The current proposal seeks to extend the Auto-Abstaining wallet up until March 2026
Motivation
Voted in June 2025, the Auto-Abstaining wallet was rolled out in order to provide a temporary solution to facilitate quorum without lowering the voting threshold. So far, it has voted in 8 proposals, contributing a total of 4M SCR in voting power.
In that sense, its participation has been key in order to secure quorum and have effective votings over the past 3 voting cycles. Still standing as a temporary solution, this 5 month extension is presented as a safeguard of the mechanism in case it is required.
Execution
Operational
No operational changes are foreseen for this extension, keeping the auto-abstaining criteria for any upcoming votes. If approved, the 500,000 SCR shall remain within the wallet up until March 2026.
Personnel and resources
No personnel and resources changes are expected. The wallet shall remain within Foundation management and vote Abstain upon any live proposal.
Financial
No disbursements are contemplated within the proposal.
Evaluation
Since the implementation of the Auto-Abstaining wallet all of the submitted proposals have reached quorum. Out of the 8 participations, 5 proposals wouldnāt have reached quorum if it wasnāt for the voting power provided by the wallet, providing a strong case for keeping the mechanism for an additional period of time.
Conclusion
As governance evolves within Scroll, thereās still a practical need of ensuring that quorum can be reached and that participation gets effectively channeled through the voting cycles.
I support extending the Auto-Abstaining wallet given current participation levels; itās clearly serving itās purpose. However, this extension should consider:
Participation tracking: Should we track participation metrics over the duration? Visibility into whether active voting power and delegate recruitment are improving could be helpful.
Sunset criteria: Under what conditions would this wallet no longer be needed? Maybe we can define a target participation threshold that would trigger retirement, so temporary measures donāt become permanent.
We support the Auto-Abstaining Wallet extension proposal.
As seen in past votes, this alternative works and helps to keep the voting process moving forward.
On the other hand, we believe it is important to find ways to get delegates to feel involved and vote consciously so that eventually the Auto-Abstaining Wallet will no longer be necessary to achieve quorum.
We support the extension of the Auto-Abstaining Wallet, as it serves as an important safeguard while Scroll DAO continues to evolve. However, we still see this as a temporary solution. It would be valuable to initiate a parallel discussion focused on developing a more sustainable, long-term approach, one that is proactive rather than reactive.
The core issue lies in low participation rate and the frequent failure to reach quorum, As noted in the proposal, out of the 8 proposals since its implementation, 5 would have failed to reach quorum without the Auto-Abstaining Wallet. The key question is how we can increase the active votable supply. We believe proposals like Incentivized Delegation Tracking (IDTs), which align delegation with active participants, could effectively address this challenge. Although IDTs may require initial bootstrapping from the treasury, developing an alternative revenue source to sustain the āyieldsā will be crucial for attracting more SCR delegators and, ultimately, increasing the votable supply.
We endorse the use of an auto-abstain wallet as a temporary solution until March 2026 to reach quorum. That said, we strongly encourage the DAO to start working on a longer term solution, whether that is treasury delegation or something else that will align the interests of active governance participants.
I support this proposal for the the extension of the auto-abstain wallet until March 2026, however, as itās already been recognized by other delegates, that this is very temporary solution to a problem that needs to be addressed as noted by @Curia , that even during the use of the A-A wallet for the last 8 proposals that without it, we would have not met quorum. This will only become more obvious and enhanced now with the change to this Optimistic governance model, and therefore, @Sov comments about tracking and sunsetting are needed to validate and identify the bigger issue.
I support this extension, the Auto-Abstaining Wallet has played an important role in keeping quorum stable and governance active. Itās a simple but effective safeguard thatās clearly working.
However, itād be good to know if thereās a plan for what happens after March 2026. Are we moving toward a more community-based participation model, or refining this system further?
Overall, this feels like a smart move that keeps things steady while Scroll continues to strengthen its governance process.
Hi everyone! Writing in behalf of the Governance Council.
Appreciate all of the feedback, comments and support!
Hereās an updated Dune regarding participation. There youāll find Organic vs AAW Voting Power contributions, among some other governance metrics. As mentioned, in several cases, the contributions from the AAW have been the turning point of the proposal reaching quorum or not, by contributing ~ 25% VP into the quorum in those specific proposals. In some others, that has not been the case, and quorum has indeed been reached organically, but certainly the proposal has met its purpose and has gained more relevance within the last proposals, where organic participation has shown a decline.
Weāll keep monitoring participation within the GC and understanding this new landscape while working towards solutions that, as @Sov mentions, will aim to avoid temporary solutions to become permanent. This is certainly a discussion that touches on several points, so weāre excited to hear about delegatesā inputs and feedback once we advance a bit on the GC items listed.
In the meantime, deciding to keep the AAW for an additional period of time will give a safeguard of governance being up, running and secure. Also, we consider the outcome of this proposal to be particularly insightful given the changes of these past months.
Thanks for the proposal and the Dune Dashboard, looks really cool.
Given the development of the votable supply, the auto-abstain mechanism is probably even more important now to help reach quorum. Did you verify that the 500k SCR allocation will be sufficient?
The dashboard shows a ~40% active delegates and ~5,2mio SCR votable supply.
I agree with @Sov and @Curia that there should be clear sunset criteria and a discussion about future options. It would also be valuable to have some communication or marketing effort around delegatingāespecially for graduates of the delegate accelerator program.
From a process perspective, since the Foundation has announced it will not endorse new proposals for the foreseeable future, is this intended to be an exception?
Based on prior votings the current VP allocation should be enough but again, this proposal will also be a temp check of current participation. Based on the outcome weāll have a better sense of where do we stand today in terms on VP contributing to quorum. We think this is a better approach than just topping up the wallet with i.e 1M SCR and increasing the reliance which will definitely can have undesired effects in the medium-term.
We also agree with the sunset criteria and itāll definitely outlined once thereās further clarity on the items currently been worked on by the GC and to be shared with the DAO. Regarding the D/Acc, the delegations set for participants has been calculated and should be executed soon, hopefully tractioning further delegations.
The focus was put on not engaging with long-term commitments that can have operational or financial impact so this can be thought of exception acting as a safeguard of current governance rails.
I agree that this is the best solution in the near term, and I echo the other delegates who have mentioned that we need to come up with an alternative solution. One conversation that could be ārevivedā is the treasury delegation to active delegates, so this balance is effectively used to assess the proposals and enhance them, rather than just providing a quorum to it.
