[RFC] Emergency Quorum Adjustment

General
1

[RFC] Emergency Quorum Adjustment

Summary

The Scroll Foundation, in coordination with the Governance Council, is proposing an emergency reduction to governance quorum from 2.1M SCR to approximately 1.6M SCR (35% of delegated voting supply). With the auto-abstain wallet proposal live, the effective quorum would be around 1.1M SCR. This adjustment is necessary to ensure governance continuity ahead of the upcoming protocol upgrade scheduled for December.

While this will not go through a standard governance vote due to its emergency nature, we are requesting feedback and endorsement from the DAO community.

Background & Current Situation

The Facts:

  • Current delegated SCR: ~4.6M
  • 56.5% of voting power is delegated to inactive delegates
  • The AA Wallet proposal barely passed quorum (+0.66%), significantly lower than the +40% average of previous months
  • We have experienced a massive decrease in delegated voting power over the past few weeks

Reasoning

We find ourselves in a challenging governance situation:

  • Immediate Risk: The AA Wallet proposal barely met quorum requirements, indicating significant risk that future proposals may fail to pass
  • Upcoming Critical Vote: We have a protocol upgrade proposal that must be passed in December for the continued health and security of the Scroll network
  • Declining Participation: The recent massive decrease in delegated VP has created uncertainty around our ability to execute critical governance decisions
  • Security Imperative: For the security and continuity of the protocol, we must ensure the DAO can pass essential proposals, particularly the upcoming protocol upgrade

Proposed Action

Emergency Quorum Adjustment:

  • Reduce quorum to 30% of delegated voting supply (~1.6M votes)
  • With the auto-abstain wallet proposal active, effective quorum would be ~1.1M SCR
  • This adjustment will be executed by the Security Council under their emergency powers as outlined in the Scroll Constitution

Constitutional Authority:

Per the Scroll Constitution, the Security Council holds “Full admin controls over the governance system” and has the authority to “change the governance process to ensure the correctness and safety of Scroll governance, in the interest of the DAO and acting in good faith.”

This situation qualifies as an emergency given:

  1. The uncertainty of being able to pass critical proposals
  2. The time-sensitive nature of the December protocol upgrade
  3. The security implications of governance paralysis

Why This Matters

Protocol upgrades are essential for:

  • Maintaining network security and performance
  • Meeting decentralization milestones (Stage 1 requirements)
  • Continuing Scroll’s growth and competitiveness in the L2 ecosystem

A governance system that cannot pass critical proposals defeats the purpose of decentralized governance. This adjustment ensures that while we work on longer-term governance improvements, the DAO can continue to function effectively.

Request for Community Feedback

While the Security Council has the authority to implement this change without a vote under emergency circumstances, we value the community’s input and are requesting your feedback and endorsement of this decision.

Please share your thoughts on:

  • Does this adjustment seem reasonable given the current circumstances?
  • Do you have concerns about the proposed quorum level?
  • What additional safeguards or considerations should be taken into account?

Next Steps

  • Community feedback period; we will open up a window for feedback until November 23rd.
  • Security Council review of community input
  • Implementation of quorum adjustment
  • Constitutional documentation of emergency action
  • Protocol upgrade proposal submission in December

This is a temporary measure to ensure governance continuity. As part of the broader governance restructuring work being led by the Governance Council, we will be proposing more comprehensive solutions including dynamic quorum mechanisms and delegate incentive structures.

8 Likes
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Unfortunate situation with active delegated power dropping off significantly lately, though not entirely unexpected. From a theoretical perspective on governance, it sort of raises the question of “what’s the point” if we can move goalposts (e.g. substantial quorum reductions) on the fly to keep the network’s governance operational. But in this case, it’s a necessary action and unlikely to be fixed within the timescale that we’d need in order to pass protocol upgrades in December. It’s also fully within the SC’s mandate, so we have no objections to moving forward. Perhaps we could consider adding some sort of stipulation to “lift” the decrease in quorum once we start consistently hitting a certain voter turnout threshold again in the new year. Looking forward to reading the proposal on dynamic quorum mechanisms.

5 Likes
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We understand with the current quorum and the recent drop in participation, many critical proposals risk failing to reach quorum.

Reducing the quorum to ~1.6M SCR helps DAO pass essential decisions in a timely manner, especially the upcoming protocol upgrade, and avoids governance paralysis.

At the same time, we recognize that this may lower the bar for approving future proposals, which could be risky.

Is there a way to differentiate quorum requirements depending on proposal type, for example, keeping quorum at 2.1M SCR for regular proposals, but using 1.6M SCR for protocol upgrades or emergency proposals?

Also clear communication with community or smaller delegates is essential to ensure they feel included and that their voices are not overlooked during this emergency adjustment.

3 Likes
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I spent some time going through the numbers here, and the situation feels a lot more urgent than it looks at first glance. When more than half of the delegated voting power is sitting with people who are no longer active, it puts the entire system in a tight corner. We already saw how close the AA Wallet proposal came to failing. If something that basic almost didn’t make quorum, then a major protocol upgrade in December could easily get stuck for reasons that have nothing to do with the quality of the proposal itself.

From my experience working across different DAOs, once quorum becomes unreachable, governance freezes in a way that is very hard to fix. The technical work keeps moving, but the actual decisions cannot be passed. That is usually where legal and constitutional safeguards are supposed to step in, so I understand why the Security Council is invoking its authority here. The Constitution gives them room to act in situations exactly like this, where the protocol’s safety is at risk and a delay could cause wider damage.

Reducing quorum temporarily feels like the most practical choice. It keeps the network moving while the governance team works on long-term fixes. My only suggestion is that we treat this like a short bridge rather than a new normal. A public note explaining how long the adjustment will last, and what signs will trigger a return to the usual quorum, would help keep trust steady.

Apart from that, I support the move. It keeps the DAO functional at a time when we cannot afford a stalled vote, and it gives everyone space to focus on the upgrade without worrying that inactive power will block progress again.

2 Likes
5

We support this emergency change to temporarily educe quorum. That said, quorum reduction is a slippery slope. Therefore we look forward to the Governance Council bringing more comprehensive and long-term solutions to the DAO.

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I’m not in favour of permanently lowering the quorum. At the current SCR price, a quorum of 1.6 million SCR equals roughly $160,000, which raises security concerns.

Also, this issue has been eminent for many months, with this org missing out on exploring alternative solutions such as:

  • Topping up the temporary auto-abstain wallet.
    After reviewing the participation data (thanks @SEEDGov for preparing), it was very clear that quorum would be challenging. Still, feedback was that we should just wait and see, which makes the “emergency” framing of this proposal hard to understand.
  • Exploring treasury delegations to active delegates, similar to what was done for participants in the delegate program.
  • Most importantly, promoting delegations.
    This was actually the primary plan when we first introduced the auto-abstain wallet, also with regard to the recent token-unlock. It would also send a positive signal that Scroll remains committed to the DAO, which is still in question.

In addition, the “declining participation” issue is largely self-inflicted by leadership’s decision to pause governance and reduce investment in the DAO. Adjusting the quorum may be the easiest short-term fix, but it is likely the worst option for the long-term health of governance here.

4 Likes
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Hello everyone,

Thanks for commenting and providing feedback.

  1. On security concerns and lowering quorum
    Even if quorum is lowered, the protocol is still well protected today:
    • A proposal still requires 50M SCR (~$5M USD) and a verified delegate to upload it
    • Only the Foundation can currently upload proposals through the governor contract
    • Foundation proposals will not put protocol security at risk
    • There is no timelock contract yet, so no funds are exposed to automatic execution

At this moment, the real risk is not a governance attack but the possibility of the protocol upgrade failing due to low participation. Ensuring that the upgrade passes is the highest priority.

  1. Auto-abstain wallet learnings
    The auto-abstain proposal had two clear purposes:
    • Maintaining quorum as delegate activity declined
    • Measuring voting behavior during a slowdown

The proposal passed, but with a very small margin. That signals that passing future proposals will become increasingly difficult if participation keeps dropping. This is why a temporary adjustment can help keep governance functional.

  1. Long-term improvements already planned
    As part of the new DAO architecture, we have clear plans to:
    • Increase delegation
    • Reduce inactive delegated voting power, which is currently one of the main issues
    • Introduce governance mechanisms where approval thresholds depend on proposal importance and risk

This means the quorum change is not a permanent solution. It is a bridge until the updated system is in place.

With all of the above in mind, we are moving forward in bringing this update to the Security Council for evaluation. If approved, we should expect the quorum to be adjusted before the next voting cycle. Will keep this thread updated with the outcomes of the conversation with the security council.

Transitions naturally come with adjustments and short term band-aid solutions. We are working closely with the community to make this shift thoughtful and smooth. Scroll DAO Day was a very productive session. I am waiting on the recordings to share a full summary of updates here on the forum. We will also start more active discussions next week, beginning with how the new councils should be structured.

2 Likes
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As a verified delegate I endorse this unfortunately necessity proposal for vote. The data regarding the Auto-Abstain Wallet proposal (passing by only 0.66%) is a clear warning sign, and we cannot in good faith, gamble with being unable to pass with a DAO vote the upcoming December Protocol Upgrade.

While I endorse the action, I have concerns about the precedent and the resulting governance parameters:

1. With the target reduced to ~1.6M SCR and the AA Wallet contributing ~0.5M SCR, the effective organic voting power required to pass a proposal drops to ~1.1M SCR.

  • This is an historically low barrier for Scroll governance.

  • Question: Can the Foundation confirm if this reduced quorum will apply only until the December Protocol Upgrade is ratified, or is this the new standard for all proposals (including Treasury spend) for the foreseeable future, or at least until the new Constitution in January 2026?

“Temporary” measures have a tendency to become permanent due to convenience. I would like to see a specific Review Date (e.g., 3 or 6 months from now) or a specific metric (e.g., “once active delegated VP returns to X amount”) that triggers a mandatory review of this quorum setting.

1 Like
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Scroll is on a spiral toward non-existence and continues to play governance theater as the solution. Quorum serves a security purpose. Reducing the barrier to governance attack to $100,000 is not a reasonable solution. The proposed mediation of this risk, effectively being that “Scroll is centralized anyway,” calls into question the relevance of Scroll DAO governance more categorically. The answer to the issue of participation is not to raise guaranteed abstentions and lower quorum requirements, pinching honest decentralized governance from both ends.

The DAO has three honest choices:

  1. Address the core issue instead of creating weak band-aid solutions
  2. Recognize that the DAO is a facade for team decision-making and look to non-governance token utility
  3. LARP community governance and continue to let the market expose the reality of the situation

IF the first approach is where the DAO commits, the answer is to make governance participation compelling. This is done by building real solutions, not gaming the levers of the voting system (abstain, quorum, etc…). Scroll leadership has done little to embrace community builder solutions, nor to encourage actual delegations and community participation. EH suggested economic incentive, the most natural conclusion in crypto: Proposal: Increase Votable Supply with Incentivized Delegation Tracking (IDTs) , which fell on deaf ears. But, beyond EH, there are likely many builders who may have real, durable answers to the core issues the DAO faces.

However, I fear that leadership will continue the failing approach and host discussions on how AI ‘makes us feel’ rather than engage teams to build real solutions, ignore build-based solutions, and hamstring the mechanisms of community governance instead of building robust architectures that bolster it.

PS: If anything, a leaner model to allocate toward building solutions should be passed, and that is it. All else should remain the same. The fact that the DAO is struggling to ratify proposals is a feature not a bug. It is the evolutionary pressure demanding that DAO change course. Ignoring this, or worse yet, avoiding it all altogether, will continue the failing arc to zero, which is already in motion.

6 Likes
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Thanks everyone for the feedback so far. I want to clarify a few points about the emergency quorum adjustment and the context behind it.

The change was reviewed and approved by a majority of the Security Council. The quorum was temporarily lowered to 1.6M VP, and this adjustment is not intended to be permanent. It is designed specifically for this voting cycle while we navigate a unique short-term situation.

Over the past few days, we saw a significant influx of new delegated VP concentrated among a few delegates. If those delegates remain active, the original quorum will no longer be an issue in the near term. Because of this, the temporary reduction simply prevents us from failing to pass critical proposals due to quorum mechanics rather than lack of support. The approval threshold itself remains unchanged, so the security profile of the protocol was never at risk.

The reason this temporary measure makes sense is that we are already working toward a deeper redesign of governance for 2026. In the new DAO structure, we expect to introduce mechanisms that directly address this problem in a more robust and long-term way, including:

• Dynamic quorum models
• Stronger incentives for active delegation
• Different voting mechanisms depending on proposal type to ensure quorum does not unintentionally block governance

Our goal is always to maintain a governance process that protects the protocol while enabling necessary upgrades to move forward. This quorum adjustment was made with that principle in mind.

We hope the DAO can continue supporting us as we work toward the best outcomes for Scroll and the broader community.

As a reminder, the upcoming Co-Creation Sprint will be the main space where these structural improvements and design optimizations will be discussed in detail as we plan ahead for 2026. We invite everyone to participate and help shape the next evolution of Scroll governance.

5 Likes