multiple perspectives, even though I understand @Zeptimus / @Kene_StableLab rational that one provider is more streamlined. Possibly, there are multiple areas (e.g. treasury diversification vs. capital allocation), that could be shared.
  • Strategies of priorities: The goals mentioned are very reasonable. I would maybe add some liquidity management or strategies to make SCR more accessible in DeFi.
  • Council or working group: Accountability council sounds good, agree with @Matt_FactoryLabs on this.
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Hi!

We’re excited to see this RFC and this discussion around what is definitely a priority for the DAO. As we grow and undertake more financial commitments, having a dedicated service provider to support this side of operations is nothing but welcomed. Some delegates have provided some great insights we align on as well!

Going point by point

We do think that DAO vote + Foundation veto aligns with the current state of our governance, and having a DAO vote with multiple options should be the best way to signal preference among different applicants for the Foundation to leverage. What could also be explored is having Foundation pre-select applicants based on their RFCs and then having the DAO vote among the already endorsed options.

All of the firms in the list are renowned for their experience in various ecosystems, and probably the RFP will bring some new faces. In that sense, just a reflection to assess the upcoming RFPs based on their content and KPIs towards Scroll’s best interest, and not solely on the team’s background.

Although it is common practice to have multiple providers, which presumably fosters healthy competition, cross-pollination and checks and balances, the current state of Scroll’s treasury as well as its ongoing operations may not justify having multiple providers at the same time, at least from the start. This is definitely something that could be reviewed in the mid-term after the initial iteration.

What we think could be done is to set a mid-term third-party audit in order to thoroughly review the evolution of the strategy.

The stablecoin conversion strategy should certainly be a priority alongside a cash reserve of some sort. Also, passive yield for both SCR-only on-chain strategies and ETH-backed strategies should be accounted for (considering the Sequencer inflow).

Then, of course, there are multiple avenues that could be explored, such as RWAs, POL and research regarding alternative revenue streams. The exact definite scope of the TM will probably vary between applicants, but those avenues are worthy to consider in the pitches alongside a milestone-based approach for their rewards.

Modular execution is certainly interesting, and it’s definitely where we think overall governance should aim towards. The Lido TM framework serves as a pretty handy rundown of what it looks like.

The one concern at this point is to have the system make sense as a whole, something we have focused on during the CCC3, and it’ll likely be showcased during the September/October voting cycle. Although the modular approach is something we’d definitely like to lean into and work towards, having multisig ops is definitely a practical and quite effective way to manage these operations in the short term.

The Accountability Council should definitely play a role within the TM framework, as per assessing the overall performance of the strategies, providing green light on some operational decisions (reallocating capital, slight adjustment of parameters, etc) and acting as a primary communication channel. In that sense, the DAO should remain in charge of allocating the budget and approving the high-level strategy.

If keeping up with initiatives (i.e: new revenue streams, RWAs, POL, etc) would significantly increase the Accountability Committee’s overhead then the creation of a dedicated structure could be assessed.

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Thank you so much for the transparency of this process to determine the selection and priorities by the DAO for treasury management. I’ve included my responses inline below for the open questions.

Selection process - DAO vote, foundation choice + DAO veto, DAO vote + Foundation veto, quadratic vote, other?

My preference is for a DAO vote + Foundation veto, as this provides the greatest impute by the DAO in the selection process.

Preference towards a single provider vs group. As in, are we open to a single provider potentially getting the opportunity to service the DAO or is there a clear preference for 2-3 to collaborate?

I would recommend a single provider, as a group provider will add complexity, possibly cause coordination and communication issues (if multi-providers responsibilities are not clearly defined) and allows a single provider to demonstrate and execute on a strategy that they recommend. Adding multi-providers will each bring their own ideas about how to implement a strategy or strategies that may overlap or conflict with another.

Secondly, I would also like to see a 6 month probation period with defined KPI’s that the DAO has the ability to review and vote on to extend for a total of a 1 year engagement with that provider (i.e. an additional 6 months). It also should not be an automatic renewal (i.e. keeping the same provider each year) and that the DAO should re-evaluate the treasury KPI results and current treasury management goals of the DAO and consider re-opening the RFP to allow for the DAO to find the ideal vendor for the current market conditions and our treasury health. This prevents a specific provider appearing to become “indispensable” to the running of our treasury management, rather than a yearly contract with the opportunity to re-apply for a RFP along with other service providers.

Any thoughts, comments, or examples from other ecosystems that we should consider?
Any service providers you would recommend we talk to? (or, alternatively, recommend not to)

I don’t have any experience with these suggested service providers or others to provide any feedback or recommendations.

Any strategies or priorities you believe the selected service provider(s) should focus on? (e.g. Should we prioritize stablecoin conversion ? Do we prefer modular on-chain execution (e.g., via Zodiac) or multisig ops?)

I strongly believe that the main priority should be on stablecoin conversion with a health but semi-conservative percentage of stablecoin to $SCR held in our treasury. Other suggestions would be to consider holding ETH as an investment strategy, but for both stablecoins and ETH, I would also look to more conservative defi strategies like Aave investment/lending pools, allowing for ROI that is not too aggressive, but provides revenue generation.

Regarding the modular on-chain (Zodiac) vs. multisig, I personally would like to for the DAO to explore moving away from a multisig (to reduce the potential of human centralization/error/lack of participation) potential and consider a solution like Zodiac. However, there is the consideration of does the benefit (and extra security requirements - like a Security Council of indivs who can override the transaction if deemed a risk to the treasury) outweigh the cost of having a solution like Zodiac with our DAO that does not have a lot of proposals or a large treasury to manage, when compared to other DAOs. I think this something that should be researched by the Operations working group to determine the cost vs. benefits are worth considering a solution like Zodiac.

I also support what Stablelabs has mentioned about not paying indivs in SCR, as it’s affected by market price fluctuations and makes it more difficult to budget for roles in proposals. Instead, the DAO and the Treasury management strategy should consider proposals paid out for work in stablecoins.

Secondly, I also completely agree that one of the main strategies of the Treasury and the DAO should include a clearly defined budget for it’s operations, but instead of a quarterly budget, I would recommend a yearly budget with quarterly reporting to the DAO to track the “Actuals and Budgeted” are aligned with the yearly budget.

Any thoughts on forming a treasury management council or working group? The sentiment after CCC3 seemed to indicate no to a council / working group and yes to being held accountable by an Accountability Council and the Foundation.

Definitely not a treasury management council or working group. The Accountability Council + Foundation should be the oversight of the treasury provider (to ensure that they are meeting their KPI’s and prevent any potential adverse or non-performance issues. This Accountability Council + Foundation should also have the ability to enforce penalties or bring to the DAO to remove a treasury provider (or any service provider for any program) if they are not fulfilling their obligations or an activity would be a risk to the treasury or the DAO.

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Splitting TM responsibilities across multiple managers from the start risks spending more time on management processes rather than on delivering immediate, high-impact results. A single competent treasury manager can execute a coherent investment strategy and provide a unified and transparent reporting stream to the DAO. This approach reduces redundancy, avoids the coordination tax, and ensures there is one clear point of responsibility. Such an approach has worked well for existing DAOs like ENS, for example. Other DAOs have attempted a more divergent approach, running multiple programs under different purviews at once. But some of those divergent approaches have proven ineffective, leading delegates to opt for consolidation after initial implementation.

Arbitrum, for instance, chose to merge multiple treasury management programs under a more unified umbrella recently. The reasoning was simple: having too many independent programs created duplicated work, more governance overhead, and unnecessary friction in aligning strategies.

“It is difficult to coordinate calls across so many teams’/individuals’ calendars, none of the committees actually speak to one another thus resulting in a fragmented strategy for the Arbitrum DAO’s treasury, each committee usually ends up in a state where a minority of members ultimately produce a majority of the work required for execution…”

Via consolidation, they aim to reduce administrative burden, streamlined decision-making, and made it clear who was accountable for results.

So, as a general rule, the more managers and councils there are, the more relationships the DAO must monitor. To address these challenges, we recommend a central oversight function and single-point accountability for execution. Foundations are often best set up for this, in supplement with a potential oversight team.

If the DAO later finds strong evidence that additional managers add value, expansion can be considered. But beginning fragmented will likely make Scroll’s treasury management more cumbersome.

Regarding specific objective functions like balancing principal growth, capital preservation, etc–-these goals should be outlined in the RFP to guide applicants. These should ideally be broad enough to allow managers to present different, compelling pitches. As for operational mandates like msigs and Zodiac modules, these aspects should be up to the TM to propose, unless Scroll Foundation has a strict perspective. Allowing for TMs to propose potential operational capacities themselves in the RFP allows for more effective proposal solicitation. In the end, the RFP with the most compelling ideas wins. Ideally, the results of the RFP should be up to a DAO vote, but the Foundation should play a key role in disclosing their biased perspective on who they think is best. This acts as a directional nudge, while still giving the DAO selection flexibility,

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Thank you, Eugene and the Scroll Foundation team, for putting this proposal together. Treasury management is a key priority for Scroll this cycle, and we love to see Scroll continuing to evolve in this direction.

Several delegates have already shared valuable perspectives, and we’d like to contribute further on the open questions

We support a Foundation-led selection process with DAO veto power. It allows the Foundation to act quickly in screening and choosing providers based on expertise and track record. The DAO should retain the right to veto, not to micromanage, but to ensure community alignment and safeguard against conflicts of interest. This also allows the DAO to mature governance controls over time.

We prefer starting with a single provider. One party means clearer accountability, streamlined communication, and faster iteration. It reduces the risk of coordination failures or overlapping mandates. That said, the agreement should include review points, allowing us to revisit and potentially diversify once the system is stable.

We believe stablecoin conversion should be a top priority for the selected provider. Maintaining a portion of the treasury in stablecoins is critical for ensuring operational runway and reducing exposure to market volatility. This is especially important given Scroll’s expanding contributor base and ecosystem funding needs.

At the same time, it could be worth considering a diversified treasury allocation that includes ETH as a strategic reserve asset. Scroll’s vision to scale Ethereum in an open and community-driven way positions it uniquely within the ecosystem, and holding ETH supports alignment with this mission. As outlined in Obol Institutional Report July 2025 several DAOs and institutions have adopted ETH as part of their long-term diversification frameworks. We suggest the service provider take this into account when designing a balanced allocation strategy that supports both short-term stability and long-term alignment with Ethereum.

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We agree with the post CCC3 sentiment, no separate treasury council needed right now. It adds unnecessary complexity. The Foundation and Accountability Council should oversee the provider, with clearly defined deliverables and reporting standards. This creates enough checks without slowing things down.

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Thanks for putting this RFC! I have a few questions:

Will the RFP text include the delegates’ feedback (making it not so open, and defining some items we want to see, like stablecoin conversion execution plan, etc)
Will we provide a template for the service providers to send their proposals, making it easier to compare different proposals?

Regarding the questions:

I agree here. It would make the selection more focused, and it would give the DAO the ratification/veto option.

One treasury manager is the path other DAOs are taking (even the other ones that started with a different strategy)

I agree here about the stablecoin diversification and the on-chain execution. The DAO needs to build a runway and should be able to claw back the funds by itself if the plan does not unfold as expected, and not rely on a multisig to unwind positions in protocols, for example.

I share the same opinion. The suggested structure would be enough.

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I’m more inclined for a DAO vote after a Foundation-led shortlisting, with all evaluations made transparent.

  • Let the Foundation run initial due diligence and shortlist top candidates, but the final decision should go to a DAO vote, with scorecards and rubrics published.

  • If the Foundation needs veto power, define it narrowly.

Strong preference for 2–3 specialized providers, not a single one-size-fits-all asset manager.

  • ETH staking, stablecoin runway, RWA’s, and diversified growth strategies all require very different skill sets and risk profiles.

  • Having multiple providers gives us risk diversification, comparative benchmarks, and operational resilience.

However, I’d avoid overfragmentation. Three best-in-class, clearly scoped partners > five average ones managing redundant portfolios.

If the DAO chooses to hold ETH long term (which I support), then staking via DVT should be the default. Obol is an obvious candidate to support this, both from a security and decentralisation standpoint. Would love to see RFP language that explicitly requests:

  • Integration plans with DVT or similar technologies

  • Slashing insurance

  • Transparent operator composition (ideally including DAO-aligned node runners)

This is an opportunity to lead by example in Ethereum-aligned treasury management.

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Thanks for the feedback everyone. A few updates based on all of the feedback:

  • we’ll go for the Foundation short listing candidates and have a DAO vote for choosing the manager. I will chat with the agora team next to figure out the best way to do this
  • @Matt_FactoryLabs love the qv idea (or trying rank choice or something) but adds too much complexity as it’s not available within agora
  • I will keep the language around the # of service providers to the effect of, there will be at least one service provider chosen, though there maybe more than one of there are multiple streams of activity that warrant multiple providers
  • I will add a section for delegate feedback on the RFP and will include the comments from above into that section to avoid me distilling it

I will revise it and re-post the RFP here in comments before officially opening it up tomorrow

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Open call to the service providers:

The governance team invites qualified service providers to submit proposals to support the DAO in developing a robust treasury management strategy. We are particularly interested in teams with demonstrated experience managing on-chain assets, supporting DAO governance processes, and designing transparent, risk-aware financial systems.

This is an opportunity to help shape Scroll’s financial future - not just by managing assets, but by co-designing the frameworks and tools that will support long-term sustainability, decentralization, and protocol alignment.

We welcome proposals from:

  • Treasury management companies/DAOs
  • On-chain risk and financial modeling teams
  • DAO-native strategists and financial consultants
  • Service providers with experience in tooling

All proposals will be reviewed by the Foundation and the DAO. Shortlisted teams may be invited to present their proposal publicly and/or take part in a pilot program or deeper scoping round.

All submitted proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria:

  1. Strategic fit: alignment with Scroll DAO’s mission & values.
  2. Relevant experience
  3. Treasury & risk management approach
  4. Tooling
  5. Cost
  6. Willingness to potentially work alongside other service providers
  7. Commitment to consistent public reporting (with an outline of the frequency / nature of updates)

:open_mailbox_with_raised_flag: Submission Guidelines

Who can apply:
Treasury management companies/DAOs, on-chain risk and financial modeling teams, DAO-native strategists and financial consultants as well as service providers with experience in tooling.

What to include:

  • Overview of your team and relevant DAO experience
  • Description of proposed services
  • Tooling or protocol integrations
  • Pricing
  • Risk frameworks and assumptions
  • Case studies (examples from your work in other DAOs)

Proposal Deadline: Mon August 18th, 2025 at midnight UTC-8.

:busts_in_silhouette: Community Feedback

The DAO community brought up the following points as well:

  • Bear market preparedness
  • Having a stable coin balance to pay for grants or service providers / to minimize downward sell pressure
  • Integration plans with DVT or similar technologies
  • Slashing insurance
  • Transparent operator composition (ideally including DAO-aligned node runners)

Please submit proposals as a post or comment in this thread.

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Looks great, @eugene , it would be really cool if the marketing team can also post an announcement on the Scroll X account so we can share the post.

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Yes, will be sharing the formal RFP once it’s posted. Thanks for the nudge on it @coffee-crusher

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