My comments have been expressed elsewhere including on a couple community calls but I would reiterate a few points.
Delegation from the treasury is no different than simply lower quorum by that same amount. So what are the reasons against lowering quorum?
First, it sets a bad precedent. If quorum can be easily changed, it fails to serve as a meaningful security measure in the first place. If a proposal fails to meet quorum, we lower quorum, and then try again, this entirely defeats the point of quorum.
Second, this is a temporary bandaid for a larger systemic problem. If the votable supply continues to decrease, which we have just seen a decrease of over 500k SCR, what then? Do we lower quorum further or delegate more from the treasury? Anticipating this cycle, we should seek to instead find some way of enticing actual token holders to delegate their tokens. This further serves as an accountability front for those delegates as they have to express the interests of their token holders, unlike with treasury delegations. Event Horizon has proposed an alternative solution that isn’t temporary, brings sidelined tokens into governance, rewards active delegates, offers yield to SCR token holders, and leverages the stickiness of delegation to be a durable solution.
I do, however, like the idea of rewarding active delegates in some way. A DIP program seems like a better way of reaching these aims. I also want to express appreciation for the diligence and level of detail put into the above proposal. It’s a step in the right direction even if the final implementation doesn’t solve the root issue as far as I can tell.