Proposal: Gov Contribution Recognition - Retro & Working Group

Governance Iterations
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1

Proposal Type: Governance

Summary

This post is meant to:

  1. Introduce governance contribution recognition at Scroll DAO,
  2. Sketch what a first proposal would look like, including a working group to plan the next steps, and
  3. Begin the feedback process so that a formal proposal can go for vote in the June voting cycle.

The discussion related to this proposal took place in this post.

This proposal technically did not follow protocol because that post was not in the appropriate template and did not include all of the relevant details. We are still moving forward with submitting this proposal in the June 2025 voting cycle given that there is good reason to believe that delegates were treating the above post as a proposal, and it did receive the right amount of endorsements.

If delegates do not approve of any details or the break in protocol, they should vote against it and the protocol shall be followed in the July voting cycle.

Alternatively, the Foundation can run an offchain vote in order to make amendments to the proposal and those will be retroactively voted on in the subsequent GCR proposal. This option will only be pursued if requested by delegates

Motivation

Governance is work.

As such, we want to introduce the idea of governance contribution recognition (GCR), the first attempt at financially recognizing the work that is being done to help build Scroll DAO in the months since TGE. This will start with a 6 month retro (for contribution from inception, Oct, through mid-April). Additionally, this proposal introduces a GCR Working Group, that will have a mandate to generate a plan for GCR at least for the next 3 months (June-August).

We want to put forth an initial outline of governance contribution compensation to start getting feedback so that weā€™re ready to vote on a proposal starting June 1.

Governance Contribution Recognition

GCR is meant to serve as a mechanism to reward people for meaningfully contributing to governance at Scroll DAO. As the DAO itself will grow and evolve, the nature of this recognition will change with it.

The first iteration of the GCR will be focused on a roughly 6 monthly retroactive award. Broadly speaking, this structure will have a small baseline reward for some minimal contribution, and will provide increasing awards based on the contribution. This was have a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures.

This initial approach will reward for certain baseline activites that are likely to not get rewarded again (e.g. voting but not partaking on the forum). The logic for including such categories is to provide a small reward (~$150 per vote) to a slightly wider set of participants, to hopefully encourage those who have some interaction to interact more in the future.

There would be additional rewards for contributing beyond the initial baseline. To give a sense of scale, the largest award would be just over $15k USD eqiuvalent at a price of $0.30 SCR/USD.

Beyond the first retro, there will be a new approach defined for at least the next 3-6 months. That proposal should put in place a more robust system for capturing the relevant data to minimize potential errors.

Execution

Operational

Once the proposal passes, the Foundation ops team will manage transfering the funds (for the GCR and for the working group) to a new multi-sig, and then on to the appropriate receipients.

The Foundation team will also manage a KYC process for those who will receive the compensation.

Proposed framework

NOTE: this retro covers the first 3 votes and forum activity through April 30, 2025.

Qualification criteria

There is only one qualification for the minimum reward, namely:

  • Voted at least once.

Forumla

  • Hourly rate = 300 SCR
  • Proposal bonus = 5,000 SCR
  • Vote time = # votes * 2 hours
    • Assumption: each vote takes 2 hours
  • Call attendance = # of calls attended
    • Assumption: each call was 1 hour
    • Note: call attendance has a 0.5 multiplier below
  • Forum = Vote threads + endorsements + meaningful comments on one of 7 active forum posts within the time frame
    • Assumption: each forum engagement takes 1 hour
  • Proposals to vote = the # of proposals that were written and made it to a formal DAO vote
    • Assumption: the sheparding of each proposal takes ~15-18 hours
  • Negation game participation = 1 if someone participated in an interview and interaction with the Negation Game team, 0 if no

Base reward = (Vote time + (Call attendance*0.5) + Forum) * Hourly rate

Proposal bonus reward = Proposal bonus * Proposals to vote

  • NOTE: only 4 proposals were posted by delegates as of April 15, 2025 that have or will soon go to vote

Bonus reward = (Negation game participation * 300 SCR) + (2000 SCR if 10 or more calls attended) + (3000 SCR if 5 or more meaningful forum comments) + (500 SCR if delegate has a delegate thread with all 3 rationales there) * 6*

  • *6 is a multiplier to bring the reward up to what qualitatively seems to be a more fair payout for contributions, proportionate to the treasury size.

In other words,

  • There is a base reward consisting of the number of hours spent on voting, attending calls, and making meaningful contributions on the forum, which is multiplied by an hourly rate of 300 SCR/hour.
  • There is a proposal bonus of 5,000 SCR for each proposal on the forum that has or will soon go to vote.
  • There is a general bonus that consists of
    • 300 SCR for completing an interview with the Negation Game team.
    • 2,000 SCR for attending 10 or more calls.
    • 3,000 SCR for having 5 or more meaningful interactions on the forum.
    • 500 SCR bonus for having 3/3 voter rationales.
    • There is a multiplier of 6.

Initial breakdown

The below is what the breakdown looks like based on the above rules.

image
image226Ɨ1152 50.9 KB

NOTE: the same data was used for this and for the votable supply calculations.

This is a google sheet version.

Working Group

This proposal also suggests to form a working group with 3 individuals or groups to collaborate on the next GCR proposal, covering at least 3 if not 6 months. These individuals will be chosen based on a transparent hiring process conducted by the Foundation.

The goal of this working group would be to generate a subsequent GCR proposal for the August 1 voting cycle.

Timeline:

  • June 10th - voting cycle concludes, application for recruiting the working group goes live (we might post it earlier acknowledging it might not happen if the proposal fails)
  • June 15th - application cycle concludes
  • June 20th - announcement of the working group, veto window starts
  • June 25th - veto window ends, team starts working
  • July 9th - at least initial thought forum post, ideally first proposal draft
  • July 16th - proposal needs to be on the forum, getting feedback and ultimately endorsements by July 31
  • August 1st - proposal goes live

The team will have weekly check-inā€™s with the governance team and will get support from them as needed.

It is important to call out, this timeline is likely unreasonable if the data needs to be analyzed in this time. The priority is for this group to put forth a formula / approach and a rough budget. The Foundation team will help with manual data entry and getting the right data provider in place, but there is a chance the latter will not be feasible.

If it becomes clear that this timeline is unreasonable for any reason, the working group and the governance team will need to produce a forum post providing an explanation and a revised timeline.

Personnel & Resources

The Foundation team will manage the operational aspects, including the recruitment of the working group.

The 3 members of the working group are TBD. A public recruiting process will commence via a Foundation managed form. Results and information will be shared afterwards. A 3 buniness day veto will begin once the announcement is posted on the forum.

Financial

The total request is 614,645 SCR.

This is broken down as follows:

  • 584,645 SCR for the GCR retro
  • 30,000 SCR for the working-group

Any funds that are not claimed (retro) or used (working-group) within 2 months will be used as part of a future GCR proposal.

Evaluation

The metrics for this proposal include:

  • The # of qualified delegates as defined in this proposal 6 and 12 months out
  • The # of delegates voting on proposals
  • The # of delegates voting on more than 50% of propals
  • The # increase in delegate threads on the forum
  • The average # of quality comments a proposal or significant discussion gets
  • The # of attendees making active contributions during calls

Conclusion

We believe that this type of proposal is an approximation of rewarding existing governance contribution through April 30, 2025. We hope such a proposal will help attract the highest quality governance contributions and support a culture where governance is seen as important work that can take significant time.

However, we do want to signal that we do not believe this is the best form of ongoing compensation. The Foundation team will work with the working group through the process of creating a subsequent GCR proposal for the August voting cycle.

As we will work on org design for the DAO in the coming months, we are likely to re-design how most work in the DAO happens, and rewards will change accordingly. We didnā€™t want to delay this so are putting forth these ideas to get a proposal up in time for the June voting cycle.

14 Likes
2

I strongly agree with and endorse the Governance Contribution Recognition (GCR) proposal outlined here. Recognizing and rewarding the efforts of contributors is critical to fostering a robust and engaged Scroll DAO governance community. IMO The retroactive 6-month reward framework, covering activities through April 30, 2025, is a thoughtful first step to acknowledge the hard work of delegates and contributors.

The establishment of the GCR Working Group is particularly vital. This groupā€™s mandate to design a more robust compensation system for at least the next 3-6 months (June-August) will ensure that future iterations of GCR are data-driven, transparent, and aligned with the DAOā€™s evolving needs. A well-defined program, shaped by the working groupā€™s efforts, will help sustain long-term governance participation and attract high-quality contributors.

I also appreciate the acknowledgment of the protocol deviation and the flexibility offered for delegate feedback or offchain amendments. This transparency strengthens trust in the process. I encourage delegates to support this proposal in the June 2025 voting cycle to kickstart GCR and empower the working group to refine the program for sustainable governance rewards.

Endorsed.

2 Likes
3

Iā€™m excited to see Scroll DAO taking this critical step toward recognizing the real labor behind governance. Governance isnā€™t just about showing up to vote. itā€™s about reading, engaging, analyzing, and contributing to the collective decision-making that shapes the protocol. This proposal acknowledges that effort in a meaningful way.

I strongly support the introduction of GCR as both a symbolic and practical incentive. It affirms that participation matters, and it encourages deeper engagement and not just from existing delegates, but from future contributors looking to enter the ecosystem.

That said, I also see this as only the beginning. The proposed working group is a smart move and it ensures this process evolves with more robust systems, transparency, and adaptability. Sustainable incentives and clear benchmarks are vital if weā€™re going to keep Scrollā€™s governance high-quality and inclusive.

Looking forward to seeing this move forward and happy to collaborate as this model matures. Letā€™s make governance more rewarding, more accountable, and more empowering.

2 Likes
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Strongly suggest that the GCR working group to exclude current delegates because it might be a vulnerability for the future iteration of program.

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Can you please share a bit more in terms of what youā€™re foreseeing as a potential issue there?

6

Compensating delegates for their time and effort in contributing to the protocolā€™s growth is a really positive step as they have busy schedules, yet still make time to add value to the protocol this deserves recognition.
However, during the recent Negation Game - Proposal Bonanza Call , we raised a concern around how we compensate delegates who propose impactful initiatives to the protocol but also may lead to a in direct financial gain for themselves after the proposal passes.
While we support rewarding meaningful contributions, we need to be mindful of the line between fair compensation and what might be seen as excessive profit or overcompensation. This is important because we donā€™t want to create incentives that might not perfectly align with whatā€™s best for the whole community.
Weā€™re oppen to feedback on how to navigate this balance and ensure the system remains fair, transparent, and ultimately supports the long-term protocol and DAO health.

3 Likes
7

Hello,

I appreciate that governance is seen as work, where you have to spend time to either do a good comment or proposal or simply have to dig into a topic to understand what impact it will have and how to vote on it.
That being said, congratulations to everyone for the retroactive reward.

For a future program I would like to propose some rules that will help ensure the money being used will be used efficiently for the DAO and we do not end up in a situation where the Arbitrum DAO was not that long ago. Where it would spend money in every direction without really knowing if its worth it or double spending is happening.

So in my opinion a GCR program should have some requirements like:

  • Voting power threshold
  • Delegates/Parties that are currently paid by the DAO in another way (for example being a service provider) should be excluded from the GCR (Aave DAO does this as well, and makes sure no double spending)
  • If a delegate consits of a group of people e.g. 3 member, only one can apply and not all 3 member
  • Voting activity of at least 90%
  • create a tiered system with a base payment of for example 250$ per month, this will keep delegates motivated even if they missed some requirements to get into the ā€œrealā€ tier system
  • GCR working group member (if they are delegates) should be excluded from the GCR as they will likely get a payment for their work and should be seen as a service provider
  • keep it simple, do not overspend thousands of dollars each month or cycle for complex systems to track delegate activity. Making the system around the GCR more expensive than what Delegates would receive in total

Some personal opinion.
I do not think/like to add a multiplier that is giving delegates with a lot VP a bigger MP and delegates with less VP are getting a smaller one. Shouldnā€™t we encourage and support smaller delegates to become bigger and be relevant for the outcome of a proposal and make sure its reaching quorum every time, rather than ā€œcentralizingā€ it with the top5?
I also think that rating comments from delegates is highly subjective and inherits the risk of selection bias and together in combination of rating and then combining the points of different comments dragging a delegate down in the ranking, simply because one comment was outstanding and the other was ā€œbadā€. This will lead to less participation as people do not want to destroy their good comment and ranking. Which should not happen, we should rather encourage people to be active and comment any time.

Here is the link to the negation game

2 Likes
8

Thanks for all the work youā€™ve put into developing this @eugene. As we brought up in the Negation Game discussions, we think governance work should be compensated and weā€™re in favor of implementing this proposal as-is. We appreciate that itā€™s been communicated that a few criteria are one-time ā€œbonusesā€ for this first retroactive round only (e.g. only voting but not using the forum) as it will help reduce gamification of the system in the future. Weā€™re also of the opinion that including IRL events largely goes against Scrollā€™s inclusivity values, so weā€™re happy that the current proposal prioritizes voting, attending calls, using the forums, creating proposals, posting rationales, etc. Those are examples of work that can be done while respecting inclusivity - whether itā€™s being respectful of othersā€™ availability or considering their working locations. @EzR3aL brings up some great points that could be considered for future programs.

As a verified delegate, weā€™re happy to endorse this proposal.

1 Like
9

I agree with the intent behind excluding working group members, especially early on, when compensation from the working group might outweigh GCR incentives, raising conflict-of-interest concerns. That said, Iā€™d propose a more time-bound or phased approach. Once the GCR proposal is finalized and publicly passed through normal governance, the distinction between a delegate who contributed to its creation and one who didnā€™t becomes less meaningful.

In other words, once the proposal is live and working group compensation ends or diminishes in relevance, those delegates should be eligible again. The key is preventing short-term self-dealing, not disincentivizing contributors from joining the WG in the first place.

Note, the time limitation should not be equal to the value of the WG compensation itself; the WG members should receive some surplus compensation. I would estimate that if a WG member is paid X SCR, they should be precluded from ~0.5X SCR in initial delegate compensation program emissions.

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Thanks @eugene for clearing up the WG side of the proposal. Weā€™ve already endorsed it so happy to further contribute to the conversation. There are some great insights in this thread that alongside the inputs from the last Negation Game sesh will surely guarantee an exciting conversation.

Some thoughts on our end:

  • The original GCR was a one-off. In this sense, we should make the effort to think beyond what was stated in the proposal and try to incorporate different aspects to take GCR/DIPs to a next iteration and hopefully benchmark the topic for governance beyond Scroll. The WG should be leading those efforts in that direction and incorporate Scroll specific nuances but remain conscious of where the current discussions are headed in the gov ecosystem.
  • WG Compensations - There should naturally be an incentive for delegates to apply to the WG and be compensated for their work and although we absolutely agree on avoiding double spending or over-compensating tasks we donā€™t think that this is an example of this given the outcome of the WG is yet to be defined so there are no rails for it to happen as of now. Eventually if a compensation structure proposal should pass, there could be a consideration of the WG not receiving a specific item of such structure but I think we might be getting ahead of ourselves.

The point here is to have the WG as a focal point of this conversation that touches on several points that are discussed on their own tracks and hopefully and eventually get rolled up into the upcoming structures that wil be discussed during the next CCC.

2 Likes
11

Iā€™ve looked through the iterations of this proposal and I do say they have been a good number of valuable feedback from delegates, through the forum posts and governance calls.

The idea of the working group fleshing out what the next proposal should look like, also sounds great. I think the ones who will be working on that, should do well to keep the community in the loop, which I believe would be the case.

Looking forward to seeing what happens in the future. As a verified delegate, I do endorse this proposal.

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12

Social dynamics and sharing in private might give certain delegates an advantage over others. An NDA will not stop anyone from DMing a delegate friend.

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As a verified delegate , we are voting FOR the proposal.

Faced with the problem of low participation in the DAO, it is important that delegates who are active in governance are encouraged to continue contributing to Scroll.

Retroactive rewards are more efficient, as they reward those who have already proven their work in the organization. Therefore, we find the idea of rewarding retroactive contributions efficient - and encourage their continuation.

2 Likes
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Iā€™m voting FOR.

Itā€™s important that delegates are rewarded for their time and contributions. Related to votable supply issues, is participation. Should delegates find that it is no longer worth their time and efforts to support the DAO with their ideas, they will begin to leave. And when delegates leave, they take their delegations with them thus resulting in a votable supply which quorum is typically pegged to, by with increasingly inactive delegations that are rarely if ever redelegated. It is therefore important that delegatesā€™ contributions are paid for accordingly. And after the call adjustment was made, Iā€™m more supportive of this initiative than I was before this change was made.

1 Like
15

Hello all !
The proposal is now live, thanks to all who already voted and CTA to do so asap if you havenā€™t yet.

As part of our work to form a working group for the GCR, weā€™re sharing the application form here for transparency and feedback.

Please feel free to share any input by Sunday (8th) night your local time, so we can incorporate it before officially opening the form for applications on Monday. A separate post will follow to announce the launch.

:backhand_index_pointing_right: Application Form

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Iā€™ll be voting ā€œFORā€ supporting efforts to establish a Governance Contribution Recognition system.

Actively encouraging and retaining quality contributors is vital for a healthy, resilient DAO. A well-thought-out recognition program can directly incentivize the kind of engagement and deeper participation we want to see, ultimately making our governance more effective.

The main hurdle, of course, will be designing a fair and transparent system that accurately identifies genuine value without becoming overly complex or creating perverse incentives. These are significant design challenges weā€™ll need to navigate carefully.

However, the potential benefitsā€”better participation, retaining dedicated talent, and improving overall governance healthā€”are too important to pass up. These challenges are worth tackling to build a stronger ecosystem.

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Iā€™m quite interested in exploring how to separate the role of proposer (those writing the proposal and responding to comments) vs operator (those actually doing the work) more clearly. Let me know if you have specific thoughts on your preferred way of making that happen (clearer conflict of interest violations, stronger enforcement of violations, training up a group to be tagged as ā€˜Proposersā€™ who get approached by anyone who wants to run a program and help them write it, etc.)

These are exactly the kinds of things the working group (application) will focus on putting together into a proposal (hopefully for vote in Aug voting cycle. Iā€™ll also comment on them:

  • Voting power threshold - this has been brought up a few times so I assume it will be in the proposal
  • Delegates/Parties that are currently paid by the DAO in another way (for example being a service provider) should be excluded from the GCR (Aave DAO does this as well, and makes sure no double spending) - we havenā€™t had service providers for the DAO yet, but agree once we do
  • If a delegate consits of a group of people e.g. 3 member, only one can apply and not all 3 member - that was the case here. for things such as the calls, we took the highest # for a single person from the group, not the combined total
  • Voting activity of at least 90% - I would just add ā€˜at least 90% since they received their delegationā€™ to be explicit. not 100% if thatā€™s whatā€™s displayed in agora
  • create a tiered system with a base payment of for example 250$ per month, this will keep delegates motivated even if they missed some requirements to get into the ā€œrealā€ tier system - as in, those who have min voting power threshold & min voting % automatically get a minimum stipend, with the rest based on further activity?
  • GCR working group member (if they are delegates) should be excluded from the GCR as they will likely get a payment for their work and should be seen as a service provider - interested what others think. would this policy create an unintentional incentive for them to partake in other things after until they can quallify for it again? I obviously hope to create an environment where thereā€™s intrinsic motivation + extrinsic/financial motivation, but I canā€™t assume that will be the case. if itā€™s easy to track with tooling, should they just be excluded from a category or time period, is that worth exploring or is it easier to avoid conflicts with a clear requirement of being on a council or working group in a given 6 month window, or go through GCR? relates to @DonOfDAOs and @SEEDGov comments below.
  • keep it simple, do not overspend thousands of dollars each month or cycle for complex systems to track delegate activity. Making the system around the GCR more expensive than what Delegates would receive in total - agree to try to automate the relevant info capture and make it as low cost as possible. overhead should be a small % of total, not anywhere near matching the cost of the awards.

Any specific concerns here in terms of which info would get shared / what the advantage would be?

1 Like
18

Hey everyone,

Applications for the Governance Contribution Recognition working group are officially open! :tada:

If youā€™re interested in joining the working group, weā€™d love to hear from you. Feel free to apply - and donā€™t hesitate to share the link with anyone you think would be a great fit:

Application Form

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The Unicircle Working Group votes in favor of this proposal. We believe governance is a complex task, and establishing a committee to review reward metrics will ensure fair evaluations.

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20

The following reflects the views of L2BEATā€™s governance team, composed of kaereste, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and itā€™s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We are voting FOR the proposal.

Retroactively compensating individuals who have actively participated in Scrollā€™s governance since its launch is a commendable gesture, and the Foundationā€™s attempt to objectively measure and reward the participation through a clear formula is a good first step. We understand the challenges involved, and we donā€™t think debating the process for this retroactive compensation would add any value.

That said, our main reservation regarding this proposal is the attempt to establish a recurring GCR formula through the working group created. We have encountered various types of delegate compensation issues in the different ecosystems weā€™re present in, each with its own nuances and challenges. We hope to extensively discuss the topic before any proposal drafted by the working group is put up to a vote, and we commit to actively participating in the discussion.

2 Likes