Scroll DAO Monthly Update — September, 2026

[Jane]

This month, we discussed Scroll’s consumer AI strategy, how Compass fits into that direction, and what the proposed changes could mean for the chain, SCR, USX, and the DAO.

The chain transition and migration plans outlined below are still under discussion and will require further governance review.

1. Background

Our 2026 priorities are to build products that reach users directly and drive more on-chain activity.

We first explored AI as a way to improve operations, marketing, and business development. Through that work, we saw a larger opportunity in consumer-facing products. Compass is the first product to put this direction into practice, supported by an API that routes user requests to suitable AI models.

Delegates asked why AI is the right focus and whether Scroll should prioritize RWA instead. We see potential in RWA, but our current focus is on problems the team has experienced first-hand and can address with its existing capabilities.

2. Compass: App and API

Compass App

Previously called PocketPal, Compass is an iOS app for digital nomads and travelers. It combines offline AI agents, eSIM purchases, and VPN services to help users navigate unfamiliar places and stay connected.

The app is available on the App Store, and the team is currently promoting it through Instagram.

Compass API

Alongside the app, the team is developing an API that routes everyday tasks to suitable AI models at a lower cost. The planned design includes ZK-based verification and USX for payment settlement.

Delegates asked how the API would compete with established services such as OpenRouter. We discussed our proprietary video models and efforts to source lower-cost models with comparable quality.

3. Proposed Chain and Token Changes

To support this direction, the team outlined a proposed transition to a permissioned chain and the deployment of SCR and USX contracts on Ethereum mainnet. The mainnet deployment is intended to maintain transparency and liquidity as the role of the chain evolves.

The intended token roles are:

• SCR: Governance token for both the chain following the proposed transition and USX.

• USX: Payment asset within Compass and a yield-generating stablecoin.

SCR holders would govern USX parameters, including how yield is distributed among users, stakers, and the protocol.

The indicative timeline discussed was:

• Mid-November–December 2026: Deploy SCR and USX contracts on Ethereum mainnet.

• By the end of 2026: Seek a governance vote on the proposed transition to a permissioned chain.

• Early 2027: Target the chain transition, with migration details and timing subject to further review.

These dates are not final. Delegates stressed that the migration will require careful planning and execution.

4. The DAO’s Role

The proposed changes raise a broader question: what should the DAO be responsible for as Scroll’s direction evolves?

Delegates pointed to limited recent proposal activity and asked how the new direction relates to earlier decentralization plans. The DAO’s future structure is still being developed, and we are asking delegates to help define its scope and decision-making responsibilities.

A delegate suggested that the DAO could retain a role through periodic or optimistic voting, with SCR serving as the governance token for both the chain and USX. The distribution of USX yield was discussed as one concrete area for governance.

5. Next Steps

Before the October call, the team will run an anonymous survey on DAO roles and governance responsibilities. The results will inform a draft DAO structure proposal for discussion at the next call.

The team will also propose a new monthly call time to make participation easier across regions.

Please share your views on the DAO’s future role and which decisions should go through governance.

[alexsotodigital]

Hey @Jane. GM.

After watching the call and reading the recap, I think I can articulate my concern more precisely.

Before we design new delegate roles or governance processes, I think we first need to define the governance domain itself.

You mentioned during the call that “everything has to go through your decision / your vote.” Historically, that has not really been the case (and I don’t necessarily think it should be)…

Foundation/Labs needs room to operate, but then we need a clear boundary: what can Foundation/Labs decide autonomously, and what decisions are actually reserved for SCR governance?

Without that distinction, asking delegates to ‘help design the DAO’ puts us in a difficult loop. We can propose structures, roles, and processes (and some of us have done so before through things like The Case for Holacracy as a Governance Model for Scroll, the Support Squad pilot, the DCP discussion around delegate roles, etc.) but unless there is clarity about the authority those structures would actually have, we are designing mechanisms before knowing what they are supposed to govern.

I also think there is a communication and authority gap between delegates and Foundation/Labs that needs to be addressed. I appreciate you (@Jane) taking a more active role as a bridge, but right now I honestly don’t know who delegates are supposed to engage with when a question requires an actual strategic commitment from Scroll. I cannot even tag Raza on the forum, and I am not clear on who has the authority to say: “Yes, Foundation/Labs commits to this.”

If the people determining Scroll’s strategic direction are not part of the governance conversation, it is difficult to know whether these monthly calls are

1. spaces for genuine institutional co-design
   or
2. spaces where delegates brainstorm and provide feedback that Foundation/Labs can later choose whether or not to use.

Both can be useful, but they are very different relationships.

For example, Raza publicly posted “I killed Open Campus” and explained the shift by saying that scroll had spent years building distribution for other founders and that “now we’re building it for ourselves” around something the team controls end-to-end. Scroll’s account amplified that direction as a shift toward “building around your own” incentives.

If something that was presented as an ecosystem initiative could disappear or be fundamentally repurposed when the strategic thesis changed, then that makes it especially important to understand what in the new Scroll is actually durable beyond the current decisions of Raza/Foundation/Labs, and what can be created, changed, rebranded, or sunset unilaterally.

If the new Scroll can function successfully as a company building Compass + AI infrastructure, why does it need a DAO?

For example, saying that the DAO could decide how USX yield is distributed may be a perfectly reasonable governance domain… but why is decentralizing that decision valuable compared with having the USX team define the policy?

This changes what being a ‘delegate’ means.

If the emerging model is closer to a company surrounded by a network of trusted, experienced contributors, that could also be legitimate. Delegates could potentially function as a kind of verified talent pool (another initiative that fell through) that can take on scoped projects when Foundation/Labs needs governance research, ecosystem work, analytics, facilitation, communications, etc. But if that is the model, the relationship should be explicit: what work is needed, who commissions it, what authority comes with it, and how is it compensated?

I am hesitant to enter another open-ended process where delegates are asked to “help figure out the DAO” without clarity on whether Foundation/Labs wants feedback, actual governance, or professional contributor work; and without knowing what commitment exists on the other side.

So before another governance design exercise, these are the questions I would most like Foundation/Labs to answer

• What exactly belongs to the DAO’s governance domain?
• What can Foundation/Labs decide, change, or sunset without DAO approval?
• When the DAO votes, is that decision binding on Foundation/Labs or ultimately advisory?
• Who has the authority to make commitments on behalf of Foundation/Labs in these conversations, and how can delegates communicate directly with them?
• What specific contribution is expected from delegates beyond voting, and how will substantial contributor work be commissioned and compensated?

In a few words, I worry we will once again spend significant community time designing a governance system without knowing whether the organization behind Scroll is actually committed to operating within it.

Peace out