We are excited to announce the Governance Contribution Recognition (GCR) Working Group. This follows the first GCR proposal that passed in the June voting cycle, and included both the first GCR itself as well as forming this working group.
The three candidates we put for the seats in the working group are:
- @Bitblondy,
- Proxy (sharing one seat), and
- @Seiryu.
The DAO will now have a 3 business day veto period begin (outlined below). If there is no veto, the team will have a kickoff on Friday July 18th.
Rationale
Overall, there was a strong desire to find a mix of three candidates who can bring forth a mix of experience:
- Designing, running, or researching delegate incentive programs (DIPs),
- Experience with economics, protocol incentives, or incentives in some other capacity than DIPs,
- Being an active Scroll DAO delegate
Additionally, we want to make sure the candidates were not based in a single continent. We were looking to have at least 2 continents covered amongst the 3 seats.
Deciding was honestly very difficult, especially given the number of applicants who have designed or run such programs in other ecosystems. It may be a surprise that some who applied were not chosen for this experience. We also had to factor in the aspect of conflicts of interest - we didn’t think it would be ok for someone to both design the next GCR and then apply to implement it or to have their tool be used for it.
This process also comes just before we do the third Co-Creation Cycle, where we will be co-designing additional councils and/or working groups for Scroll DAO. There were some candidates who were very strong but we thought would be an even better fit for a different council that we hope to see formed by the end of the summer. We did our best highlighting such feedback in the follows up we sent those who were not chosen.
Let us share some on why we picked who we did for these three seats.
Marlene
Marlene has been on the more active delegates since the beginning of the DAO, and brings experience being part of a group designing a DIP and and holds a master’s degree in which she explored incentives in web3 as part of it.
Proxy
The Proxy team, spun out of Boardroom, has some quality experience in governance broadly and in various DIPs. Their recent experience designing a system with tiers was of interest to us.
Seiryu
Seiryu is a researcher mostly focused on core ETH related research. He is a researcher with the PBS Foundation and has done research in collaboration with the Ethereum Foundation and others. We especially wanted to both get his core ETH incentive experience, as well as wanting direct input from a profile (technical researchers) that has been hard to get more of in gov.
Based on the interviews, we also believe that these three will bring different knowledge and be able to work well together towards producing the proposal for the next GCR for the Sept 1st voting cycle.
Public Applications
This sheet has the information of the responses that we received.
We had 22 applications, with one repeat so 21 unique applications. 17 of 21 said they were comfortable sharing their application, 4 just wanted to share their interest.
We reached out to schedule 13 interviews, though one didn’t end up happening.
GCR WG Objectives
This working group is primarily tasked with producing the next GCR proposal, covering 6 months.
The goal of this working group would be to generate a subsequent GCR proposal for the Sept 1 voting cycle.
Veto process
This form is how the veto will be conducted for the GCR process, and is the same as for the Ecosystem Growth Council process.
Delegates will submit their vetos in the above form. After the 3 business day window concludes, the form will be closed and the votes will be counted and then shared publicly. If there are less than 5 submitted responses from delegates, then the process concludes.
If at that point, there are more than 5 vetos submitted, then the gov team will review the results and published the token weighted result. The token weights will be taken as a snapshot within 12 hours of voting beginning.
Vetos can be submitted at the level of a specific member and can include multiple members, or all three seats.
For the veto to succeed, there needs to be enough to clear quorum (2.1m) on a specific veto. That is to say, if there are 1.5m votes to veto member1 and 700k votes to veto the full set of choices, only member1 would be removed. This also means, if 300k veto each member and 300k veto all three (+500k auto-abstain), this measure would technically clear quorum but no specific veto would take place. In this case, all members have 600k veto votes against them (300k per + 300k for all) + 500k auto abstaining, which is not to veto a specific member.
The auto-abstain wallet will participate to stay in accordance with its goal of making sure all DAO votes hit quorum.
Conclusion
We are very excited to see the first formal working group form, focused on how to best incentivize quality contributions to Scroll DAO governance.
Given that this process and the EGC process are the first, there are definitely ways we can improve the process. We look forward to hearing the feedback on how this can be improved for subsequent council formations.