There’s nothing like a constitution to clearly set the baseline framework for DAO operations. We are super excited to see this being put into place in Scroll DAO and we appreciate the efforts of @Eugene and team for the work that has gone into this. It’s important to get these building blocks right from inception as it lays the groundwork for future developments. We only have a few suggestions and questions that we would like to highlight.
Voting Process
- We suggest modifying the proposal to require an endorsement from the foundation for progression to voting rather than making progression to voting a discretionary power of the foundation. The foundation will clearly be playing a key role in governance (in keeping with the objective of progressive decentralization), and structuring the voting process this way seems less arbitrary than in its current form. DAO contributors should simply understand that they need an endorsement from 3 delegates + the foundation to automatically progress to voting instead of being subjected to an added layer of uncertainty.
- We also propose inserting a timeframe or window within which delegates and the foundation are required to signal their endorsement for a proposal. This will ensure that contributors are not arbitrarily left in the dark as to the status of their proposal and know when to move on or redirect effort. This window could be something like “within X days of the next voting cycle.”
- We also think it’s important to define in the constitution what / how voting cycles are determined. If this has already been defined elsewhere on the forum, it might be sufficient to include language that incorporates it in the constitution or, alternatively, directly include it in the constitution. This will ensure predictability for DAO operations and push contributors to kickoff discussions or proposals in alignment with voting cycles.
Quorum
We are quite curious about what informed the decision on the quorum for proposals. Why 0.21% of the total supply? This seems substantially lower than the typical quorum requirements across DAOs which ranges from anywhere between 1-3% of the total supply. As it stands, the votable token supply (~6.12M SCR) is less than 1% of the total supply, so understandably it’s impracticable to follow the convention. However, it would be great to get insight into the design choices informing this proposed figure. Moreover, increasing and dispersing the votable supply of tokens is something the DAO pay attention to in the near future, as a way of safeguarding the DAO from governance vulnerabilities which are easier to exploit at this early stage. But this is perhaps a discussion for another day.