# DonOfDAOs Delegate Thread **URL:** \ **Category:** Delegates\ **Tags:** delegates\ **Created:** [April 17, 2025, 4:59pm UTC](https://forum.scroll.io/t/donofdaos-delegate-thread/611 "2025-04-17T16:59:58Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 2
**Author:** ![DonOfDAOs](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex002/user_avatar/forum.scroll.io/donofdaos/32/218_2.png) [@DonOfDAOs](https://forum.scroll.io/u/DonOfDAOs)\ **Post date:** [April 24, 2025, 11:37pm UTC](https://forum.scroll.io/t/donofdaos-delegate-thread/611/2 "2025-04-24T23:37:33Z")
Initial Feedback on: [Proposal: Scroll DAO Delegate Accelerator Proposal - #14 by DonOfDAOs](https://forum.scroll.io/t/proposal-scroll-dao-delegate-accelerator-proposal/571/14) > [@Proposal: Scroll DAO Delegate Accelerator Proposal](https://forum.scroll.io/t/proposal-scroll-dao-delegate-accelerator-proposal/571/11): > > In order to increase the chances of retention and consistent engagement, we need to have incentives for trainees, this is a key feature of running a program in our ecosystem, comparable programs at Optimism leverage incentives to keep trainees engaged. I believe this is the exact issue though, and why so many programs (correct me if I’m mistaken) fail to drive durable delegates for their respective ecosystems. If a user must be paid to join in the first place or to be retained _during_ the program, then how does one expect them to stay unpaid _after_ the program? I suppose one argument could be that the program is more intense than being a standard delegate, so maybe there’s a drop off in time commitment? But, ultimately, I think one of the greatest challenges program creators face in these kinds of initiatives is actually the pre-program, top-of-funnel portion. The finding of highly motivated aspiring delegates. This would require outreach and marketing. I’d be more supportive of distributing the incentive budget items toward pre-program methods of finding motivated users. This is also something EH would be happy to support in as this top-of-funnel is also very important to us. Initial Feedback on: [Votable Supply Adjustment Proposal](https://forum.scroll.io/t/votable-supply-adjustment-proposal/628) I greatly respect and appreciate the Scroll team for putting this together and getting this discussion started. It is much needed. That said, I’m not in favor of a model which in effect heavily punishes the largest delegates. It seems misaligned that delegates who have earned the least delegations on market, are rewarded with 5 times the voting power as those delegates who received the most delegations on market. In practice, the largest delegates would have benefitted far more by having _not_ garnered any delegation to date, than to have even tried. ex. a delegate with 6.09 SCR is earning 55,217 in delegated VP, while delegates with between 510,000 SCR and 70,000 SCR earn less than 15,000. (Though, I would support a public access pool for quorum achievement if we do want an equal-access pathway. This would not alter the relative weightage of each delegate in any meaningful way and would still accomplish the goal of distributing VP.) > [@Votable Supply Adjustment Proposal](https://forum.scroll.io/t/votable-supply-adjustment-proposal/628/8): > > **To conclude** , we ran a [quick mock test](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12Nc7NZE2JY-nC3FVgY1nFJWSnvf9OYKkMhEa8ZJo7z4/edit?gid=1294236141#gid=1294236141) in order to leverage this new formula. In case you want to experiment feel free to fork the doc, follow the instructions and play around if you want to but the core idea is to ignite a conversation regarding what activity/tasks we value as Scroll delegates and how we can factor those in this initiative which can surely be refined from the original one. I appreciate SEEDGov taking the time to construct a revised model, and would go as far as to say, the skew should be greater toward an 80/20 split (@SEEDGov your variables participation and VP weight may be inversed on the sheet, unless I’m misunderstanding the variable names.) If the north star metric behind this was to expand the minimum threshold of non-participation from the bunch which would bar quorum, I would advocate increasing the total delegation amount to be distributed while maintaining greater weighting on existing delegation size. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.scroll.io/t/donofdaos-delegate-thread/611)._