# Proposal: Ecosystem Growth Council Formation **URL:** \ **Category:** Ecosystem Growth\ **Tags:** growth, councils\ **Created:** [May 15, 2025, 9:00pm UTC](https://forum.scroll.io/t/proposal-ecosystem-growth-council-formation/718 "2025-05-15T21:00:32Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 15
**Author:** ![Chris\_Areta](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex002/user_avatar/forum.scroll.io/chris_areta/32/184_2.png) [@Chris\_Areta](https://forum.scroll.io/u/Chris_Areta)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2025, 11:55am UTC](https://forum.scroll.io/t/proposal-ecosystem-growth-council-formation/718/15 "2025-05-23T11:55:06Z")
Thanks @eugene for this proposal. We’re excited about the idea of a potential Ecosystem Growth Council to steer growth programs and initiatives within the DAO. > [@eugene](#): > > Once formed, the EGC would review the [responses to the RFI](https://forum.scroll.io/c/eco-growth/rfi-apr-2025/11) and would decide on clear next steps from there Would the EGC also be empowered to propose fresh ideas / initiatives beyond those in the existing RFI responses? > [@eugene](#): > > Once votes conclude, a 3 business day veto window kicks in. During this time, delegates are able to call for a veto on a EGC decision if they see fit. +1 to this governance structure. We believe this is strikes the right balance between operational efficiency and decentralized decision making. This is a more streamlined approach as opposed to having the DAO vote on all EGC-recommended programs from the get-go. Eigenlayer’s DAO adopts a similar governance structure (more [here](https://open.substack.com/pub/aretaonchain/p/eigengov-council-based-governance?r=5bb8v7&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false)), where (s)elected councils oversee specific focus areas (incl., grants, protocol, incentives and governance) and token holders retain veto rights through voting, as a power-checking mechanism without sacrificing efficiency. > [@eugene](#): > > Once votes conclude, a 3 business day veto window kicks in. During this time, delegates are able to call for a veto on a EGC decision if they see fit. It might be helpful to clarify that the veto window begins upon the EGC’s formal publication of its decision to the forum and not when the EGC’s vote concludes. > [@eugene](#): > > requesting an offchain vote to confirm a veto Given Scroll has only operated with on-chain voting, and perhaps as part of a broader constitutional discussion, what would be the duration of off-chain votes? Will it be the same as with on-chain votes? Currently, the Scroll DAO constitution does not envisage off-chain voting ([1](https://gov.scroll.io/proposals/1247605826408291988137032745109360457689615424039552986782425232092434978933), [2](https://scroll.io/gov-docs/content/governance-process)). > [@eugene](#): > > The council would need a 4/7 vote to pass any proposal that uses less than 25% of the total budget, and a 6/7 to pass any proposal that would use more than 25% of the budget To increase transparency, the forum post announcing the EGC’s decision should include a brief voting rationale from each member. This fosters alignment with token holders and reduces veto attempts due to unclear reasoning. As a suggestion, a dedicated Snapshot space for the EGC (and future councils) could streamline this by combining voting and rationale publication. > [@eugene](#): > > At least 5 separate comments from active delegates requesting the vote would be needed to iniate the veto. Rather than “active delegates” which is hard to define, we suggest limiting this to the same category of delegates who are eligible to signal proposals. This seems consistent. > [@eugene](#): > > - the proposal is reworked and put forth to the EGC for a new vote. This can be done once. If that vote is vetoed again, then > - the proposal would need to put to a full DAO vote. We think the last step of putting the proposal to a full DAO vote adds unnecessary length to the process and is redundant. If a proposal has been vetoed twice by delegates following the proposed process, then that is sufficient signal that the DAO should not move forward with it. We don’t see a need of adding an extra third step requiring the same delegates to vote on something they’ve already twice voted on. As a final minor suggestion we believe the proposal can benefit from some formatting improvements to clearly outline key pieces of information and make them stand out. We suggest restructuring the Operational section to include the following two subsections: - Responsibilities of the GRC - Veto Process --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.scroll.io/t/proposal-ecosystem-growth-council-formation/718)._