Votable Supply Adjustment Proposal

Proposals
1

Proposal Title: Votable Supply Adjustment

Proposal Type: Governance

TLDR

This proposal suggests a temporary delegation of 1.5m SCR from the Scroll DAO treasury to 46 active delegates to boost votable supply and reduce quorum risk. The delegation, managed via a Foundation multisig, would run until October 2025. Delegates who become inactive may have their tokens reallocated. The goal is to ensure proposals can pass even if top delegates are unavailable.

Summary

This proposal is meant to provide an initial idea for how Scroll DAO can help improve the votable supply. Following the governance calls on Apr 16, there was a clear desire to focus on increasing votable supply as opposed to decreasing the quorum.

This idea involves setting aside 1.5m SCR from the DAO treasury to a new multisig managed by the Foundation. The 1.5m SCR would be delegated across 46 delegates who have voted on at least 2/3 proposals through the April voting cycle AND attended at least one call or left at least one pertinent comment on the forum.

This would be a temporary delegation that would last from the approval of this proposal through the end of October, 2025 (just after the first unlock).

We are mainly seeking approval for the:

  1. Qualification criteria
  2. The formula
  3. The total amount to be delegated

The data collection was done manually, so we will address any potential errors as they arise until the proposal is approved.

It is important to stress that this program alone is not meant to sustainably increase the votable supply. Rather, this program is meant to provide an initial kickstart, to which additional efforts shall be added. Those efforts are beyond this proposal and will be addressed at a future date.

Motivation

We need to raise the active votable supply.

  • Votable supply = the proporation of the total supply that is currently able to vote (delegated)
  • Active votable supply = the portion of the votable supply that votes a majority of the time and is active in at least one other way (calls or forum)

As the April voting cycle, the following data give a sense of the distribution of active voting power:

  • Total voting power (vp) amongst those who have voted at least on 1/3 proposals (68 delegates): 2,676,700
  • Total vp amongst those who have voted on at least 2/3 proposals (56 delegates): 2,419,471
  • Total vp amongst those who have voted on 3/3 proposals (38 delegates): 2,165,731
  • Quorum: 2,100,000
  • The top two delegates have a voting power of 887,149 between the two of them.

We are in a position where if a few delegates, especially the top ones, end up having to miss a vote for any unforeseen circumstances, votes are likely to not hit quorum. This can act as an unnecessary bottleneck for the DAO and may result in increased apathy if not addressed.

With this in mind, we are proposing an increase to the votable supply of 1.5m SCR from the DAO Treasury and to distribute it to the most active voters (defined below).

The reason for requesting 1.5m and not less is to ensure that if the top few delegates are not able to vote, we can still pass quorum. If we use the same formula outlined below with 1m tokens, it would still not be possible to pass quorum without just the top 2 delegates.

  • The 46 most active delegates (see Criteria below) a total vp of 1,933,199
  • Upon distributing 1m SCR, the total-vp-1m would be 2,933,199
  • The total-vp-1m without the top 2 delegates is 2,025,528
  • If we distribute 1.5m instead, the total-vp-1.5m would be 3,433,199
  • The total-vp-1.5m without the top 7 would be 2,115,471.85

There are no clear conflicts of interest for this proposal as we see it.

Execution

Operational

The operational process will be as follows:

  • If approved, the governance team will set up a new multisig that will receive the 1.5m SCR
  • The gov team will delegate that SCR via the multisig as outlined below to delegates

There will be some potential clawbacks of delegation before Oct, as follows:

  • There will be reviews of the data at least quarterly, if not monthly, to ensure that those who have received delegation via this proposal are actively voting
    • For any delegate who received delegation from this proposal and misses more than 1 vote during the period will lose this delegation
    • The revoked delegation will then be re-distributed evenly to the set of delegates outlined below
  • If there is a significant increase in votable supply beyond this program prior to October, the governance team may choose to undelegate some of the tokens
    • This would be done proportionately to the allocation and those funds would be sent back to the DAO treasury
  • If the DAO puts forth a vote to terminate the program early and it gains majority support, then funds would be sent back to the DAO treasury

There are no new tools introduced here. We will track the work on either google drive or notion.

Personnel & Resources

The Foundation governance team will set up the multisig, transfer funds, and process the delegation. Eugene and Jamilya will own the project, with support from others as needed.

Anyone in the community will be welcome to provide feedback and hold the program accountable on the forum.

Financial

The overall budget for this proposal is 1.5m SCR to be used for delegation. These funds would be sent to a new, Foundation-managed wallet and funds would be sent back to the treasury by the end of October.

There is technically is no cost to run the program for the DAO, as no DAO funds will be needed to pay personnel or for tools. The Foundation will cover nominal costs that arise (e.g. setup of a new multisig, etc.).

Evaluation

We will include two sections here:

  1. How to distribute the delegation
  2. How to evaluate the program

How to Distribute the Delegation

First we set up criteria of who qualifies for receiving delegation as part of this program.

Criteria:

  • Voted on 2 of 3 votes through the April voting cycle, and
  • EITHER attended one call OR posted once of the forum

This resulted in a table of 46 delegates, including their name and voting power.

From there, we found a formula that would help us figure out who to start with a 10k distribution to the largest delegate, and then given each subsequent delegate an evenly increasing delegation.

Screenshot 2025-04-22 at 12.28.40 PM
Screenshot 2025-04-22 at 12.28.40 PM638Ɨ248 6.93 KB

This was then turned into a formula we could use in Google Sheets

=10000
ā€˜+ā€™ (ROW() - ROW(###))
ā€˜*ā€™ ( 2 * (1500000/46 - 10000)
/ (46 - 1) )
Where ### was the cell where you put the starting 10,000.
The + and * in the forumula need to be in ā€˜ā€™ because of markdown.

This resulted in the following table:

image
image284Ɨ648 56.5 KB

Note on sources:

  • We used a dune dashboard that featured the voting power and delegate name
  • This is the spreadsheet you can use to reference this data. Feel free to make a copy and play around with it.

How to Evaluate the Program

  • Do the votes in the June-Oct voting cycles pass with at least 1m more votes than quorum?
  • Are proposals able to pass if one or two of the top few delegates are unable to vote in a given month?
  • Does the overall votable supply change enough so that this program can pull back all delegation and votes still pass with at least a 750k margin?

Conclusion

This proposal outlines a temporary delegation to 46 existing delegates using 1.5m SCR from the DAOā€™s treasury through the end of October.

If you believe you qualify but werenā€™t included, please reach out to the gov team.

11 Likes
3

Thanks @eugene for this proposal. This proposal comes at the perfect time and strikes a good balance between performance and inclusivity. I believe that this is a first iteration of this program and it will evolve based on our collective learnings as a DAO.

Keeping the first iteration simple is the best way forward and it broadly distributes VP between several delegates. Hence, I am in favor of this proposal.

3 Likes
5

This is an innovative approach to a common challenge. I appreciate that itā€™s designed as a temporary solution, with a clear expectation for evolution over time.

6

Iā€™m happy to support this as a short-term solution, evaluate and evolve from there as needed.

I see some concerns about large delegates (those with large trust) losing power and said trust potentially going to less trusted parties. Not in the sense of security, but in the sense of decision quality.
That being said, I think this is an acceptable tradeoff to increase decentralisation enough to have some operational safety in the DAO. And although I have concerns about the delegate training program being enough to upskill delegates, itā€™s now a nice coupling of initiatives.

Ideally, each delegate would have strong strategy, organisation design, and technical skills. How to get there is something I believe we must figure out sooner rather than later but not a blocker for this proposal.

2 Likes
7

Not supporting the Votable Supply Adjustment Proposal, in the current form.

While we understand and appreciate the motivation behind this proposal (addressing quorum fragility and increasing votable supply), we will not be supporting this proposal for the following reasons:

The delegation curve disincentivizes active delegation.
By evenly boosting the voting power, the proposal flattens the distinction between delegates who have organically earned support and those who havenā€™t. This undermines the incentive for users to delegate to active contributors.

There is no distinction between delegates who have earned support and those who havenā€™t, and there is no distinction between being trusted by 500 users and 1 user. We propose to use a more dynamic approach to delegation, wherein the formula takes into account the number of delegated addresses.

Just a reminder, the proposal is a temporary fix, not a sustainable solution. This approach doesnā€™t solve the root issue of low delegation and participation. Delegating from the treasury might help in the short term, but it doesnā€™t build long-term resilience or encourage organic engagement from token holders. It feels more like a bandaid than a strategy.

We are happy to engage further, collaborate, and improve the proposal to be more sustainable and equitable.

Regards,
Ethereum TGU

1 Like
8

Hi!

First of all we support the idea of having a larger VP pool that will ensure quorum for the upcoming initiatives down the pipeline while incentivizing new delegates to join Scroll governance. Although the endgame is to have circulating supply becoming delegated supply and taking an active role in votings, this intermediate solutions help to smooth that transition in an organized yet decentralized way.

Nonetheless, we do have some suggestions regarding the allocation mechanism of the proposal. Itā€™s worth to mention that despite being ā€œyoungā€, the Scroll DAO has had a fair amount of activity tractioned by the co-creation cycles, the core units leadership and delegates commitment. In that sense we believe those aspects should be leveraged not only for the purpouses of this proposal but for setting the bar for overall delegate activity in any future initiative.

We then propose to have a weighted approach to VP allocation that accounts for this activity alongside the current VP that delegates have and the spirit of the proposal regarding balancing VP. This is: leveraging activity on the distribution instead of only in the criteria.

An example - 40/60

We could have 40% allocated per participation requirements and 60% per voting power adjustement based on the initial formula.

  • Participation - 40%

As mentioned in the criteria, voting, attending governance calls and commenting on the forum are part of the delegates core activities or -better said- are the outcomes or showcase of delegates work. A formula that should account for that 40% of Total Participation could include the following tasks and weights:

  1. Voting in the past 90 days (Participation Rate - PR ) - 30%
  2. Voting in the last month (Onchain Voting - OV) - 30%
  3. Having posted in the forum (Forum Post - PF) - 25%
  4. Having attended one governance call (Governance Call - CA) -15%
  • Voting Power - 60%

Naturally, current VP is to be considered as an allocation factor, but reducing itā€™s weight within the formula should leave some room for having activity as a contributing but not determining factor. Following the example, a 60% of the initial formulas result would be incorporated into the final allocation.

To conclude, we ran a quick mock test in order to leverage this new formula. In case you want to experiment feel free to fork the doc, follow the instructions and play around if you want to but the core idea is to ignite a conversation regarding what activity/tasks we value as Scroll delegates and how we can factor those in this initiative which can surely be refined from the original one.

Feel free to reach out if any questions or comments!

5 Likes
9

Thank you for the proposal @eugene I like the idea of this proposal to addressing the quorum issue by distributing more 1.5m SCR in temporary voting power across 46 active delegates to increase long-term voting participation. In the case of the previous Euclid Upgrade proposal, if the top two voting power holders hadnā€™t participated it might not have passed.

Additionally Question:

  • The first one is the formulation for voting power distribution. The current method of calculating how temporary voting power should be distributed among active delegates seems unfair. It caps large votingā€power holders too sharply and over-amplifies small ones. For example a delegate who already has 20,000 voting power only receives 30,000 from the program, bringing them to 50,000 total. While someone with just 2,000 voting power also gets 50,000, ending up at 52,000. Flattens ranking. By design, half of the delegates converge on nearly the same final voting power, so the extra tokens disproportionately favor the smallest delegates. Could you clarify the rationale behind this distribution logic?
  • Regarding wallet delegation mechanism, how will the delegation of 46 wallets be managed? Is the delegation being done manually across 46 wallets and will the Scroll Foundation be managing this? Is there a more efficient tool or automated process available (eg. Partial delegation)

Suggestion:

  • I think we should consider distributing the voting power equally among the 46 delegates, with each receiving 32,608 SRC. This approach would bring fairness by better matching the effort of consistency delegates while maintaining the current delegate ranking. Final voting power should mirror the original voting power ordering not compress it into a flat band.

Voting Power Comparison:

  • New Voting Power without top 2 delegates (After Adjustment)
    New Total Voting Power: 2,480,833.24
    Previous Total: 2,525,045.80
    Difference: -44,212.56
  • New Voting Power without top 5 delegates (After Adjustment)
    New Total Voting Power: 2,168,227.56
    Previous Total: 2,271,222.73
    Difference: -102,995.17

This method results only a small decrease on New Voting without top2 and top5, showing no significant change compared to your method.

IMG_7336
IMG_73361157Ɨ1235 231 KB

Also we believed there should be some clear accountability measures for delegates receiving voting power through this initiative to ensure their consistent participation. For instance:

  • Define minimum performance standards (e.g., require each delegate to publish their voting rationale in the designated forum thread and to maintain at least X % voting turnout.)
  • Tie continued delegation to adherence: delegates who fail to meet these criteria risk removal of their temporary delegated voting power.
  • I think having a monthly eligibility reviews to evaluate each delegateā€™s performance against these standards and adjust the roster accordingly, so new, high-performing delegates can join and inactive delegates are removed.
4 Likes
10

I greatly respect and appreciate the Scroll team for putting this together and getting this discussion started. It is much needed.

That said, Iā€™m not in favor of a model which in effect heavily punishes the largest delegates. It seems misaligned that delegates who have earned the least delegations on market, are rewarded with 5 times the voting power as those delegates who received the most delegations on market. In practice, the largest delegates would have benefitted far more by having not garnered any delegation to date, than to have even tried.

ex. a delegate with 6.09 SCR is earning 55,217 in delegated VP, while delegates with between 510,000 SCR and 70,000 SCR earn less than 15,000.

(Though, I would support a public access pool for quorum achievement if we do want an equal-access pathway. This would not alter the relative weightage of each delegate in any meaningful way and would still accomplish the goal of distributing VP.)

I appreciate SEEDGov taking the time to construct a revised model, and would go as far as to say, the skew should be greater toward an 80/20 split (@SEEDGov your variables participation and VP weight may be inversed on the sheet, unless Iā€™m misunderstanding the variable names.)

I am also open to @Curia 's proposed solution, though I would suggest the distribution be either:

  • The largest delegation recipients: the top 46 delegates who have voted at least once.

Or

  • The most dedicated voters: A tier model, where added vp is ascribed to 3-time voters; those who have continued participating since inception.

The present state of having voted twice seems like an arbitrary middle ground.

I would be open to expanding the total delegation amount if any of the above models donā€™t full fill the desired ā€˜x top delegates could be absent and a proposal would still passā€™ requirement.

11

We think it would be helpful to summarize a couple of the big-picture viewpoints here. We understand why the Foundation proposed doing things the way that they did as outlined in the original post. The current formula increases the adjustment linearly by row number ā€” so smaller delegates (lower current voting power) get more, and those closer to the top get less. If you have very little voting power (e.g. 2Kā€“10K), you get the highest boost (up to ~55K). If youā€™re already at ~40K or more, you get ~20K or less. @SEEDGov is offering an alternative that is a bit more nuanced with weights, but at the end of the day, delegates with ~40K voting power are still receiving ~20K-30K and delegates with <1K are still receiving ~40K-49K. The big difference is @Curiaā€˜s suggestion, saying ā€˜letā€™s just boost everyone equally.ā€™ We tend to agree with that stance.

We are attempting to cast a wide net here by setting low qualification criteria. If 46 delegates meet those criteria, we think it makes more sense to offer a blanket X amount per delegate for meeting those requirements. If the end goal is to reduce reliance on the top-2 delgates by voting power, and a static increase in VP among these 46 delegates accomplishes that, why add the complexity of scaling or weights at all?

2 Likes
12

What about just giving everyone an extra ~30k delegated SCR? Seems like that achieves the goal while keeping it simple and still respecting the trust earned by the highly delegated accounts.

This would mean about delegating about 1.2m SCR from the treasury (assuming there are about 40 qualifying delegates)

2 Likes
13

@blockful supports the direction of this proposal as a necessary short-term fix for our quorum challenges.

Weā€™d like to suggest a few refinements

Key Points:

  • Equal Distribution: We strongly agree with @Curia and @connormcmk that distributing tokens equally between all the active delegates is less error-prone, fairer, and much simpler to execute. This approach raises the bar for everyone at the same ā€œheightā€ and avoids unnecessary complexity. We still appreciate @SEEDGovā€™s efforts on improving the formula and running simulations on the spreadsheet.

  • Sybil Resistance: An attention point for both the current proposal and if itā€™s needed again in the future is sybil resistance, since anonymous delegates could actually be the same actor accumulating delegation across different profiles. This should be addressed in implementation.

  • Alternative Approach: Since the proposal threshold is 50M SCR tokens (which only the top 6 token holders have) and all past proposals were submitted by the foundation because they have the governorā€™s manager role, a possible path that would be equally effective is decreasing quorum for now. This doesnā€™t increase security risks because 50M SCR is still needed to submit a proposal, which would likely win the votes anyway.

  • Implementation Tool: The Franchiser contract could be an effective tool for managing the delegation distribution. Weā€™re interested to hear how the Foundation plans to operationalize this and are happy to support the implementation as well.

14

Thanks for the proposal and explaining in the community call. Itā€™s a good initiative to ensure the DAOā€™s ability to act, while not reducing the (already low) proposal quorum.

  • I agree with previous comments, that ā€œharmonizingā€ the voting power between all active delegates is not necessarily the best approach with representing the current delegators. I tend to support @Curiaā€™s approach there as well.
  • It will be more challenging for new delegates, to receive a meaningful voting power.
  • Itā€™s good thereā€™s a monthly/quarterly evaluation planned, in case the votable supply increases in the meantime.

Considering this will be a short time solution, Iā€™m in support of the general framework.

1 Like
15

Thank you for a clear and thoughtful proposal to boost Scrollā€™s votable supply. We fully support the overall intent, but we do not support the current sliding-scale formula; instead, we recommend distributing the 1.5 M SCR equally across all selected delegates.

ā€œMiss more than one voteā€ is binary. Illness or travel may cause accidental penalties; conversely, a delegate could cast low-effort abstain votes and still qualify. Needs adjusting.

Separately, we propose allocating three (3) of the 46 delegate allocations to ā€œemerging delegates.ā€ Several small delegates, have attended calls, commented on the forum, and stand ready to vote but have not yet had a chance to vote. A capped trial (3 of 46) adds marginal quorum power without meaningfully diluting existing active delegates. We understand it is not part of the current discussion but we believe it is worth bringing up.

By giving new contributors a measurable stake, the DAO gains fresh perspectives, reduces over-reliance on a few heavyweights, and creates a clear on-ramp for the next generation of voters.

4 Likes
16

Hi! Some further comments on the proposal:

The current VP allocation makes distribution quite challenging considering the difference between the top 2 delegates and the ones down the list. As @kevinknielsen well noted within our formula, thereā€™s not that much room for manouver given this difference and logically every delegate meeting the criteria should be considered for delegation despite itā€™s prior holdings.

As the orange line shows, this proposal does not flatten the distribution while solving quorum requirements (met by adding the 1.5M SCR to the supply). Basically, what we are doing is translating the dependency from the two biggest delegates to the following 44 delegates. Itā€™s good to keep this in mind since itā€™s precisely a temporary solution to potential quorum issues.

1600Ɨ652 141 KB

Allocation Mechanism

A flat amount seems to be the most appealing in terms of simplicity but given the flexibility of the initial criteria we think that thereā€™s room to improve the proposal on that end, echoing @DonofDaos in the sense of breaking down contributions in order to allocate VP with more consideration than a plain flat amount.

Expanding on this, the initial criteria seems reasonable for a first filter of recognizing active delegates, but insufficient for being the final call on how much to delegate. On rought calculations, there has been at least 15 Governance calls on top of the activity derived by the Co-Creation-Cycles which can be broken down on feedback, comments, specific calls, etc. That, on top of having voted on 3/3 proposals which has merit of itā€™s own as well.

We then would support allocating a flat amount to all delegates meeting the criteria but leaving some % to be allocated per a tiered -yet simple- approach that captures some of that exceptional activity. In that sense, a flat delegation of 25,000 SCR could be given equally and the remaining to be equally distributed among delegates that meet the following criteria:

1. Voted on 3/3 proposals
2. Shared rationale for 3/3 proposals
3. Attended at least one call per month in 2025

Some other criteria that could be leveraged could be:

  • Provided feedback to at least one proposal per month
  • Engaged in a Co-Creation-Cycle initiative (calls + comments)

Also, we support @Curiaā€™s consideration regarding tying delegated VP to some determined activity threshold. To which the proposed one seems reasonable if we add some activity on top of voting such as sharing voting rationales and providing feedback to at least 2 RFCs/RFIs in the quarter. The reason for this is to capture activity beyond the voting cycles since there are lots of contributions that can be made for proposals may not reach the voting stage.

17

I do support a multi-tier model. I will say that point 3 may be overly filtering. Having attended several calls myself, I can say quite certainly, there just arenā€™t enough people in the calls yet to create a wide enough net of qualifying delegations.

I believe the balance here is to establish a simple model which also isnā€™t completely devoid of any acknowledgement of existing delegations or contributions.

This is intended to be a back-of-the-napkin example, if there is interest in the general framework, we can build out the final version.

A simple three-tier model:

Tier I: Top 10 Delegates | 50K each (500,000 SCR)
Tier II: Next 25 Delegates| 35K Each (875,000 SCR)
Tier III: Next 10 Delegates | 12.5K Each (125,000 SCR)
total: 1,500,000 SCR

Top 45 delegates qualify. With a simple 10-point schema to create a leaderboard-style ranking:

Voting:
ā€“ 0 votes: disqualified
ā€“ 1 vote: 1
ā€“ 2 votes: 2
ā€“ 3 votes: 3

Existing Delegation:
ā€“ 1 Point: <10,000 SCR
ā€“ 2 Points: 10,000-30,000 SCR
ā€“ 3 Points: >30,000

Call Attendance:
ā€“ No Calls: 0
ā€“ 1 Call: 1
ā€“ 2 Calls or More: 2

Rationales / Forum Contributions:
ā€“ No Rationales / Contributions: 0
ā€“ 1 Rationale / Contribution: 1
ā€“ Multiple Rationales / Contributions: 2

Maximum points are 10, and your tier is based on your relative ranking after points are calculated.

I donā€™t think we have to get overly complex, nor do I think a blindly flat allocation makes all that much sense.

18

Thanks for the feedback everyone.

tldr

  • It seems thereā€™s most interest in doing an equal distribution.
  • Iā€™m still in favor of similar qualification criteria, but want to hear more peopleā€™s thoughts

We will dicuss this on the Wed gov calls on Apr 30

Overview

It generally seems there are two points of criticism:

  1. The distribution formula
  2. The qualification criteria

Letā€™s take these each in turn.

Distribution formula

The formula we put forth was intended to simultaneously raise overall VP while generally flattening the curve of distribution. This seems to be unfair, not taking into account the fact that the top delegates are in those positions thanks to delegations from tokenholders, and that breakdown should be respected.

I am personally leaning towards @Curiaā€™s model where we then distribute an even amount to everyone. This presents two opportunities:

  1. Giving an equal amount of VP to all delegates who qualify, or
  2. Coming up with a tiered distribution of some kind (e.g. all qualified delegates get some amount, say 10k, and then the rest is split based on meeting high criteria).

My inclination would be to keep it simple and keep it to an equal distribution as @Curia suggested and @connormcmk @bitblondy @kevinknielsen and others have expressed support for.

Thank you to the @SEEDGov team for putting your suggestion together. I am more than happy to revisit in more detail if other delegates are in favor of a weighted approach over equal distribution.

I am keen to hear what folks think about that and if anyone has objections to a simple split amongst all who qualify.

Qualification criteria

There are some arguing for a higher bar for qualifying. My main concern with this, is that this will inherently favor professional / team delegates and would disadvantage individual delegates. This concern is especially in regards to requiring more consistent call attendance.

I personally am worried that as a space, we might end up being in a situation where the top 10-20 delegates have the most VP across all protocols. This does not seem like a great outcome long term for the space. So I am personally interested in finding a way to balance recognizing those who have done more work with the fact that not everyone has the same time to give. This is also a topic that extends beyond VP and we will come back to this in terms of delegate compensation and organizational design of the DAO, amongst others.

The logic of the formula that led to 46 delegates was to strike a balance between not entrenching less than 10ish delegates as the ones who make all of the decisions at the end of the day, and not just giving more VP to those who havenā€™t put forth a reasonable amount of effort. My personal bias is to skew to a slightly larger pool without making delegates feel weā€™re delegating to too wide of a pool. We have something like 25k total delegates with at least 1 SCR delegated.

I am very open to adjusting the criteria to recognize work done. But again, if that starts going to less than 20ish delegates, Iā€™d be worried about setting the stage for a low amount of delegates to dominate the majority of VP / decision making.

If we do an even distribution, are people ok with the current qualification criteria? What are peopleā€™s reactions to the tiered models such as those brought up by @SEEDGov and @DonOfDAOs?

Other points

Lowering quorum

To clarify, the proposal threshold is at 50m while quorum is 2.1m. Given that the proposal threshold is staying at 50m and the Foundation is the only one able to meet that threshold, I personally donā€™t think that decreasing quorum introduces too much risk at this point.

If there is openness to lowering quorum, then we may not even need to do a VP distribution. We can also do both. On the calls on the 16th, there seemed to be more concern with lowering quorum then with increasing VP. Are there others who are ok with decreasing quorum for now?

Giving vp to those who havenā€™t voted yet

As stated above, I do want to be mindful of criteria not excluding too many individuals. At the same time, I donā€™t want to make those doing the most work feel as though their voice is being diluted for those who have yet to demonstrated reasonable commitment. I think criteria of at least one vote is important. While such ā€˜emerging delegatesā€™ will miss out on the VP boost, they will potentially be able to qualify for delegate comp or other programs in the future.

Personally, I would not feel comfortable pushing for lowering the criteria to drop the voting requirement. We can discuss if there are others who also think thereā€™s a benefit there.

1 Like
19

Thanks for this proposal @eugene - great to see a swift response to the issue of addressing quorum. Happy to share some points of feedback on the following key areas:

1. Qualification Criteria

For the second criteria on attendance / forum participation, we believe it will be more beneficial to adjust as follows:

  • Attended one call AND posted once on the forum through the April voting cycle

If we are proposing to delegate upwards of 10k SCR to delegates, we feel that there should be a higher participation requirement. In our view, the threshold currently being proposed is too low. Inasmuch as we want to decentralize voting power and ensure meeting quorum is not dependent on a few delegates, we should also aim to ensure that we are empowering delegates with reasonable context of and involvement in DAO activities / discussions. Else, we solve one problem (quorum) while inadvertently creating another (low quality decision making).

We should also consider adjusting the criteria to only account for delegates who meet a specific voting power threshold. This goes hand-in-hand with adjusting the distribution formula to be weighted based on existing voting power (as we point out below). The reason for this has been partially highlighted by @EthereumTGU:

Screenshot 2025-04-29 at 10.32.59
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Following the current criteria and distribution formula, delegates with as low as 6 SCR in voting power end up with >55k SCR delegation. This doesnā€™t seem to be the best approach. The criteria and distribution formula should aim to decentralize voting power, but not at the risk of undermining pre-existing community support and delegate quality.

2. Formula

We support the approach suggested by @SEEDGov below:

The distribution formula should be weighted for both participation and existing voting power.

3. Total Amount to be Delegated

Directionally, we are aligned with the total amount to be delegated (1.5m SCR). The reasoning should be to increase delegation by an amount where quorum can be met assuming average voting participation rates and non-participation by the two largest delegates.

20

If the proposal is 1.5m distributed equally across this list of delegates and if we clearly communicate that this is a temporary additional allocation until October, then I would endorse that proposal.

Anyone else also comfortable endorsing that as a simple short term solution for this May vote?
@bitblondy
@Matt H
@Matt_StableLab
@slobo.eth
@danielo
@EthereumTGU
@SEEDGov

It seems to me that given this is reversible and it evades a potential risk itā€™s not important to get too sophisticated, more important just to disagree and commit, details can be refined in a subsequent proposal.

2 Likes
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To answer your questions @Eugene

(1) Distribution Formula - given our previous comment, weā€™re in support of an equal distribution

(2) Qualification Criteria - weā€™re okay with the simple criteria laid out in the original post. If we were doing a weighted distribution, @DonOfDAOsā€™ three-tier model makes sense and it doesnā€™t add much complexity. But if weā€™re going with an equal distribution, weā€™re in favor of the original criteria and keeping things as simple as possible.

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